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the European Union and the 
New Trade Agenda
Annmarie Elijah, Donald Kenyon, Karen Hussey 
and Pierre van der Eng
This book examines issues relating to the prospective trade agreement 
between Australia and the European Union (EU). It takes the position 
that robust, informed debate about this potential agreement is timely 
and useful. As the title of the book suggests, the aim is to situate the debate 
in a rapidly changing international context. The collection has its origins 
in an important conference held at The Australian National University 
(ANU) Centre for European Studies in November 2013. The conference 
proceedings took place in an atmosphere of reflection about whether 
a trade deal between Australia and the EU would ever come to pass, with 
participants arguing the case for its consideration. It is a mark of the 
changing relationship that at the time of writing the preliminary scoping 
for this agreement is underway.
The European Commission’s recently released trade policy strategy, 
Trade  for All, commits the Commission to requesting authorisation to 
negotiate free trade agreements (FTAs) with Australia and New Zealand 
(European Commission 2015a: 32). In November 2015, Prime Minister 
Malcolm Turnbull together with European Commission President Jean-
Claude Juncker and European Council President Donald Tusk agreed 
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to work towards the launch of ‘comprehensive’ trade negotiations, 
in a context of deepening the Australia–EU relationship (European 
Commission 2015b). These are steps in a process that will be slow to 
unfold; nevertheless, the debate about this agreement—and indeed the 
Australia–EU relationship at the centre of it—has moved on.
Historically, the path of the Australia–EU economic relationship has 
not run smoothly. The bilateral relationship is littered with examples of 
trade politics souring the broader terms. The difficulties have been well 
documented (see Benvenuti 2008; Kenyon & Lee 2006; Elijah 2004; 
Murray, Elijah & O’Brien 2002) and it is not the purpose of this book to 
reiterate them, but it is for these reasons that even a decade ago the notion 
of a trade agreement seemed remote. For Australian policy makers the 
difficulties appeared insurmountable. For European policy makers there 
would have been no obvious rationale for undertaking negotiations with 
Australia. What then has changed?
Australia and the EU: From adversaries 
to allies
The common agricultural policy (CAP) was a major problem in Australia–
EU trade relations through to the end of the 1980s. Australia also 
maintained a somewhat closed and protected (especially on manufactures 
and services) economy up to the mid-1980s. CAP reforms and the 
creation of the EU single market in the 1990s, together with domestic 
economic reforms in Australia from the mid-1980s, have changed these 
fundamental issues (Kenyon 2012: 34–39). Reform of the CAP enshrined 
in the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, especially disciplining 
the future use of export subsidies, took much of the heat out of the 
decades-long dispute between Australia and the EU over agricultural 
trade policy (WTO 1994). Former Trade Minister Mark Vaile was able 
to declare in 2002 that ‘there was more that united than divided Australia 
and the EU’ on trade policy issues (Vaile 2002).
Australia and the EU emerged from the Uruguay Round in 1994 with 
a much greater level of agreement over future reform to the global trading 
system than at the beginning of the negotiations in 1986. The economic 
policy reforms in both Australia and the EU from the mid-1980s onwards 
have made them strong allies in the push for greater trade liberalisation 
3
1 . INTRODUCTION
on manufactures and services trade and in strengthening multilateral 
rules aimed at reinforcing the World Trade Organization (WTO) as the 
mainstay of an open global trading system.
These developments delivered a significant change for the better in the 
bilateral relationship after a long period of conflict. Australia and the 
EU became strong and active proponents of a new round of WTO trade 
negotiations from the beginning of the 21st century. The aim was to 
pursue the unfinished business of the Uruguay Round on the liberalisation 
of agricultural, manufactures and services trade—the so-called ‘inbuilt 
agenda’ for future negotiations foreshadowed at the end of the Uruguay 
Round—to further develop the new rules agreed during the Uruguay 
Round on services and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) more generally and to 
extend the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) rules into 
new areas. As this volume will show, the EU was particularly active in 
promoting the development of new WTO disciplines; for example, trade 
and the environment, labour standards, investment, competition policy 
and trade facilitation through the simplification of customs procedures. 
Young and Peterson refer to the EU as ‘the most aggressive and persistent 
advocate of a broader international trade agenda’ (2006: 796).
When the Doha negotiations were finally launched in 2001, Australia and 
the EU both pursued the new multilateral trade round as a top priority 
trade policy objective (Lamy 2002). The EU declared a moratorium (1999) 
on further bilateral trade negotiations in order to accord priority to the 
WTO negotiations. Yet, despite more than a decade of sustained effort, 
the Doha negotiations have not progressed to a successful conclusion. 
There are a number of reasons for this.1 These include ongoing differences 
on the depth of cuts to domestic subsidy levels for agriculture in the 
developed world and the magnitude of further cuts to industrial tariffs 
among developing countries. Linking these key, unresolved issues in the 
negotiations has not assisted their resolution.
Fuelled in part by the limited success in advancing the multilateral trade 
agenda through the Doha negotiations, the EU signalled a new direction 
in trade policy with its Global Europe strategy (2006). The EU identified 
key markets in Asia (Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 
South Korea and Mercosur) as targets for ‘new generation’ trade 
1  For an in-depth discussion of the failure of the Doha Round and its significance, see Muzaka and 
Bishop (2015). 
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agreements aimed at liberalising trade beyond what was possible in the 
WTO; particularly, overcoming ‘behind-the-border’ barriers impacting 
on services, standards, investment, public procurement and competition 
policy problems. Recognising the limitations of current WTO rules, the 
EU argued in 2006 in Global Europe that trade agreements can go ‘further 
and faster in promoting openness and integration … preparing the ground 
for the next level of multilateral liberalisation’ (European Commission 
2006: 5–8). Since 2006, the EU has concluded agreements with South 
Korea, Singapore, Vietnam and Canada, and is now negotiating with 
Japan. The status of the proposed agreement with the United States of 
America (USA), the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP), is unclear.
Australian trade policy from the beginning of the 21st century has 
followed a similar trajectory. Beginning in 2003, trade agreements with 
an increasing emphasis on NTBs as well as tariffs have been concluded 
with Singapore, Chile, Thailand, USA, ASEAN (together with New 
Zealand), Malaysia and, in 2014, Korea, Japan and China. Australia is 
now seeking to conclude trade negotiations with India. Notwithstanding 
these bilateral  and regional agreements, the Australian Government 
continues to accord primacy to the WTO and the multilateral agenda 
(DFAT 2015).
The new trade agenda
The term ‘new trade agenda’—sometimes referred to as the ‘deep trade 
agenda’—is shorthand for the changed nature of international trade, 
‘in terms of both content and process’ (Young & Peterson 2006: 795). 
The changes have recently gathered speed, as analysts have widely noted. 
The changed content of the new trade agenda is characterised by several 
factors. First, the trend towards global supply chains, where industries 
(e.g. motor vehicles) are increasingly global and where trade is in parts 
or components (or even intellectual property such as design) rather than 
in finished products.
Second, the new trade agenda explicitly recognises the rapid increase 
in the importance of services in world trade: professional services, 
financial services, services as part of the digital economy, education, 
tourism, transport and business services. Third, the new trade agenda 
is in the growing importance of foreign direct investment around the 
5
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world as enterprises, especially from developed economies, increasingly 
seek to  invest in manufacturing, mining and services activities in other 
countries to take advantage of resources, labour conditions and proximity 
to markets in order to maximise the productivity of their enterprises.
As a consequence, the new trade agenda is as much concerned with 
behind-the-border barriers as it is with straightforward at-border market 
access. Current policy makers, therefore, engage with how domestic 
standards and regulations impact on trade. They aim to address regulatory 
divergences between countries and regions relating to technical and 
environmental standards for manufactured goods and basic agricultural 
and food products; licensing, qualifications and certification procedures 
impacting on the supply of tradeable services; conditions applying to 
foreign direct investment, including rights of establishment, investment 
protection, repatriation of profits and dispute settlement; and competition 
policies, including the disciplining of monopoly and oligopoly power and 
public procurement policies.
The changed process of the new trade agenda is impacting on the way 
governments (and indeed other actors) are now seeking to achieve their 
objectives. In part because the importance of new trade agenda issues 
has advanced significantly since the launch of the Doha negotiations in 
2001, trade liberalisation is no longer predominately being dealt with 
in a multilateral setting. Multilateral rules designed for a time in which 
a much less integrated global trading system could be kept open by 
reducing and eliminating visible barriers to trade—notably import tariffs 
and quotas—were effective in delivering progressive liberalisation of the 
world trading system from the late 1940s to the early 1980s. The focus 
then was on elimination. With the creation of the WTO at the end of the 
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (UR), the focus has 
shifted increasingly to regulatory cooperation. This is proving more of 
a challenge for the multilateral trading system.
According to the WTO, the eight rounds of trade negotiations that were 
completed during the 1980s and 1990s saw tariff rates on manufactured 
goods in developed countries fall steadily to less than 4 per cent (WTO 
2014). The GATT progressively sought to deal with emerging issues since 
the 1980s; however, the system has not entirely succeeded in creating 
effective new rules to discipline new trade agenda and NTB problems. 
Even the signature reform reached in the Uruguay Round in the form 
of a new set of rules designed to liberalise trade in services—the General 
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Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), aimed at mirroring the original 
GATT rules of 1947—has suffered from these shortcomings. To some 
extent this explains why it has not been possible to repeat the Uruguay 
Round success in the WTO. As it is, the multilateral process is essentially 
stalled. Bilateral, plurilateral and mega-regional deals have proliferated. 
At December 2015 the WTO has been notified of some 452 regional 
trade agreements (counting goods, services and accessions together) with 
265 currently in force.2 The incompleteness of efforts in the UR to bring 
new rules into effect, with the creation of the WTO, to discipline new 
trade agenda issues, is dealt with in more detail in the final chapter of this 
collection.
Thus, in the 1960s and ’70s, an emergent Australian economy and 
a (then) European Economic Community of six and later nine member 
states endured a difficult bilateral relationship centred on straightforward 
‘at-border’ market access issues. At present the 28 EU members states 
(EU28) and Australia find themselves partners in pursuing an agenda 
that includes revitalising credentials of the WTO; embedding GATT-plus 
commitments in other agreements in the meantime; and finding scope 
for trade liberalisation ‘behind borders’, with all of the complexity that 
entails. Further, the bilateral economic relationship between Australia 
and the EU is no longer adequately regulated by the WTO (Villalta Puig 
2014: 300). It is in this context—a changed bilateral trade relationship; 
a vastly different international context—that an Australia–EU trade 
agreement becomes possible, and perhaps inevitable.3
The chapters that follow are in one sense deeply practical contributions 
to the forthcoming policy debate on the Australia–EU FTA. They are 
designed to contribute background information, provide case studies 
and directly inform the negotiations. The chapters highlight potential 
points of difficulty and possible gains from an Australia–EU FTA. They 
set out different perspectives on issues that will soon be front and centre 
in trade policy debates. Contributors from the Australian Productivity 
Commission, the European Services Forum and Austrade ensure that this 
book is policy relevant.
2  Counted separately, the figures are 619 notifications with 413 in force (see WTO 2015).
3  For a full account of the changing bilateral relationship, see Kenyon and van der Eng (2014).
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The book seeks to make two further contributions. First, it constitutes 
a reappraisal of Australia–EU relations; particularly, but not only, the 
economic relationship. Here it complements a growing body of work 
that demonstrates that the Australia–EU relationship need not consist 
only of squabbles over agriculture (Kenyon & van der Eng 2014; Murray 
& Benvenuti 2014; Villalta Puig 2014). Whatever the past difficulties, 
the  relationship described in this volume is multidimensional and 
maturing. The treaty-level Framework Agreement (concluded in 2015) 
between Australia and the EU is expected to underline the extensive 
cooperation underway across a range of policy areas.
Second, the chapters taken together present a snapshot of current issues 
in trade policy—the ‘new trade agenda’—that is more complex and 
politically visible than ever. The issues that will arguably be confronted by 
Australia and the EU in forthcoming negotiations are those confronting 
policy makers around the globe. They are testing public tolerance of 
decisions once viewed as dull and technocratic, and are redefining the 
academic treatment of trade policy.
Structure of the book and key themes
This book is organised into three sections. Section 1 deals with lessons 
from abroad. The EU has recently sought trade agreements with 
several of Australia’s major Asia-Pacific and Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) trading partners such as 
South Korea, India, Singapore, Canada, Japan and the USA. These new 
generation agreements are ambitious in scope and aim to go beyond border 
measures, such as tariffs. Proposed liberalisations extend to behind-the-
border barriers, such as domestic regulation impacting on trade in both 
goods and services. What can we learn from recent trade deals the EU has 
concluded? This section examines the EU’s trade deals with South Korea, 
Singapore and Canada. In doing so, it provides important background 
information about the likely shape of negotiations, the length of time that 
reaching agreements can take, and the obstacles to successful conclusion. 
What are the similarities with the Australian case, and what are the points 
of difference?
Section 2 consists of sectoral analysis. It addresses in detail two crucial 
aspects of a potential trade agreement between Australia and the EU. 
Trade in agriculture has historically been the principal source of tension 
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in the bilateral relationship, a fact that dates from the United Kingdom’s 
(UK) decision to join the European Community in 1973. Recent changes 
inside the EU and in Australia’s export profile mean that this aspect of 
the relationship has altered fundamentally, such that scope for genuine 
gains exist for both sides in the negotiations; regulatory convergence 
across a range of NTBs is ‘ripe for the picking’. Trade in services is now 
a key plank of the bilateral trade relationship and a much-lauded aspect 
of new generation FTAs. A successful Australia–EU FTA would contain 
ambitious measures relating to trade in services. The chapters in  this 
section consider agriculture and services in detail.
Section 3 deals with the broad political and economic terms of an 
Australia–EU agreement. It brings together European and Australian 
perspectives on what could be gained from a potential agreement. 
It debates whether a trade agreement is the best format for pursuing 
cooperation and liberalisation, it details institutional questions about how 
trade agreements actually work, and it considers the risks to both sides 
of not undertaking the negotiations. A number of the contributions in 
this book present arguments in favour of Australia negotiating an FTA 
with the EU: the growing importance of bilateral services trade and scope 
for its expansion and mutual interests in agricultural trade, for example. 
Importantly, the Abbott and Lee-Makiyama chapter details the reasons 
why an EU–Australia agreement is also in the interests of the EU.
Several key themes emerge from the collection of chapters in this book. 
The list of five below is not exhaustive.
1. The current limitations of multilateralism and the 
search for alternatives
Without exception, the chapters that follow take as a starting point the 
apparent incapacity of the multilateral system to successfully conclude 
the Doha negotiations. Gretton describes prospects for finalising the 
Doha Round as ‘bleak’; Gosper describes the multilateral possibilities 
as ‘underwhelming’. Two issues feature repeatedly. First, governments 
seeking greater market access via tariff reductions and increased quotas 
need to secure this bilaterally given the lack of multilateral progress. 
The  rationale for bilateral deals in this case is clear, especially given 
the all-but-finalised deals that remain in limbo pending the successful 
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conclusion of Doha. Gosper’s chapter notes that Australian negotiators 
could ‘see the shape’ of EU agricultural market access that Doha could 
make possible, still.
Swinbank and Daugbjerg’s chapter deplores the failure of the international 
community to conclude the Doha Round, explaining the role of the 
WTO in locking in CAP reform in the past. In their view, the EU 
will not likely agree to further tariff reductions except in the context of 
a multilateral agreement, and in the meantime countries like Australia 
could potentially use a trade agreement to ‘sidestep’ continuing high EU 
tariffs on agriculture through increased tariff quota (TQ) access, much as 
has been secured in the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
(CETA). Thus, the stalling of the recent WTO Round is seen as a motive 
for governments to embark on more diffuse trade strategies, including 
bilateral, plurilateral and mega-regional deals. The second issue, as Kang 
explains, relates to coverage. The limited ability of the WTO to deal with 
issues of concern to the EU such as investment, public procurement, 
competition policy and intellectual property rights has led directly to the 
strategy of institutionalising EU preferences in other trade agreements.
2. The changing nature of trade agreements
The chapters in this volume demonstrate that especially bilateral trade 
agreements increasingly broach new territory. The issues covered in the 
new generation agreements and the level of ambition that they articulate 
differ greatly from previous bilateral trade agreements. Particularly 
where developed countries have already substantially lowered their tariffs 
on manufactured goods, trade in services takes on new significance in 
negotiations and is considered crucial to the projected gains. Elms argues 
the centrality of services trade in the EU–Singapore deal and sees it 
as ‘the primary offensive objective’ of the EU. Elijah notes CETA was 
hailed as a major achievement by both sides, especially in relation to its 
treatment of services. Kerneis outlines the importance of services trade to 
both the EU and Australia and explains how negotiations about services 
trade liberalisation might unfold between the two. Hussey and Tidemann 
illustrate that while tariff reductions are unlikely to feature prominently 
in any potential Australia–EU FTA, the opportunities to remove technical 
barriers to agricultural trade are many, particularly where those barriers 
relate to environmental and human health objectives.
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Investment provisions (recently elevated to the EU level by the Treaty 
of Lisbon, 2009) now feature across multiple trade agreements; for 
example, in the EU–Singapore agreement and in the CETA. The full 
implications of this development—for the EU and its trading partners—
are still becoming clear. As Elms explains, the EU–Singapore agreement 
was delayed as a result. The investment provisions in CETA have become 
especially controversial and contributed to the so-called ‘CETA-saga’ 
of late 2016. 
Largely because of the investment policy provisions of CETA—both 
‘direct investment’, which following Lisbon is now an EU matter, and 
‘portfolio investment’, which remains a member state responsibility—
the European Commission decided to treat the ratification of the CETA 
treaty as a ‘mixed agreement’ requiring approval by all 38 national 
and regional governments in the EU rather than the simpler route of 
a ‘qualified majority’ vote by the 28 national governments in the Council. 
The government of the Belgian region of Wallonia threatened to veto the 
CETA immediately prior to its signature. Clarifications were sought from 
the EU (especially in relation to investor–state dispute settlement (ISDS) 
provisions), which finally enabled the CETA treaty to enter into force 
provisionally on 30 October 2016.
Trade agreements are more complex and broader in scope than ever. 
The complexities of entry into force, especially with the multiplicity of 
governments required to approve ‘mixed agreements’ has both political 
and practical implications.
3. Trade agreements are interconnected 
Multiple chapters here attest to the interconnectedness between the 
different agreements that are now finalised or in prospect. It is clear that 
the sequence of negotiations matters greatly—in terms of potential trade 
diversion, but also in relation to the inclusion of liberalising measures, 
which are seen to represent the latest best possible outcome. The obvious 
example examined in this collection is the CETA. These negotiations were 
conducted with an eye to the proposed TTIP, as some of its ‘wait and see’ 
clauses demonstrate. Outcomes will ultimately depend on what the USA 
and the EU can agree. Meanwhile, Australian policy makers contemplate 
the CETA and its usefulness as a ‘roadmap’ for Australia. Abbott and 
Lee-Makiyama suggest that it is a deliberate strategy of the EU to pursue 
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negotiations with a smaller, more flexible partner in a given region first, 
before engaging a larger trade partner (South Korea, then Japan; Canada, 
then the USA; and potentially New Zealand, then Australia).
Kang argues that South Korea may lose its competitive edge as the EU 
finalises more deals in East Asia, and underlines the need for Korean 
companies to make full use of the agreement’s provisions. Elms traces 
the history of the EU–Singapore agreement to the failed EU–ASEAN 
negotiations, and notes the extent to which these negotiations were 
conducted by the EU with the aim of returning to an ASEAN-wide deal 
at a later date. Thus, the purpose of the EU–Singapore agreement is not 
simply trade liberalisation, but the building of a model that may form 
the basis of regional arrangements between the EU and ASEAN. Gosper 
outlines the place of the EU in Australian trade considerations. The fact 
that the EU is negotiating with Australia’s trade partners ‘adds to the logic’ 
of trade negotiations with the EU.
It is clear in this volume that governments are pursuing defensive 
interests via trade agreements. It is less clear how the various agreements 
might ultimately relate to each other for the purpose of reinvigorating 
multilateralism, or even plurilateral initiatives. Bhagwati’s concerns about 
the ‘spaghetti bowl’ and its impact on the multilateral trade system surface 
in multiple chapters (Bhagwati 2008). With their stated commitment 
to multilateralism, Australia and the EU share an interest in resolving 
this dilemma. The EU identifies the ‘interoperability’ of agreements as 
a priority in its recent trade strategy statement (European Commission 
2015: 29).
4. Domestic settings and trade policy are inseparable 
The domestic roots of trade policy have long been established. As Adams, 
Brown and Wickes (2013: 87) remind us, ‘domestic policy settings form 
the basis of negotiating positions’. For the policy makers behind the new 
trade agenda, as the chapters show, domestic policy is not merely the 
source of negotiating positions, it is their prime target. The new trade 
agenda progressively inserts itself into national sovereignty issues in the 
determination of public policy decisions across a wide range of regulatory 
policies. Given the overall decline in the importance of tariffs, regulatory 
divergences have an increasing profile (Hussey & Kenyon 2011). These 
divergences arise more frequently from legitimate (e.g. historical) 
differences in public policy than protectionist motives. Nevertheless, the 
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adverse impact of regulatory divergences—as intended or unintended 
NTBs—is incontestable. Dealing with the trade impacts of  regulatory 
divergences is challenging (Mumford 2014). Further, it  raises a raft of 
institutional questions that are far from resolved.
Kenyon and van der Eng conclude this volume by elaborating the 
possibilities for Australia–EU cooperation on the new trade agenda. It is 
argued that Australia and the EU are now set on a trade policy course with 
common objectives: to embed WTO-plus liberalisation in agreements 
with  key trading partners in the context of frustrated multilateralism; 
and to ensure that current commitments can ultimately be ‘stepping stones’ 
in future, rather than ‘stumbling blocks’ to more effective multilateral 
trade liberalisation (European Commission 2006: 8). The concluding 
chapter examines how a new generation trade deal between Australia and 
the EU could advance these objectives. 
5. The increased political salience of trade policy 
Recent developments—notably the Brexit vote in favour of the UK 
leaving the EU in the referendum of June 2016, the near-scuppering of 
the CETA prior to its signature and the surprise victory of Donald Trump 
over Hillary Clinton in the US presidential election of 8 November 
2016—have brought into sharp relief the political discontent that exists 
amongst those who have been left behind by the internationalisation of 
the global economy and technological change that have gathered pace 
through the second half of the 20th century. 
In fact, these concerns have been growing since the end of the GATT 
Uruguay Round of trade negotiations in the mid-1990s. The Round 
broke new ground in moving beyond liberalising tariff barriers into the 
liberalisation of NTBs in areas such as agriculture, services, technical 
barriers to trade, investment and public procurement. Liberalising NTBs 
frequently results in adjustments to domestic regulations. With the decline 
in importance of tariffs as trade barriers the move into non-tariff barriers 
is a logical next step in the continuing liberalisation of global trade.
Opposition to aspects of the new trade agenda dogged the Doha 
Development agenda— intended as the successor to the Uruguay Round 
of the 1980s and 19990s from its inception in 2001. From the beginning 
of the Doha negotiations, the prospect of moving further down the path 
of liberalising particular NTBs was especially challenging to a number of 
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developing countries, which were expanding their economies and enjoying 
increasing living standards for a growing proportion of their populations. 
At the same time, concerns about losing jobs to globalisation was growing 
in the developed world.
The political backlash now evident in the US and Europe is of particular 
concern for the trade policy agenda. Since the end of the Second World 
War, it has been the OECD countries that have driven global openness 
in trade as a key instrument in spreading economic growth and increasing 
living standards around the world. In key OECD countries it is now 
apparent that a rising tide does not automatically lift all boats—some have 
clearly been left behind. Jobs have been lost; pockets of poverty in even 
the richest of countries have persisted and expanded. Corrective action 
is needed to deal with these (not quite new) domestic political problems.
This collection brings together diverse perspectives, but none of the chapters 
here suggest turning back the clock on trade liberalisation. Much in terms 
of growth, better living standards and greater equality across countries 
in the world has been achieved. To fall back on increased protection, 
erecting new barriers against immigration and increased autarky in 
economic and security terms would only generate new conflicts. It is clear, 
however, that those who have lost out through the process of increasing 
global openness—in both developed and developing countries—need to 
have their interests more effectively taken into account. This is the task 
of individual governments. Domestic policy settings on job-enhancing 
programs and providing governments with increased financial resources 
will be needed. Noting the increased political complexity of trade 
negotiations, the focus of this book is on the role that trade policy might 
play in moving forward. 
The point is now frequently made that Australia (with New Zealand) is 
one of the few OECD countries with which the EU does not have some 
kind of trade agreement. Australia and the EU appear to be entering a new 
phase in the bilateral relationship, and the push towards a potential trade 
agreement has been steadily gaining momentum. Chapters in this volume 
argue that a potential Australia–EU trade agreement has ‘ample scope’ for 
a substantive negotiating agenda and that the failure to act in this regard 
is untenable. Contributors to this collection have not assumed, however, 
that an agreement should be undertaken simply because there is not one 
in place. Trade agreements take time and resources. They are not self-
evidently good, and the case must be demonstrated. With the prospect of 
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an agreement under active consideration in both Brussels and Canberra, 
this volume begins to examine and explain the coming negotiations and 
inform public debate.
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1  For the purpose of this chapter, Korea refers to the Republic of Korea. 




The European Union (EU) is an important economic partner for Korea 
in both trade and investment.1 If the EU is considered a single economic 
area, it is 14 times larger than the Korean domestic market and it has 
always been an important export destination of Korean companies. 
In 2014, trade with the EU accounted for 10 per cent of Korea’s total 
trade, making the EU the equal second-most important partner after 
China (21  per cent), alongside the United States of America (USA) 
(10  per  cent). European companies have been very active in investing 
in Korea. According to European statistics, they represent more than 
40 per  cent of the cumulative total of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
since 1962 (Delegation of the EU to the Republic of Korea 2013). 
During 2008–12, European companies were the largest contributors to 
inward FDI into Korea with investment totalling US$22 billion. 
Korean companies are also increasingly active in investing in Europe. 
Half  of  Korean cars sold in European markets are produced in the 
assembly lines in Slovakia and the Czech Republic, and Korean electronics 
companies made a number of important investments from research 
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and development (R&D) centres to production facilities in Europe. 
In financial sectors, Korea’s economy is more closely related to European 
financial markets. According to statistics from the Bank for International 
Settlement (BIS), European banks have very important exposures to 
the Korean economy. Almost half of Korea’s external liabilities are with 
European banks, which means that both economies are increasingly 
interdependent. In this context, creating a more stable economic 
framework can be beneficial to both Korea and the EU and this was the 
background upon which Korea and the EU agreed to launch free trade 
agreement (FTA) negotiations in 2007. By 2015, the Korea–EU FTA was 
the only FTA that the EU has implemented with an Asian country.
This chapter reviews Korea’s economic relations with the EU, focusing 
on the Korea–EU FTA implemented in July 2011. The FTA should be 
understood from mutual economic interests as well as Korea’s overall trade 
policy. The Korea–EU FTA was the first FTA that Korea implemented 
with a large trading partner, and it is the EU’s first ‘new generation’, 
or ‘WTO-plus’ FTA. This chapter firstly reviews the background of the 
Korea–EU FTA from both the Korean and EU perspectives. It describes 
the economic and political background of the FTA in the context of 
the overall trade policy of Korea and the EU. Secondly, it sheds light 
on the  negotiation process of the FTA, focusing on arguments raised 
during the process. Thirdly, it examines the trade statistics over four years 
of the FTA. To compare changes in trade before the FTA and after its 
implementation, important factors are considered that affect trade from 
both sides. Finally, this chapter discusses future prospects for Korea’s 
economic relations with the EU in the context of the Korea–EU FTA.
Background of the Korea–EU FTA
Korea’s perspective
Negotiating an FTA with the EU was included in Korea’s FTA roadmap 
announced in September 2003. This medium-term FTA plan reflected 
and expanded upon Korea’s first FTA, the 2003 Korea–Chile FTA. 
Even though trade with Chile accounted for a small part of Korea’s total 
trade, this first FTA provoked significant controversy and its ratification 
took more than one year. In order to obtain public support, the Korean 
government set up the FTA roadmap, which stated four principles of the 
Korean government’s FTA policy: 1) multiple-track FTAs; 2) advanced 
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and comprehensive FTAs; 3) transparent procedures in FTA preparation; 
and 4) diplomatic consideration in FTA policy (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade, Korea, 2003, cited in Kang 2009: 16).
The roadmap also announced trade partners to be considered for FTAs 
on the basis of concrete economic criteria, such as economic feasibility 
and large and advanced economies. It organised prospective FTA partners 
into two groups: short term (negotiation within two years), and medium 
term (negotiation in more than three years). The EU was included in the 
list of medium-term prospective FTAs, along with the USA and China. 
One reason for this longer time frame was that the impact of FTAs with 
large trade partners would be much more significant than FTAs with 
small countries. Also, the EU exercised a de facto moratorium on new 
FTA negotiations during 1999–2006 in favour of the Doha Round of 
multilateral discussions in the context of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) (Lamy 2002).
Table 1. Korea’s FTA roadmap and list of FTA partners according 
to time schedule




Japan, Singapore • Start negotiations as soon as possible, 
including joint feasibility studies
Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN), 
Mexico, European Free 
Trade Association (EFTA)
• Prepare negotiations or joint studies 





USA, EU, China • Progressive approach 
Israel, Peru, Panama, 
New Zealand, Australia
• Countries who have shown their 
intention to conclude FTAs with Korea 
Canada, India • Prospective FTA partners
Note: Canada and India were reclassified as FTA partners of short term, when the 
roadmap was revised in May 2004 .
Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Korea, 2003.
In the meantime, trade and investment with European countries 
increased rapidly. In 2007, the EU became the second-largest trade partner 
for Korea after China. After its first FTA with Chile, Korea first initiated 
new FTA negotiations with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). 
The FTA with the EFTA was generally considered as a preparatory step 
to one with the EU, because its member countries had maintained free 
trade status with the EU, adopting most of the EU’s trade regulations. 
The Korea–EFTA FTA was concluded after only 10 months of negotiation.
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EU’s perspective
In the mid-2000s, EU business circles and external trade surroundings 
put increasing pressure on the EU to pursue bilateral FTAs. There were 
increasing concerns that industries of emerging countries such as India, 
Brazil and China would become more competitive than European 
industries. In this context, the arrival of the new trade commissioner, Peter 
Mendelssohn, brought a new point of view on bilateral FTAs. He argued 
that wisely constructed and ambitious bilateral agreements with carefully 
chosen partners could create new trade and improve the competitiveness 
of EU companies in key foreign markets experiencing high growth. 
Incorporating new objectives in external trade policy, the European 
Commission announced a new trade policy in October 2006, later 
known as ‘Global Europe’ (European Commission 2006). The strategy 
emphasises the role of the EU’s external trade policy, which contributes 
to the EU’s competitiveness in foreign markets. Considering that it 
proved hard to make progress with investment, public procurement, 
competition and intellectual property rights issues in the WTO Doha 
Round, negotiating comprehensive FTAs with like-minded countries was 
regarded as the second-best option.
In order to select FTA partners, the European Commission proposed 
key economic criteria: 1) market potential (economic size and growth); 
2) level of protection against EU exports (tariffs and non-tariff barriers, 
NTBs); and 3) potential partners’ FTA negotiations with EU competitors 
(potential discriminatory impact on European firms). On the basis 
of these principles, the European Commission identified the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Korea and the Mercosur bloc 
of countries in South America as priorities. 
In addition to using economic criteria for selecting FTA partners, Global 
Europe is notable in several other respects. First, it aimed for ambitious 
and high-level FTAs. New competition-driven FTAs are aimed to be 
comprehensive and ambitious in coverage, aiming at the highest possible 
degree of trade liberalisation, including far-reaching liberalisation of 
services and investment. Second, ongoing or scheduled FTA negotiations 
with the EU’s competitors (implicitly the USA) were taken into account. 
Third, the new FTAs would explicitly focus on tackling NTBs through 
regulatory convergence and contain strong trade facilitation provisions, 
intellectual property rights and competition. This means that the new FTA 
model that the European Commission sought to construct was seeking 
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deep integration, including harmonisation of trade-affecting rules. These 
objectives of the EU’s FTA policy corresponded to what Korea had been 
seeking for its FTA roadmap.
Negotiating the Korea–EU FTA
Negotiation process
Official Korea–EU FTA negotiations were launched in May 2007 after 
a  series of preparatory meetings held the previous year. It took over 
two years, eight rounds of negotiations and many technical meetings to 
finalise the agreement in October 2009. By this time, Korea had already 
finished FTA negotiations with the USA and had signed the Korea–US 
(KORUS) FTA in June 2007. This allowed Korean trade negotiators to 
use technical know-how obtained in these negotiations as an example for 
an advanced FTA. Effectively, this experience provided a partial template 
for the Korea–EU FTA. From its side, the EU sought a comprehensive and 
advanced FTA with Korea, which was at the time its most economically 
developed bilateral FTA partner to date. Accordingly, the Korea–EU FTA 
became the most comprehensive FTA ever negotiated by the EU. 
The agreement eliminated import duties on nearly all products 
(97.3  per  cent of Korean products for the EU market by number 
of  items)  and it liberalised services trade to a greater degree than the 
KORUS FTA (KORUS-plus) did. Composed of 15 chapters, the Korea–
EU FTA includes provisions on investment (termed as ‘establishment’ 
due to the fact that the European Commission has an EU mandate in 
foreign trade policy, not foreign investment policy) both in service and 
industrial sectors, provisions on intellectual property and competition 
rules. The Korea–EU FTA is also a pioneering case in that it aims to reduce 
NTBs and promote a future dialogue on industrial regulation. During the 
preparatory and implementation period, Korea changed many parts of its 
domestic laws to be able to implement the KORUS and Korea–EU FTAs. 
Most of the revisions concern service sectors and intellectual property.2 
2  The Korea–EU FTA had a two-year transition period in order to accommodate market 
liberalisation and to revise domestic laws. In line with the KORUS FTA, Korea changed 57 
Acts, enforcement decrees and rules (as of September 2012). Most changes were relevant to the 
implementation of the Korea–EU FTA, because it was in part based on the KORUS FTA, in particular 
its services chapter.
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Diverging concerns between Korea and the EU
Two issues delayed the finalisation of the overall negotiation: 1) the duty 
drawback system (DDS); and 2) rules of origin.3 Korea and the EU showed 
a very clear divergence on the DDS from the beginning. For Korea, 
the DDS is a crucial support system, especially for small and medium 
enterprises that rely heavily on outsourcing production of intermediate 
goods to China and Southeast Asia. Without DDS, any kind of FTA 
would not bring about tangible economic benefits to Korean firms. 
It seems that European negotiators understood that the DDS is important 
for the Korean Government not only for economic purposes, but also 
for political reasons. To gain ground for Korean exporting firms, it was 
necessary for the Korean Government to maintain the DDS, which dated 
back to 1964 in the Korean customs system. The problem was that the 
EU had not included the DDS in its previous three FTAs (i.e. with Chile, 
Mexico and South Africa). The reason for this can be found in the trade 
structure of European countries that rely largely on intra-European trade 
for supplies of intermediate products. More developed Western European 
firms have taken advantage of the European enlargement towards Eastern 
Europe in this respect. As a result, they tend to rely to a far lesser extent 
on outsourcing from outside the EU, so that the DDS is less important 
for them.
However, this relative indifference of the European Commission on the 
DDS soon turned into a major preoccupation, when major industrial 
associations in the EU—especially the association of automobile 
producers—showed their concerns about Korea’s DDS and its positive 
effect on the price competitiveness of Korean products. The European 
Automobile Manufacturers’ Association (ACEA) strongly opposed Korea’s 
intention to include the DDS in the Korea–EU FTA (ACEA 2009). 
The  ACEA argued that approving the DDS in the framework of the 
Korea–EU FTA would offer a disproportionate competitive advantage to 
the Korean auto industry when exporting to the EU. It also insisted that 
this would set a precedent for other scheduled EU FTAs. In finalising the 
negotiations, Korea and the EU reached a compromise. In the final deal, 
the EU agreed to allow Korea to maintain the current DDS (on average 
8 per cent) on Korea’s exports to the EU for five years from the start of the 
3  DDS allows an importer to obtain a refund of import duty, if the imported good is subsequently 
exported. The rules of origin are criteria that specify the degree to which the value of a final product 
is produced in the exporting country.
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FTA implementation. If Korea’s imports of intermediate goods increased 
rapidly after the five-year grace period, the EU would be allowed to limit 
DDS to 5 per cent.4 
Setting a threshold for local content in the rules of origin was also an 
issue for both parties. As with the DDS case, the EU had a precedent 
that served as a principle: in its FTAs with Chile, Mexico and South 
Africa, the EU set the minimum percentage of locally produced content 
in a final product to 60 per cent. This meant that in order to be qualified 
as ‘Made in Korea’, at least 60 per cent of the value of a product needed to 
be produced in Korea. Korea’s initial proposal for minimum local content 
was 35 per cent, as in the KORUS FTA. In the final deal, EU agreed 
to reduce the local content threshold to 45 per cent.
After more than two years of negotiations, Korea and the EU signed the 
deal in October 2010 during Korea’s presidential visit to Brussels for 
the 8th Asia-Europe Meeting summit. The agreement was approved in 
February 2011 by the European Parliament and Korea’s National Assembly 
ratified it in 5 May 2011. With this, all necessary legal procedures were 
completed and the FTA entered into effect on 1 July 2011.
Four years after implementing the  
Korea–EU FTA
Trade flow between Korea and the EU after the 
global financial crisis 
In the 2000s, trade between Korea and the EU increased considerably. 
Korea’s exports to the EU soared from US$39.2 billion in 2000 to 
US$98.4 billion in 2008. Imports from the EU showed a similar increase 
from US$23.4 billion to US$58.4 billion. In this context, the possibility 
of FTA implementation raised the prospects for more exports to the EU. 
Various studies suggested that the Korea–EU FTA would contribute to 
increasing Korea’s exports to the EU, as well as to Korea’s gross domestic 
product (GDP). A 2010 study by the Korea Institute for International 
4  The Singapore–EU FTA initialled in late 2013 excludes all kinds of drawback of duties for bilateral 
trade. Given that the FTA with Singapore will undoubtedly serve as a template for FTAs with other 
ASEAN members, it seems likely that the EU does not want to include the DDS in its future FTAs.
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Economic Policy (KIEP) expected that the FTA would increase Korea’s 
exports to the EU by US$2.5 billion per year and, as a result, Korea’s GDP 
would increase by 0.1 per cent in the short term and by 5.6 per cent in 
the long term (KIEP 2010). Decreux, Milner and Péridy (2010) provided 
a similar estimation, stating that Korea’s export to the EU would increase 
by up to 5.5 per cent following the implementation of the FTA.
While Korea’s trade surplus vis-à-vis the EU reached a record level of 
over US$19 billion in 2007, it has gradually decreased since then. Korea’s 
imports from the EU increased by 21 per cent per year from 2009 to 2011, 
while its exports to the EU increased only at an annual rate of 9 per cent 
in the same period. The reason for the difference between export and 
import growth rates is the slowdown of the EU’s economic growth, which 
decelerated import demand, and the increase of imports into Korea from 
the EU due to Korea’s rapid economic recovery. In 2011, Korea recorded 
several monthly trade deficits with the EU, and in 2012 Korea recorded 
a US$1 billion trade deficit with the EU for the first time since 1998. 
The deficit expanded further to US$9.1 billion in 2015.
Figure 1. Korea’s goods export to and import from the EU, 1971–2014 
(US$ billion)
lh, left hand; rh, right hand
Sources: UN Comtrade database, comtrade .un .org/db/; Korean Statistical Information 
Service, kosis .kr/eng/ .
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Four years of the Korea–EU FTA
Korea’s exports to the EU, which had been recovering following the 
2008 global financial crisis, began to decrease in the second half of 2011. 
For  the first year of the FTA with the EU, Korea’s exports to the EU 
decreased 12 per cent compared to the previous year. This result is an 
exception, given Korea’s overall exports to the world increased by 7 per cent 
in the same period, as shown in Table 2. For Korea, this outcome based 
on trade statistics is rather disappointing, as most of the previous studies 
predicted a substantial increase in exports. Moreover, this figure contrasts 
with Korea’s considerable increase in exports to the USA after the KORUS 
FTA. For the second year, Korea’s exports to the EU once again fell, by 
4.7  per cent, while it rebounded in the third year, largely due to the 
base effect. 
Table 2. Korea’s exports to its trade partners before and after the Korea–
EU FTA, 2010–15 (US$ billion)
One year 
before
1st year 2nd year 3rd year 4th year 4 years 
total
EU 57 .9 50 .8 48 .4 51 .7 47 .6 (–17 .7)
(–12 .3) (–4 .7) (6 .7) (–7 .8)
China 125 .6 133 .2 140 .5 145 .8 143 .8 (14 .5)
(6 .1) (5 .5) (3 .8) (–1 .3)
USA 54 .2 59 .1 59 .2 64 .6 72 .1 (33 .2)
(9 .1) (0 .2) (9 .2) (11 .7)
Japan 34 .3 40 .1 36 .6 33 .7 29 .3 (–14 .6)
(16 .8) (–8 .8) (–7 .7) (–13 .1)
India 12 .5 12 .5 11 .6 11 .9 12 .5 (–0 .1)
(–0 .5) (–6 .8) (2 .4) (5 .2)
ASEAN 62 .2 75 .5 82 .9 84 .4 78 .4 (26 .0)
(21 .3) (9 .9) (1 .8) (–7 .2)
Korea’s total 
export
518 .7 556 .6 549 .4 566 .4 551 .9 (9 .7)
(7 .3) (–1 .3) (3 .1) (–2 .5)
Note: 1) Numbers in parentheses refer to annual percentage change . 2) One year before: 
July 2010 – June 2011, 1st year: July 2011 – June 2012, 2nd year: July 2012 – June 
2013, 3rd year: July 2013 – June 2014, 4th year: July 2013 – June 2014, four years 
total: change in exports from one year before (July 2010 – April 2011) and the 4th year 
(July 2014 – June 2015) .
Source: Author’s calculation based on data from Korea International Trade Association . 
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In contrast, Korea’s imports from the EU increased by 13.1 per cent for 
the first year of the FTA (Table 3). Given that Korea’s overall imports 
from the world increased by 9 per cent in the same period, the increase 
in imports from the EU is consistent with the overall trend. However, 
imports from the EU also increased for a second year by 8 per cent, 
while Korea’s overall imports increased only by less than 2 per cent. 
During four years of the FTA implementation period, imports from the 
EU increased by almost 40 per cent and the trade balance turned from 
a surplus of US$14.5 billion to a deficit of US$12.9 billion. It is clear 
that the FTA exerted a positive influence on Korea’s imports through the 
tariff-cut effect, given that the growth rate of imports from the EU was 
four times larger than Korea’s overall import growth. However, a question 
remains regarding the fall in exports to the EU under the ‘FTA effect’. 
In order to understand this change in trade between Korea and the EU, 
it is necessary to review the economic situation and trade flow in more 
detail.
Table 3. Korea’s imports from its trade partners before and after the 
Korea–EU FTA, 2010–15 (US$ billion)
One year 
before
1st year 2nd year 3rd year 4th year 4 years 
total
EU 43 .5 49 .1 53 .0 60 .0 60 .5 (39 .5)
(13 .1) (8 .0) (13 .2) (0 .9)
China 81 .0 83 .8 81 .3 85 .9 90 .6 (11 .9)
(3 .4) (–2 .9) (5 .6) (5 .5)
USA 42 .4 45 .7 40 .8 43 .7 44 .2 (4 .1)
(7 .8) (–10 .7) (6 .9) (1 .1)
Japan 67 .6 66 .8 62 .2 56 .3 50 .8 (–24 .9)
(–1 .2) (–6 .9) (–9 .4) (–9 .8)
India 6 .8 7 .3 6 .6 5 .6 4 .8 (–29 .4)
(7 .0) (–9 .9) (–14 .5) (–14 .4)
ASEAN 48 .8 53 .5 51 .7 53 .8 49 .0 (0 .5)
(9 .7) (–3 .4) (4 .2) (–9 .0)
Korea’s total 
import
479 .7 513 .7 523 .2 518 .7 485 .7 (3 .3)
(9 .3) (1 .8) (–0 .9) (–6 .4)
Note: 1) Numbers in parentheses refer to annual percentage change . 2) One year before: 
July 2010 – June 2011, 1st year: July 2011 – June 2012, 2nd year: July 2012 – June 
2013, 3rd year: July 2013 – June 2014, 4th year: July 2013 – June 2014, four years 
total: change in imports from one year before (July 2010 – April 2011) and the 4th year 
(July 2014 – June 2015) .
Source: Author’s calculation based on data from Korea International Trade Association . 
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First, there is a stark contrast between Korea’s exports to the EU and other 
regions. Exports to the EU have been decreasing despite the FTA, while 
its exports to other trade partners have increased considerably. Over the 
four years since the FTA came into effect, Korea’s exports to the EU fell by 
more than 15 per cent. On the other hand, its exports to the USA, China 
and the ASEAN countries increased by 14–33 per cent during the same 
period. The answer to such a difference can be found from a comparative 
view on exports of other Asian countries to the EU. According to trade 
data from Eurostat, most East Asian exporting countries—China, Japan 
and Taiwan—have experienced a sharper decline in their exports to the 
EU than Korea. While China’s exports to the EU increased by 7 per cent, 
Japan and Taiwan’s exports to the EU dropped by 8–20 per cent. Given the 
continued depreciation of the Japanese yen from late 2012, it is intriguing 
to see that Japanese exports to the EU have seen the most visible decrease.
It is noteworthy that most East Asian economies experienced a decrease 
in  exports to the EU. They have common features in that they are 
specialised in exports in manufacturing sectors. The sharp fall in domestic 
demand in the EU has exerted undoubtedly a very negative influence 
on exports to the EU of East Asian countries with a high export share 
in manufacturing industries. In other words, the less-than-expected 
performance in Korea’s exports to Europe should be attributed to weak 
demand in the EU from around 2008. Indeed, the decline in exports to 
the EU was common among the exporting countries in Asia. 
Second, the fall in exports is salient in ships and electronics, which are 
Korea’s most important export items. For example, ship exports accounted 
for 28 per cent of Korea’s total exports to the EU in 2011. However, its 
export amount fell by more than 60 per cent since the implementation of 
the FTA. Exports of mobile phones, LCD televisions and semiconductors 
were reduced by 15–52 per cent. These products are marked either by 
general European import market contraction, due to the economic 
recession, or by relocation of Korean firms to Southeast Asia in order 
to cut production cost. Because Korean exports to the EU are highly 
concentrated in these few sectors, their fall creates a more statistically 
important impact on change in overall exports to the EU. On the other 
hand, Korea’s exports increased for manufacturing items—such as refined 
oil, automobiles and chemical products—for which the tariff cuts were 
quite important. 
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Third, Korea’s imports from the EU increased considerably, which had 
a more important impact on change in the trade balance than the decrease 
in exports. Imports from the EU increased by almost 40 per cent over 
four years. This figure is outstanding, given that Korea’s total imports only 
increased by less than 4 per cent during the same period. At the sectoral 
level, an increase in imports from the EU is identified over a wide range 
of manufacturing products, from intermediates such as crude oil and 
refined petrol to machinery, automobiles and luxury items. For instance, 
Korea’s import of both crude and refined oil from the EU (Brent oil) 
was negligible before the FTA, but its import soared and accounted for 
17.2 per cent of Korea’s total import from the EU. Instead, imports from 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) countries 
fell, which means the FTA created a trade diversion effect from Korea’s 
main oil resource to the EU—largely the United Kingdom. Some imports 
from Japan in machinery and industrial equipment were replaced by 
European products.
Fourth, the weakening value of the Euro (since mid-2011) exerted a 
positive influence on the EU’s exports in that European products became 
cheaper outside of Europe. The reasons for the weak Euro can be explained 
by the decline of confidence and economic recession in the Eurozone and 
the lowest key interest rate since the introduction of the Euro in 1999. 
As a consequence, the trade balance of crisis-affected European countries 
improved considerably. For example, Germany recorded its largest-ever 
trade surplus. It is expected that the Euro will remain weak while the 
European Central Bank considers an expansionary monetary policy. 
This will create a favourable trade environment for European exporters.
Korea’s exports to the EU turned to positive growth in the third year 
of the FTA, mainly due to the base effect. As European economies start 
to lift themselves out of the recession, it is likely that Korea’s exports to 
the EU will increase. However, as the EU is negotiating FTAs with Japan 
and members of ASEAN, Korea’s unique status as the EU’s FTA partner 
in East Asia may become obsolete. All the more, the relocation of Korean 
firms will be more salient as they try to create supply chains in developing 
countries. In this context, the role of the FTA in promoting export in 
statistical terms will meet its limit and a more comprehensive approach 
will be required to make full use of the FTA.
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Conclusion
In summary, this chapter has indicated that Korea enjoys close ties with 
the EU both in bilateral trade flows and in terms of investment by EU 
firms in Korea and Korean investment in assembly operations in the EU. 
Korea’s trade and investment relationship with the EU is similar to that 
with the USA. A factor in the EU giving high priority to Korea, along 
with ASEAN and Mercosur as a target for a ‘new generation’ or  ‘deep 
integration’ FTA following the EU’s Global Europe initiative of 2006 
was that the USA had already begun FTA negotiations with Korea. 
The importance of global supply chains, especially in the sourcing of 
intermediate products from China and Southeast Asia, for the production 
of final goods, especially cars and consumer electronics, was a major issue 
for the EU in its FTA negotiations with Korea.
These issues were only settled in the final stages of the negotiations. 
In the final deal, Korea was able to maintain its DDS for a limited time, 
and the EU modified its rules of origin requirements by accepting a local 
content of 45 per cent on Korea’s exports to the EU, compared to its 
customary demand of 60 per cent. In the short period since the Korea–
EU FTA entered into force in July 2011, the study of the trade flows 
implies that the agreement has been somewhat more beneficial to the 
EU than to Korea. Nevertheless, the high price elasticity of demand of 
the manufactures that dominate Korea–EU trade can be significantly 
impacted on by short-term economic circumstances.
The Korea–EU FTA contains a few elements that should be noted. 
Conventionally, FTAs focus on reducing tariff barriers. However, the 
role of tariff barriers in trade has become less important, as developed 
countries have already lowered their tariffs on manufactured goods in the 
context of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and WTO. 
As it has been difficult to progress trade liberalisation in the multilateral 
context, bilateral FTAs are implemented to advance the agenda. Issues 
of trade negotiation have therefore shifted from tariff liberalisation to 
harmonisation and mutual recognition of different regulations. This was 
also the case in the Korea–EU FTA. During the negotiation of the Korea–
EU FTA, different standards between Korea and the EU were highlighted, 
particularly regulations on the safety certificate procedures in electrical/
electronic goods and product standards for automobiles. 
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The Korea–EU FTA states that both parties establish regular committees 
on  how to reduce trade-impeding regulatory barriers. It is still hard 
to expect that Korea and the EU can complete a free trade framework 
equivalent to that of the European Economic Area where most of the 
trade-related regulations are highly harmonised and mutually recognised. 
However, as trade and investment relations between the two parties are 
strengthened by the FTA, the pressure on them to tackle NTB issues 
will  increase. What we will see during the next few years will be policy 
efforts to coordinate business practice as well as ‘regulatory convergence’ 
between Korea and the EU. This will certainly require more time and 
involve more stakeholders—not only government officials, but also 
businesses.
Technology cooperation can be another opportunity in the period since 
the conclusion of the FTA. For example, Korea and the EU could create 
and activate international technology transfer mechanisms through 
both public and private initiatives. Small and medium enterprises can 
experience a number of hardships in the course of doing business, from 
finding technology to financing. In some cases, it is impossible for small 
and medium enterprises to independently introduce, apply and spread new 
technology. As institutional cooperation frames have been consolidated 
by the Korea–EU FTA and its associated arrangements, it will be more 
possible to promote cooperation between private firms. Trade associations 
can find a more important role in this regard.
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Initial negotiations on a free trade agreement (FTA) between the 
European Union (EU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) began in 2007. Although the quest for a region-wide deal 
quickly foundered, the EU soon shifted focus to negotiating with key, 
individual member states in ASEAN. Singapore was targeted to sign 
the first agreement and negotiations got underway in 2010. The EU–
Singapore FTA was completed in 2014, with the remaining issues 
in  the investment chapter finished by May 2015. The final outcome is 
a relatively high-quality deal, with nearly all tariffs dropped between the 
two parties, new openings in services markets, some additional rules in 
areas like intellectual property rights and government procurement, and a 
robust investment chapter. Implementation of the agreement got delayed, 
however, pending internal procedures in Europe. Officials are hoping for 
the deal to enter into force sometime after a ruling from the European 
Court of Justice, delivered on 16 May 2017.
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Rationale for an agreement
In 2007, the EU launched negotiations with ASEAN to create a mega-
regional FTA. Such a trade agreement would hook together two large and 
diverse regional actors—the then 27 members of the EU (EU27) with 
10 members of ASEAN (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam).
Taken as a bloc, ASEAN represented a large and growing economic 
market for the EU, as shown in Figure 1. Trade in goods with ASEAN 
was larger than trade with Japan, Brazil, India and the Gulf states. Services 
trade was also significant and growing. Finally, foreign direct investment 
was substantial. The economic impetus for a deal to more closely connect 
the two regions was clear.
Figure 1. Key EU partners in goods trade (2012)
Source: Eurostat 2013 .
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However, shortly after negotiations got underway, the Europeans quickly 
understood that while the EU negotiates as a genuine bloc, ASEAN does 
not. When negotiating with ASEAN, at least 11 people are seated at the 
table—one person from each of the member states plus someone from 
the ASEAN Secretariat. Secretariat staff are largely unable to commit 
to anything on behalf of their members. Creating an agreement with 
ASEAN essentially meant creating 10 separate bilateral agreements in key 
areas (like market access schedules for goods, services and investment) 
with, potentially, a few common elements across all ASEAN members.
The EU decided that, if it was going to have to negotiate more than one 
agreement, it might get better terms and an easier negotiating path by 
starting with key markets on an individual basis. This meant launching 
bilateral talks with Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam and Thailand.1
EU–Singapore negotiations
On the surface, Singapore did not appear to be a particularly interesting 
market for Europe. The total population of roughly five million included 
a substantial number of foreign workers with limited capacity to consume 
European goods and services. However, this picture does not accurately 
reflect the actual importance of the Singapore market. Singapore 
dominated trade within ASEAN vis-à-vis Europe. Figures 2–4 highlight 
the importance of the Singapore market. For example, Singapore alone 
accounted for more than €42 billion in exports for European companies, 
while the region imported €35 billion in goods and services from 
Singapore. Of equal interest was the substantial stock of foreign direct 
investment (FDI). Table 1 shows that the EU had more money invested 
in Singapore (€126 billion) in 2012 than in the United States of America 
(USA) (€65 billion) by more than double. Singapore’s investments into 
the EU were also significant at €55 billion. The total number of European 
companies resident in Singapore approached 9,000.
1  Of course, the EU was actually composed of 27 distinct members, so the agreement is not 
technically a ‘bilateral’ deal between two nations. But the EU effectively negotiates as one, particularly 
(as noted further below) after the Lisbon Treaty changed competence of investment to the EU level 
instead of member state levels. This meant that all aspects of trade negotiations could be handled by 
the European Commission on behalf of its members.
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Figure 2. EU trade in goods and services with ASEAN (2012)
Source: Eurostat 2013 .
Figure 3. EU27 top imports from Singapore (2012)
Source: Eurostat 2013 .
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Figure 4. EU27 top exports to Singapore (2012)
Source: Eurostat 2013 .
Table 1. Value of foreign direct investment (FDI) in 2011
FDI source Investment stock into 
Singapore (€ billion)
Investment stock into 




Japan 29 .1 144
Switzerland 15 .9
ASEAN-9 14 .2
India 13 .2 10
Hong Kong 13 .0 64
Norway 12 .1
Malaysia 10 .3 4
China 8 .1 15
Sources: Singapore’s figures from Department of Statistics, May 2013; EU from 
Eurostat 2013 .
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Hence, Singapore represented an attractive market all on its own as a trade 
agreement partner. Singapore also had growing interest and experience 
negotiating FTAs. Much of what the country had promised to the 
Americans in a 2005 bilateral agreement could potentially be replicated 
in a negotiation with the EU. This would represent a very high-quality, 
ambitious FTA for Europe.
Finally, if the EU succeeded in crafting a solid FTA with Singapore, 
it  could serve as the template for a future agreement with ASEAN. 
The Singaporeans would go first and likely finish negotiating the fastest. 
Thus an EU–Singapore FTA (EUSFTA) bilateral could serve as a model 
for negotiations with other countries such as Malaysia and Thailand. 
Furthermore, keeping consistency across ASEAN-member FTAs could 
make it easier to combine six agreements into one (with Singapore, 
Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia and Vietnam). Cambodia, 
Laos and Myanmar were not invited to join in bilateral negotiations 
with the EU, but these countries already received preferential access to 
Europe through ‘Everything But Arms’ trading schemes. The last ASEAN 
member, Brunei, was simply not an important enough bilateral partner 
to warrant separate negotiations. It would have to wait until the regional 
agreement was ready and be folded in at that time. Hence, by the end 
of the process, the Europeans could combine enough ‘building block’ 
agreements to finally wrap up a region-to-region deal.
Economic benefits of the agreement
Negotiations commenced with Singapore in 2010. The basic framework 
was finished by 2012, with a few minor issues remaining. As discussed 
in greater detail below, sticking points included geographical indications, 
financial services and investment rules. The deal (except for investment) 
was finished by October 2014. In May 2015, both sides announced the 
conclusion of the agreement, when the final legal scrubbing was completed 
for the investment chapter (see Ministry of Trade and Industry, Singapore, 
2015). The European Court of Justice (ECJ) decided in May 2017 on 
whether only the European Parliament must ratify the FTA or whether 
member states would also have to approve portions of the final agreement. 
The ruling provided for ‘mixed competence’, showing that the EU could 
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determine most of the agreement, but some elements, including parts of 
investment, will require member state approval. The EUSFTA  allows for 
a provisional entry into force once the Court ruling is completed.2
Modelling of the economic benefits of the agreement appeared quite 
lopsided, with the majority of gains flowing to the Singapore side. 
This reflects the significant differences in economic size between the two 
parties. The Chief Economist of the European Commission estimated 
that EU exports to Singapore could increase by €1.4 billion over 10 years 
while Singaporean exports to the EU could increase by €3.5 billion. Real 
gross domestic product (GDP) in the EU could grow by €550 million 
while Singapore could see an increase of €2.7 billion (see Delegation 
of the European Union to the United States 2015).
Note also that economic modelling usually handles comprehensive 
FTAs  badly. This is because the economic models overemphasise 
the importance of tariff reductions (which are easy to measure and 
straightforward to model) and underemphasise the importance of services 
and investment changes (which are very tricky to measure and hard 
to model, particularly with knock-on effects likely). In addition, firms 
are increasingly concerned about the proliferation of non-tariff barriers 
(NTBs), such as incompatible or complex standards, testing regimes, 
labelling laws, delays in processing shipments at the border and so forth. 
NTB reductions are nearly impossible to include in economic modelling. 
Hence, while economic modelling is a useful exercise and can provide 
information about the expected direction of economic growth as well 
as handy figures for political leaders to press for changes, the real-world 
impact of FTAs can be much greater or different than economic models 
suggest.
In the case of the EUSFTA, models will likely also fail to capture the 
potential for increased regional economic growth by European companies 
using Singapore as a platform for further expansion into ASEAN. Most 
of the European companies located in Singapore prior to the FTA used 
the island as a base for regional strategies. There is every reason to expect 
this pattern to continue and to accelerate after the FTA takes effect. 
2  For the complete text of the agreement, see European Commission (2015).
AUSTRALIA, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE NEW TRADE AGENDA 
42
Finally, the EUSFTA has always been intended—from the European 
perspective—to form the basis for the larger regional agreement with 
ASEAN. Thus, the European Commission and member states have long 
recognised that while benefits from a bilateral agreement with Singapore 
may be lopsided, the benefits from the expansion of an FTA to encompass 
all of ASEAN will likely be substantial for European companies.
Exploring the EUSFTA in detail
So, what happened in the EUSFTA? In brief, the bilateral agreement 
represents a relatively high-quality outcome. This result was easier to 
obtain than in many negotiations, given the comparatively open nature 
of the Singapore market. For example, Singapore’s applied tariff rate 
for all goods  (except for six tariff lines for some alcohol products and 
cigarettes) is zero. This always makes it easier to craft a trade agreement, 
since Singapore has fewer built-in sensitivities in goods that must 
be accommodated. 
The agreement covers most goods, including a few new provisions on 
electronics and a consultation process for agricultural trade regulations. 
Several important sectors have specific coverage under the agreement. 
Services trade was also opened and liberalised with a clear eye towards 
crafting an ASEAN-wide deal on services for the future. 
The agreement also included provisions on government procurement, 
new  rules on intellectual property rights including a greatly expanded 
set of covered geographical indications, a chapter on competition, 
development objectives, labour standards and dispute settlement 
procedures. Each of these elements is covered in more detail below.
Trade in goods
Given Singapore’s duty-free applied access to goods, the EUSFTA binds 
Singapore tariffs at 0 for European goods imports. The bulk of the 
negotiations focused on tariff reductions for the European side. Basically, 
the EU agreed to reduce its own tariffs to match the levels found in the 
2011 EU–Korea FTA within 5 years of entry into force. This included 
dropping tariffs to 0 on entry into force for approximately 75 per cent 
of tariff lines. Most of the remaining lines were also scheduled to go to 0 
across a time period of 3–5 years, with reductions taking place in annual 
installments.
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A goods agreement cannot be evaluated on the basis of tariff line 
reductions alone, however. Trade between parties is often concentrated, 
so the bulk of actual trade between members in an FTA might take place 
in a handful of tariff lines alone. If these lines are not included in the 
final agreement, a headline figure of even 95 per cent tariff reductions 
may not translate into meaningful economic outcomes on the ground. 
However,  EU–Singapore trade is relatively widely dispersed, making it 
more likely that tariff cuts would affect tradeable sectors like machinery, 
chemicals and pharmaceuticals.
Tariffs also interact with rules of origin. Rules of origin are necessary 
to ensure that only firms from member countries are eligible to receive 
the benefits (particularly lower tariff rates) built into the agreement. 
If  any company could take advantage of the deal, it would undermine 
the specific benefits for members. Hence, every FTA comes with rules 
of origin to ensure that products claiming preferences are either wholly 
‘from’ members (i.e. grown, produced, mined or extracted from the 
member without any additional content added from any other member 
state) or are substantially transformed from their original materials or 
components into a new type of product within the geographic spaces 
covered by the FTA.
It is possible to create an agreement with zero tariffs across the board, 
but make the requirements for receiving duty-free treatment so onerous 
that almost no firms are able to take advantage of the lower tariff rates. 
Or, conversely, it is possible to have tariffs drop by less, but make it so 
easy for firms to use the agreement that nearly all companies participate 
in the agreement.3
There is no agreement among firms on what type of rules are easiest to use. 
For some companies, blanket rules (such as requiring 40–45 per cent of the 
content embedded in a product to come from member states) are preferable 
to more specific rules for each product. These blanket rules can apply to 
3  Companies never get the benefits of an FTA automatically—each FTA requires firms to certify 
that they are using an FTA. The method of certification varies, but often FTAs require a certificate of 
origin to be obtained from a local chamber of commerce or another designated body before customs 
officers at the border will grant lower tariffs. Without a certificate of origin (or self-certification in 
some newer generation agreements), products cannot qualify for the preferential rate and are instead 
charged the most-favoured-nation (MFN) rate. The MFN tariff rate is the tariff charged to all World 
Trade Organization (WTO) members automatically without requiring any certification of origin. 
Since more than 160 countries are WTO members, practically speaking, nearly all firms can use 
MFN rates for their goods shipments. For many firms, unless the preferential benefits of an FTA are 
substantial, companies often opt to avoid the hassle required in using the provisions of an FTA and 
ship goods under MFN tariffs.
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every item in a firm’s inventory, so once a company works out the value of 
the content for each product, it can determine easily which will be allowed 
to claim preferences and which (absent reformulation or shifts in the supply 
chain) cannot. However, some firms prefer more specific rules. Product-
specific rules grant less flexibility to customs officials in evaluating products 
at the border. Product-specific rules can also be subject to fewer disputes 
and may be less at risk to shifting prices in raw materials, components, 
labour and even exchange rate fluctuations (since products that reach, for 
example, 43 per cent value content today may be only 38 per cent value 
content tomorrow if the prices shift in determining the product values).
The EUSFTA contains mostly product-specific rules of origin. The agreement 
includes some co-equal rules (which allow firms to use one or the other 
of two calculation methods to prove sufficient content). The agreement is 
effectively a bilateral agreement between the EU (counting EU members 
as if they were one) and Singapore. Hence, the agreement does not allow 
content from across ASEAN to count towards content. This can be a 
problem for Singapore, since the country has very few indigenous items 
to add to a product’s content. Singapore’s major exports to the EU include 
oil and oil-related products, manufactured goods (especially electronics), 
and pharmaceuticals. With raw materials, parts and components usually 
coming from overseas, it is not always possible to reach high levels of locally 
added content, absent the ability to add up, or cumulate, content from 
elsewhere. Nevertheless, as the EU moves towards incorporating all the 
bilateral trade agreements into one region-wide ASEAN agreement, it is 
likely that ASEAN cumulation rules will be built in the future.
The EU did not pledge to reach duty-free status in all products. 
The EUSFTA left some items that will not be subject to tariff elimination 
including some fish products (tilapia, catfish, salmon in vegetable oil, 
bonito and surimi); as well as chemically pure fructose; and sweetcorn 
and maize. 
Specific customs duties will remain for some vegetable and fruit products 
imported into Europe, including vegetables (fresh or chilled tomatoes, 
cucumbers, globe artichokes and courgettes); citrus (including fresh sweet 
oranges, clementines, monreales and satsumas, mandrins and wilkings, 
tangerines and lemons); and fruits (including table grapes, apricots, 
sour cherries, nectarines and plums).4
4  For the specific exceptions, please see the market access schedules of the EU found in Annex 2-A 
of European Commission (2015).
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Other goods provisions
The agreement included an additional chapter on what are called technical 
barriers to trade. These are largely regulatory and standards-based rules 
that govern specific types of goods. The EUSFTA sets up a rudimentary 
structure to strengthen cooperation in regulatory areas in the future, 
as well as better procedures for exchanging information and streamlining 
regulations between the parties. 
One exception to the largely generic nature of the technical barriers to trade 
rules can be found in an annex on electronics. Singapore has an unusually 
complex system of testing in this sector. The agreement contains promises 
to use conformity assessments and international standards bodies as much 
as possible.
Another chapter covers rules for food and food safety. The sanitary 
and phytosanitary chapter codified that both sides could have import 
requirements for food and food stuffs. Imports can be stopped and 
checked for compliance with relevant sanitary and phytosanitary rules, 
under a set of procedures that was tightened and clarified with specific 
timelines for inspections. The agreement sets out a variety of committees 
and consultations to take place around sanitary and phytosanitary issues 
in the future.
Finally, the agreement also sets out four sector-specific provisions. 
For  motor vehicles, Singapore agreed to recognise EU standards and 
testing regimes for cars and car parts. The agreement also has language 
on green rebates for more environmentally friendly motor vehicles. 
A second section covers electronics, where Singapore agreed to gradually 
replace third-party testing of products (particularly to accept suppliers’ 
declarations of conformity that are widely used inside the EU). A third 
sectoral element of the EUSFTA looked at pharmaceuticals where the 
primary pledge calls for greater transparency in pricing structures. Finally, 
the agreement has a section on green technology: both sides pledged to 
allow renewable energy equipment to move between the EU and Singapore 
with national treatment (foreign products granted the same treatment 
as locally produced comparable items) and no additional conformity tests.
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Trade in services
While the agreement covers trade in goods, the primary offensive 
objective of the EU was to improve access to Singapore’s services markets. 
Services could include financial services, insurance, banking, brokerage, 
accounting, design, architecture, legal, management, food and beverage, 
travel and tourism and so forth. For most developed economies, services 
can represent the bulk of economic activity. Even in manufactured goods, 
the services content of goods in cross-border supply chains can be 40–70 
per cent. Hence, greater access and better protections of these key sectors 
were important objectives for both sides.
The EU claimed to have given Singapore levels of access comparable 
to the  EU–Korea FTA in telecommunications, financial, computer, 
transport, environmental and some business services. The sections of the 
agreement covering postal services, the EU argued, went beyond what 
Korea got. 
Both parties agreed that the governments may not use licensing 
requirements as a mechanism to obstruct entry into services markets. 
While licensing is not a particularly serious barrier to entry in either the 
EU or Singapore, this remains a favoured mechanism in many ASEAN 
countries to restrict foreign firm competition. Hence, the inclusion 
of clauses on licensing for services in the EUSFTA is primarily a marker 
for future ASEAN and ASEAN-wide agreements.
To ensure that both parties maintain the very best access to each other’s 
services markets going forward and to capture whatever gains come from 
future negotiations with other partners, the parties agreed to include 
a most-favoured-nation (MFN) ratchet clause into the agreement. This 
means that the EU automatically receives new, matching benefits if 
Singapore ever negotiates an improved services agreement in any other 
format and vice versa for Singaporean firms entering the EU.5 
5  This is, frankly, a terrible idea, but it is currently wildly popular with trade officials all over the 
globe who worry about losing ground to new players in future agreements. The problem with ratchet 
clauses is that they tie your government and markets into provisions that you had zero input in 
negotiating and could potentially cause harm in ways you cannot imagine. The easiest way to see the 
dangers is to imagine one party signing an agreement in the future with a small country in the Pacific 
Ocean (for example) where the economic stakes seem so modest that the agreement can afford to be 
incredibly ambitious. Suddenly, your own country has granted the same access through the ratchet 
to far more competitive firms in the partner country that could ultimately threaten domestic firms.
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The services chapter does not cover all services. Carved out of the deal 
are audio-visual services; national maritime cabotage; air transport; 
and mining, manufacturing and processing of nuclear materials.6 
The Europeans were not terribly successful in getting new market access 
to Singapore’s financial services sector.7
Services were negotiated on the basis of a ‘positive list’. This is a typical 
negotiating style for the EU. Under a positive list approach, only 
the services  sectors and subsectors specifically listed are opened for 
competition from firms in the partner country. Any new services sectors 
developed in the future (such as the whole industries of services generated 
by new technologies) are not opened unless the parties specifically 
negotiate such an opening in the future.8 The positive list is currently 
easier for the EU to use, since the individual member states can be very 
clear about what sorts of commitments in which subsectors they are 
willing to promise. Everything else not specifically noted is not opened 
for competition from partner firms. 
In services, like in goods, an agreement includes two parts. The first is 
a set of rules and regulations governing the sector. The second are specific 
market-access promises made by each side, broken down by 12 sectors 
and 160+ subsectors. In addition, in the EUSFTA, the European-side 
commitments are split into horizontal commitments (to apply across all 
subsectors in a sector), as well as establishment promises for the subsector 
and specific pledges on what is called mode 4 (temporary movement 
of personnel). 
The EUSFTA opens up competition in postal services. These are services 
that are often considered sensitive by many governments with extensive 
restrictions for entry into the market. 
6  As an example of the dangers of the ratchet, if not done carefully, future deals on either side 
could open the audio-visual sector or lead suddenly to open skies if a future agreement on either side 
grants such provisions (and the ratchet in the EUSFTA contains any ambiguities that would let these 
new rules flow through the EUSFTA). Clever lawyers can find all sorts of ways to make mischief. 
7  The goal was to get comparable coverage to what the Americans received in their bilateral 
agreement with Singapore. But the EU was not successful in meeting this objective. See Singapore’s 
specific commitments on financial services in Annex 8B-2 of European Commission (2015).
8  The contrasting approach is called a ‘negative list’. The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and 
all American FTAs include a negative list. Under this style of negotiating, all services sectors except 
for those listed are opened to competition. This includes all future and new sectors and subsectors 
that are automatically opened unless the parties agree in a negotiation to close them to competition. 
Singapore, which has agreements with the USA and is a TPP member, negotiates services agreements 
using both positive and negative approaches. ASEAN, as a whole, has always used positive lists.
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Both sides agreed that telecommunications has a vital role to play in 
business today. They agreed to respect the confidentiality of information 
and to require firms to provide services on non-discriminatory terms, 
conditions or rates. The agreement also outlined competitive safeguards 
for major suppliers of telecommunications services. While the agreement 
does not break new ground on e-commerce, it does pledge cooperation 
between both sides. Both sides agreed to avoid imposing unnecessary 
restrictions or regulations on e-commerce activities. The agreement 
recognises the importance of the free flow of information and commits 
both sides to uphold international standards of data protection.
Other new areas of coverage
Meat
One issue of concern for Europe was Singapore’s complex system of 
approval for meat imports. Under the EUSFTA, Singapore agreed to 
remove a requirement that meat products should be individually inspected 
and approved by the Agri-Food and Veterinary Authority (AVA) in 
Singapore. Going forward, Singapore agreed to set up an auditing system 
and allow inspections only when triggered by the auditing system.
Government procurement
Both Singapore and the EU are signatories to  the Agreement on 
Government Procurement (GPA) at the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). In 2017, 19 parties are signatories.9 Under the GPA, members 
agree to allow certain government contracts for goods and services to be 
opened to firms from member states under competitive bidding. 
Since both parties are included in the GPA, the EUSFTA extended the 
coverage areas under which tenders are to be accepted. The EU agreed to 
include EU central government entities, public works concessions such as 
railways, and some additional utilities. In addition, the EU dropped the 
threshold levels for bidding by Singaporean firms. 
9  Counting the EU as one. www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/memobs_e.htm (accessed 14 
May 2017).
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Geographical indications
Although the EUSFTA includes other elements in the intellectual property 
rights chapter, nearly all the focus was on geographical indications (GIs). 
This issue nearly derailed the entire negotiations and largely held up the 
conclusion of the agreement for nearly two years. 
The basic problem is that the EU is the world’s staunchest supporter of 
GIs, while Singapore has been generally hostile to the idea. To complicate 
matters further, Singapore was simultaneously negotiating an FTA with 
the USA and other parties in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The TPP 
specifically did not include GIs, and TPP members were extremely 
uncomfortable with reconciling the two agreements at the end.10
A GI is a specific type of product protection. Put simply, a GI suggests 
that products are unique largely due to specific conditions, reputations 
and traditions surrounding their creation. These products cannot be 
recreated elsewhere and should not be allowed to bear similar names. 
To allow similar names is to confuse consumers who are not receiving 
benefits from all the specific aspects of a good.
The term originally came from wine (and subsequently spirits) production. 
Champagne grown in Champagne, France, is assumed to carry elements 
of the specific soil, weather conditions, growing traditions and bottling 
procedures. These elements cannot be replicated in a place like California. 
Whatever product gets produced in California should be called something 
other than champagne, such as sparkling wine, to avoid misleading 
consumers.
The EU has pushed for the inclusion of GIs in FTAs and has expanded 
the list of products beyond wines and spirits (many of which now have 
protections at the global level under the WTO) to items like cheeses and 
meats.11 Once a product receives GI protections, no other similar product 
10  The resolution of this issue in the aftermath of Singapore’s commitments in the EUSFTA for the 
TPP has been to allow GIs for ‘compound names’. In general, such product designations require two 
names. Thus, ‘feta’ cheese is considered generic (and not protected). But ‘Wisconsin cheddar’ might 
qualify.
11  In the EU–Korea FTA, the GIs annex runs to 22 pages and includes a wide range of products 
including a host of different types of mushrooms. The EU’s internal register of these products includes 
more than 1,000 food items and 3,000 different types of alcohol. The USA, by contrast, prefers to 
give products protection under trademarks, if the products meet the necessary criteria for trademark 
protection. 
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can use the same product terms even if the label makes origin explicit. 
The EU tries to stop firms from producing products made ‘like’ or ‘in the 
style of ’ or using a ‘method’.
Singapore had no list of GI protections and no products that it wanted 
included on a list. After heated negotiations, Singapore developed 
a list of 196 products to be granted GI protections in the marketplace. 
Recognition was therefore not automatic, but subject to negotiation and 
approval from the regulatory authorities in Singapore. The Singapore 
list is particularly heavy on compound names (not just parmesan cheese, 
but Parmesan-Reggiano cheese or not just ham but Parma Ham) and 
items already protected with trademarks. In general, the stance of the 
Singaporean Government was to add products to the list only after 
determining whether such product names were viewed in Singapore as 
a ‘generic’ name. If so, products could not be granted GI protection.
Singapore added another wrinkle to the negotiations by insisting in 
a side letter that the entire agreement would not go into force until the GI 
procedures were sorted out and the list of protected GIs was confirmed by 
the Singapore Parliament. The bill was passed in April 2014. 
Competition chapter
The agreement includes a chapter on competition policy. Both Singapore 
and the EU already have in place laws that are designed to prevent the 
growth and spread of monopolies. Hence, the chapter starts at a deeper 
level and commits both parties to enforcing their own respective laws on 
competition. The chapter also urges both sides to address the horizontal 
and vertical agreements between undertakings that might distort 
competition.
The chapter does, however, explicitly allow for public undertakings with 
special or exclusive rights and to maintain state monopolies. Finally, the 
chapter includes provisions that clarify procedures around subsidies. 
The agreement allows for subsidies for things such as serious disturbances 
to the economy; the coal industry; social character; natural disasters; 
economic development for abnormally low areas; certain economic 
activities such as research and development (R&D), environment and 
supporting small and medium-sized enterprises; culture; and regional 
interest projects.
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Trade and sustainable development
All European agreements include a chapter on trade and sustainable 
development, including the EUSFTA and EU–Korea FTA. The primary 
purpose in these two agreements is to include binding commitments on 
domestic levels of environmental and labour protections consistent with 
core international standards and agreements. 
The deal has provisions for corporate social responsibility activities, as 
well as conservation efforts. Fish and logging are specifically called out in 
the texts. 
This chapter includes information about the procedures for stakeholder 
engagement and consultation with civil society. Finally, the chapter comes 
with its own dispute mechanism.
Labour standards in the EUSFTA
The agreement gives each party the right to establish their own levels of 
labour protection. Both sides also have the right to adopt or modify relevant 
laws or policies on labour. Finally, both sides committed to upholding 
the 1998 International Labor Organization (ILO) Declaration. Under 
this provision, parties agreed to the freedom of association, and effective 
recognition of the right to collective bargaining; elimination of all forms 
of forced or compulsory labour; effective abolition of child labour; and 
elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.
Dispute settlement and management
The agreement spells out the procedures for handling disputes. Complaints 
are to be handled by an arbitration panel if necessary.
The EUSFTA also sets out a strong institutional structure of committees 
and working groups for implementation. 
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Obstacles to entry into force: Who is 
responsible for investment now?
Officials negotiating the agreement considered the possibility that 
ratification in 27 (now 28) member states might be a lengthy process. 
The  deal allows provisional implementation to take effect during 
ratification by individual member states.
The effective date of the agreement, however, was thrown into turmoil by 
an unexpected European obstacle. The EUSFTA was the first agreement 
negotiated by the EU after the Lisbon Treaty took effect. 
Lisbon moved competence over investment from individual member 
states to the European level (Meunier-Aitsahalia 2014). But it did so in 
a relatively unusual way. As Sophie Meunier relates, five words (‘and on 
foreign direct investment’ ) were added in a very late review session for the 
treaty that could change the way Europe deals with investment issues. 
Prior to this session, individual member states in Europe had their own 
responsibility for managing investment. Most member states had an 
extensive network of existing bilateral investment treaties (BITs) spanning 
the globe. 
But once the relevant section of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU or the Lisbon Treaty) came into force on 
1 December 2009, the European Commission argued that responsibility 
for investment moved to the European level and was no longer to be 
handled by individual member states directly. Articles 206 and 207 of 
the TFEU include the phrase ‘the progressive abolition of restrictions 
on international trade and on foreign direct investment’. Changes to the 
treatment of investment could be quite challenging to manage.12 
After the conclusion of the treaty, some member states in the EU objected 
to an expansive definition of this phrase, which saw the European 
Commission suddenly taking over the task of handling investment 
negotiations as well as broader trade issues. Some members suggested 
that investment—at best—ought to be considered an area of ‘shared 
12  But a great boon to an army of consultants, lawyers and scholars to sort out in the coming years. 
The fate of other agreements, such as the FTA between Canada and the EU as well as ongoing early 
negotiations with China over a BIT, are also stuck in limbo.
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competence’ with the European Commission and individual member 
states involved in any agreements that covered the gamut of potential 
investment issues like those usually handled inside an FTA or a BIT.
The EUSFTA does include broad coverage of investment. The negotiated 
rules cover expropriation, national treatment, fair and equitable treatment 
for investors from member countries, full protection and security, and free 
capital movements and payments. These clauses are, by now, fairly typical 
for recent FTA agreements between developed economies. The EUSFTA 
chapter will replace 12 existing BITs between Singapore and European 
member states.
One wrinkle in a standard investment treaty comes from Europe’s 
status as ‘not a state’, which makes it ineligible for investor–state dispute 
settlement under the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID). Therefore, the EUSFTA provides additional venues 
for settling disputes over investment such as an additional facility at 
ICSID, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, and 
any other forum designated by the parties to a dispute. The rules allow 
tribunals to dispose of claims that are ‘manifestly without legal merit’ and 
‘unfounded as a matter of law’. The agreement contains three annexes that 
outline a mediation alternative, give a code of conduct to arbitrators, and 
cover procedures for transparency and access to the public of the dispute 
proceedings (see Shepherd 2014).
The investment chapter of the EUSFTA was handed over to the European 
Court of Justice to revise on 30 October 2014. The European Court of 
Justice delivered its ruling on 16 May 2017, and the expectation is that 
the agreement will now progress to ratification.13
Conclusions
The signing of the EUSFTA was a key first step on the pathway to a larger 
regional agreement linking Europe with ASEAN. Once the agreement 
clears the European Court of Justice and then the European Parliament, 
it will set up additional opportunities for European economic activity 
with Singapore and allow Singaporean companies expanded access into 
13  ECJ Opinion 2/15 (Full Court), curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=9ea
7d2dc30d6b9fc7709f4e94ae5a2948b05c7a3a370.e34KaxiLc3qMb40Rch0SaxyLb3r0?text=&docid
=190727&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=470866.
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European markets. For both sides, the agreement also includes a wide 
range of rules and regulations that bring greater certainty and increased 
transparency to business operations.
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4
Is the CETA a Road Map for 
Australia and the EU?
Annmarie Elijah
Introduction
Canada and the European Union (EU) reached agreement on key 
aspects of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) 
in October 2013. The full text was released to the public in September 
2014 before undergoing a legal ‘scrub’ ahead of ratification across the 
jurisdictions. The CETA was signed in October 2016 and approved by 
the European Parliament in February 2017. 
For the EU the CETA is the first trade agreement with a Group of Eight 
(G8) country and a significant plank in its post-2006 ‘Global Europe’ trade 
strategy, which moved the focus of EU trade policy towards bilateral deals. 
For Canada it represents an attempt to cement political and economic 
ties with the EU and diversify its trade profile, which is otherwise heavily 
dominated by the United States of America (USA).
In a joint statement at the time of its release, the EU and Canada referred 
to the CETA as an ‘ambitious and ground-breaking’ agreement. It  is 
a  complex and lengthy text that took almost five years to negotiate. 
The  agreement is a good example of the ‘new generation’ of trade 
agreements that seek to address both traditional market access issues and 
‘behind the border’ impediments to trade. 
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The CETA includes chapters on market access; rules of origin; trade 
remedies; technical barriers to trade; sanitary and phytosanitary measures; 
customs and trade facilitation; subsidies; investment; cross-border 
trade in services; temporary entry; mutual recognition of professional 
qualifications;  domestic regulation; financial services; international 
maritime transport services; telecommunications; electronic commerce; 
competition policy; state enterprises; monopolies and enterprises; 
government procurement; intellectual property; sustainable development; 
labour; the environment; and regulatory cooperation.
It includes protocols on conformity and manufacturing practices and 
a number of joint declarations and understandings, some of which serve to 
incorporate former agreements into the new framework. Multiple annexes 
set out reservations to the agreement. It contains robust administrative 
and institutional provisions and sets out the parameters for dialogue 
and further bilateral cooperation between the EU and Canada. It thus 
constitutes a ‘living agreement’ in the sense that obligations among the 
parties may be expected to change in coming years. 
The starting question for this chapter was whether the CETA might 
constitute a ‘road map’ for a possible trade agreement between Australia and 
the EU, with particular reference to the role of sub-national governments; 
mutual recognition of qualifications; government procurement; and 
institutional provisions. The chapter proceeds with a history and context, 
before outlining findings in the specific areas, and drawing lessons for 
Australia. With some important qualifications, the research confirms the 
usefulness of the CETA as a recent indicator of the EU’s likely position 
in any forthcoming negotiations. The concluding section argues that the 
CETA provides grounds for cautious optimism about prospects for an 
Australia–EU agreement, noting the different context of the bilateral 
relationships. 
History and context
Notwithstanding some clear historical parallels in the bilateral 
relationships, a survey of existing political and economic cooperation 
between Canada and the EU compared with Australia and the EU reveals 
a ‘thicker’ transatlantic relationship. Canada has a longer and stronger 
record of cooperative action with the EU, including a less acrimonious 
trading relationship since establishment and more cooperative agreements 
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in place. In the postwar years, economic ties with European countries 
waned in favour of strong Canada–USA ties (Deblock & Rioux 2010). 
Canada did, however, maintain significant member state relationships 
with both the United Kingdom and France, a fact that became relevant in 
the trade negotiations. 
The formal history of the CETA commenced in 2007 at the Canada–EU 
Summit in Berlin when the parties announced that joint work would be 
undertaken on the potential benefits of an agreement. However, a Canada–
EU trade agreement was debated and even pursued much earlier. There 
was an attempt to institutionalise economic cooperation in the late 1990s 
with the EU–Canada Trade Initiative. In the early 2000s, a parliamentary 
report suggested a trade agreement to address the ‘steady downward spiral’ 
of Canada–Europe economic relations (see especially Dymond & Hart 
2002) and Prime Minister Jean Chrétien was instrumental in launching 
the Trade and Investment Enhancement Agreement (2002). There was 
little enthusiasm on the EU side, however, with the main emphasis still 
on multilateral trade negotiations at that time (Hage 2011). Canada–EU 
economic cooperation remained largely superficial. 
In Canada, the debate over enhanced ties with the EU is always conducted 
with reference to the concentration of trade with the USA: the EU is 
necessarily cast as an ‘alternative’ partner, and in some cases a solution 
to ‘stagnating’ North American economic integration (DeBardeleben 
& Leblond 2010). However, Canada has faced difficulties in terms of 
leverage. Although political and economic ties between the EU and 
Canada were sound, for many years Canada ‘did not constitute a priority 
for Europe’ (Deblock & Rioux 2010). 
In the event, it was a provincial premier who raised the political profile 
of  a possible trade agreement in both Canada and the EU. Arguably, 
Quebec Premier Jean Charest was uniquely placed in this regard. 
His work in championing an agreement at home and abroad (including 
with the French Council presidency of 2008) coincided with extremely 
slow progress multilaterally and a changed set of EU trade policy priorities 
(Hage 2011). After a joint study that promised benefits in both the EU 
and Canada, the negotiations were formally launched in May 2009. 
Like other potential trade agreement partners for the EU, Canada was 
obliged to put in train a treaty-level political agreement in tandem with 
the economic negotiations. The Strategic Partnership Agreement was 
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concluded in 2014. The form of wording in the agreement includes 
a satisfactory outcome on the so-called linkage issue, whereby agreements 
with the EU are connected with each other and subject to human rights 
clauses. The wording had previously caused consternation over the EU’s 
political agreements with Canada, Australia and New Zealand. 
The CETA negotiations took five years, not including the ‘scoping’ 
period preceding the formal launch in 2009 or the legal scrub, multiple 
translations and ratification currently underway. The time that would 
be required to complete the CETA was repeatedly underestimated by 
analysts and governments throughout the negotiations (see, for example, 
Deblock & Rioux 2010: 39) and few anticipated the EU’s internal 
political difficulties of October 2016 when the government of the Belgian 
region of Wallonia threatened to veto the CETA immediately prior 
to its signature.
At the completion of the CETA text, the agreement was recognised by 
the EU and Canada as a new phase in bilateral relations and ‘a vehicle 
to create new prosperity’ on both sides of the Atlantic (Government of 
Canada & European Union 2014). In terms of traditional market access 
the CETA results in clear gains for both parties, with liberalisation (tariff 
reductions and quota increases) occurring upon entry into force and at 
three, five and seven years thereafter. The European Commission describes 
the elimination of customs duties for goods originating in the EU and 
Canada as applying to ‘almost all goods’ (European Commission 2014a). 
Carve outs (exclusions and longer transitional arrangements) remain in 
sensitive areas. 
In relation to services and investment, the CETA ‘constitutes the most 
comprehensive trade agreement the EU has ever concluded’ (European 
Commission 2014a). Given that the projected gains from the agreement 
rely heavily on trade in services, this is significant. The chapters relevant 
to trade in services are numerous and not all aspects are covered here. 
A key point is that the EU was persuaded to enter into a ‘negative list’ for 
services, widely regarded as being a more liberalising instrument, since 
parties are required to list reservations and exceptions and include all 
other trade. 
The way this has been handled in the CETA is a complex two-tiered 
system of annexes. Annex I lists existing measures and restrictions that 
parties wish to maintain, with no other restrictions to apply and ‘no risk 
of rollback’ (European Commission 2014a). This is considered especially 
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important to provide certainty to business. Annex II lists further measures 
but makes no commitment on whether parties will adopt new, different 
or potentially more restrictive measures in the future. The annexes on 
services run to more than 300 pages. The full implications of the CETA 
and its treatment of trade in services will not be known for some time. 
The role of sub-national entities
Negotiations for the CETA were genuinely ‘multilevel’. While the interests 
of the EU’s member states (and for that matter its sub-national entities) 
were represented by the European Commission, the Canadian provinces 
and territories were directly involved in the negotiations. This  was the 
first—and so far only—time that the provinces were ‘at the table’ for 
a trade deal.1 This involvement was at the request of the EU, which sought 
‘buy-in’ at a sub-national level (Fafard & Leblond 2013). 
Projected gains from the CETA are substantially attributed to ‘behind 
borders’ liberalising measures. The changed nature of trade agreements—
often referred to as ‘second generation’ agreements—has involved sub-
national entities more than previously, as issues under negotiation impact 
on policy competences not held exclusively at the national level. 
The need for province and territory commitment to the CETA was 
most obvious in relation to government procurement, but sub-national 
involvement was by no means limited to Chapter 19. It was estimated 
in 2012 that the provinces and territories were actively involved in 
more than  half of the negotiating committees on the CETA (Fafard 
& Leblond  2012). Further, as negotiations progressed it was clear 
that different regions stood to gain (or lose) to different degrees from 
the proposed deal. The negotiations underlined the need for effective 
coordination among the Canadian provinces and territories and with the 
federal government, which has the authority to negotiate, sign and ratify 
international treaties. 
1  This negotiating model has not been replicated in other trade negotiations that Canada has since 
commenced; for example, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations, which Canada formally 
joined in October 2012. 
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This is not to suggest that the CETA was the first time that Canadian 
provinces and territories were involved in international negotiations. 
Consultation and information-sharing mechanisms had existed since the 
negotiations of the (then) Canada–USA Free Trade Agreement (1989) and 
later the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Established 
‘C-Trade’ meetings took place quarterly and more often as appropriate. 
Existing coordination mechanisms, however, were challenged by the 
CETA. Proponents of the deal—such as the former Premier of Quebec, 
who saw himself as a key player—sought additional involvement. Other 
provinces and territories were vocal in their opposition. Particularly where 
provincial interests did not align with likely outcomes, the difficulty 
of maintaining ‘one voice’ was an ongoing challenge for the Canadian 
government. 
Notwithstanding the difficulties, the Canadian rationale for including 
the provinces and territories in the negotiations may have been twofold. 
First, it met the need to assure the EU of provincial commitment to the 
agreement. Second, it served as a neat precursor to the domestic reforms 
that will need to occur to implement the CETA—some of which are long 
overdue. Here the recognition of occupations and professions is a good 
example, where domestic impediments to movement across provinces 
has become a significant problem. In this case, the CETA has provided 
impetus to a domestic reform process. 
Since the CETA’s conclusion and its release in September 2014, the 
complex nature of provincial commitment to the agreement has become 
publicly apparent. Based on a dispute over compensation for fisheries, 
Newfoundland has first, threatened to withdraw support for the CETA 
and second, raised its concerns directly with EU institutions and the 
member states. This is notwithstanding considerable effort on the part of 
the Canadian Government to maintain a unified negotiating position and 
adequate buy-in from provinces and territories. It is unclear whether these 
late objections will have any impact on implementation of the agreement. 
In the event, it was the role of EU sub-national entities that proved 
politically salient immediately prior to the CETA’s signature in late 2016.
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Mutual recognition of professional 
qualifications
A stated objective of the CETA is to increase the flow of professionals 
between the EU and Canada. Chapter 10 (temporary entry) clarifies and 
simplifies provisions relating to short-term business visitors with the aim 
of facilitating trade and investment. It includes the aim of visa-free travel 
for EU and Canadian citizens in the near future (Government of Canada 
& European Union 2016). 
Provisions for mutual recognition of professional qualifications appear in 
Chapter 11 and a related annex. The European Commission Directorate-
General for Trade’s assessment of this chapter is that the CETA has 
‘broken new ground’ (European Commission 2014a). The institutional 
innovation here is to enable relevant authorities and professional bodies 
in the jurisdictions to work with government in establishing a mutual 
recognition agreement (MRA) in a given area. 
The chapter establishes a joint committee that will oversee cooperation 
on the recognition of qualifications. The committee will assess proposals 
on the basis of criteria including industry needs, potential economic 
benefit, and compatibility of licensing and qualifications requirements 
for that sector before a sector-specific MRA is signed and implemented. 
These provisions are potentially liberalising but must be seen as a starting 
point for a forthcoming, potentially lengthy, process of assessment across 
different sectors. 
Ultimately, when specific MRAs are concluded, EU professionals would 
have their qualifications recognised in Canada, and vice versa. Much 
may depend on relevant authorities or professional bodies driving the 
process. In some cases professional bodies appear to have begun their 
work in anticipation of institutional mechanisms that would enable 
mutual recognition. Engineers and architects are apparently advanced 
in negotiations, and in these cases the measures will most likely prove 
successful in enabling people movement. 
In other areas sustained attention to implementation and uptake will be 
required to make best use of the measures. This can best be described as 
a cautious or ‘managed’ form of mutual recognition that will be applied 
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on a case-by-case basis.2 Economic gains from mutual recognition 
provisions in the CETA may therefore be limited in the short term. 
The Joint Committee on Mutual Recognition will meet within a year of 
the entry into force of the CETA and report back to the CETA committee 
on progress in relation to MRAs. Built-in transparency provisions 
(Article 11.5(e)) should enable progress on MRAs to be monitored. 
Government procurement
The European Commission summary of the CETA states that the 
EU achieved ‘a very positive result, fully in line with the EU interests 
and negotiation requests’ on government procurement (European 
Commission 2014a). The provisions of Chapter 19 refer to reciprocal 
bidding rights inside the EU member states and the Canadian provinces 
and territories. This may include federal entities, provincial and territorial 
ministries, most agencies of government, crown corporations, regional, 
local and municipal governments and entities. 
Certain thresholds and exemptions remain in place to address provincial 
interests, for smaller contracts and non-urban areas in Canada.3 However, 
Chapter 19 is seen by the EU as a significant win in terms of access, 
particularly in relation to municipalities, academic, school boards and 
hospitals (known as MASH), which have not previously been included 
in any Canadian trade agreement. According to the Directorate-General 
for Trade the ‘opening to European bidders is unprecedented’ (European 
Commission 2014a). 
The CETA text on government procurement is compatible with—
and  indeed derived from—the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) 
Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), a plurilateral agreement 
aiming to ensure fairness and transparent conditions of competition 
on procurement. Signatories commit to the GPA with schedules 
detailing market access. In the revised GPA (finalised in April 2014) the 
parties undertook to revisit the agreement and negotiate on extended 
coverage within three years. WTO dispute resolution mechanisms 
2  These provisions in no way resemble the mutual recognition provisions implemented by Australia 
and New Zealand in the 1990s. In that case all registered occupations (except medical practitioners) 
were deemed mutually recognised among Australian jurisdictions and New Zealand upon entry into 
force of the agreement. See the Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition Arrangement (1998). 
3  For example, exceptions were made for some energy suppliers in Ontario and Quebec. 
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apply to the  GPA.  The CETA further builds on GPA commitments 
by institutionalising Canada–EU cooperation through a government 
procurement committee, which will report to the CETA committee. 
Importantly, Canada has committed to a level of openness in the CETA 
that it did not in the GPA context. While both the EU and Canada are 
signatories to the GPA, the EU has committed to coverage across central, 
sub-central and ‘other entities’. Canada committed only to coverage 
at the level of central government. On the basis of lack of reciprocity, 
the EU did not extend access to procurement to Canada under its GPA 
commitments. The 2008 joint study commissioned by the Canadian 
Government and the Directorate-General for Trade estimated that only 
10 per cent of procurement in the EU and Canada was subject to any 
GPA commitments at that time (European Commission & Government 
of Canada 2008). 
Thus, the benefits from Chapter 19 accrue to both European and 
Canadian companies, which will upon ratification have unprecedented 
access to procurement across levels of government, with certain exceptions. 
For obvious reasons, the ongoing commitment of sub-national entities in 
both Canada and the EU will be crucial to successful implementation of 
the procurement measures. This goes some way to explaining the EU’s 
enthusiasm for having Canadian provinces and territories ‘at the table’ 
for the negotiations. 
On close inspection, the procurement situation inside the EU is also 
complex.  Notwithstanding claims from the European Commission 
about the EU being substantially open to outside bidders already, 
analysts have recently highlighted the inadequacy of procurement 
data internationally. This makes claims about openness difficult (if not 
impossible) to substantiate. The CETA does include transparency 
provisions (Article  19.19) requiring the collation of statistics and that 
parties report annually to the committee, which may help in time to 
understand procurement in the bilateral relationship. 
Researchers also found in 2012 that openness varied significantly across 
EU member states, and that there may be non-tariff barriers (NTBs) at 
work in procurement in both the internal market and for foreign suppliers 
(Messerlin & Miroudet 2012a, 2012b). This issue was also highlighted in 
the annual US report on trade barriers, which newly singled out Poland 
and Slovakia, and identified further issues in countries listed previously, 
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such as the Czech Republic, France, Italy and Romania. US trade 
negotiators have pointed to issues ranging from widespread corruption 
to transparency issues, inadequate law enforcement and inefficiencies in 
government as trade barriers (Inside US Trade, 8 April 2015). Procurement 
has been a vexed issue in the EU–USA negotiations for a Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). 
It is worth noting that government procurement across the EU single 
market is a work in progress, with a recent law reform taking place in 
2014 and still being implemented across the member states. For the 
moment it is safe for trade partners and foreign bidders to assume that 
the 28 member states (EU28) are not all equally accessible in terms of 
procurement. 
Institutional provisions
Institutional provisions governing how the CETA will work are found 
predominantly in Chapter 26 (administrative and institutional provisions). 
These are straightforward and complement existing mechanisms for 
bilateral dialogue. The CETA Trade Committee will oversee a number 
of specific committees tasked with monitoring chapters of the agreement 
(for  example, on mutual recognition and government procurement). 
Dispute settlement mechanisms (Chapter 29) provide for consultation, 
mediation and intergovernmental bargaining among the parties should 
differences of opinion arise. These exist alongside existing recourse to the 
WTO but aim to resolve issues much faster. In general, the institutional 
provisions for the CETA are robust. Given that much work remains to be 
done—for example, in working together on closer regulatory regimes, and 
finalising MRAs—it is imperative that the CETA is a ‘living agreement’. 
Progress in bringing Canada and the EU economically closer will depend 
greatly on the effectiveness of these committees. 
Strong review mechanisms no doubt reflect EU and Canadian intentions 
to fully implement the CETA. The mechanisms also reflect the fact that 
neither party yet knows the outcomes of the TTIP during negotiations. 
An indicative example can be found in Chapter 4 on technical barriers 
to trade, which has an annex entitled ‘Cooperation in the field of motor 
vehicle regulations’. Annex  4-A of the annex is a revision clause that 
enables the parties to revisit the terms of the deal relating to motor vehicle 
regulations, in a long-standing area of disagreement between the EU and 
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the USA. It is entirely possible that aspects of the CETA could be refined 
or reviewed if the TTIP were to proceed in some form. Institutional 
provisions reflect this. 
Bilateral negotiations between Canada and the EU on a Strategic 
Partnership Agreement were conducted in tandem with the CETA 
negotiations and concluded in September 2014. The agreement aims to 
enhance bilateral cooperation on a broad range of issues.
The Strategic Partnership Agreement is relevant here in that it contains 
provisions relating to the ‘linkage issue’, which arises in EU agreements. 
The linkage clauses knit together bilateral agreements between a third 
country and the EU. Further, at the insistence of the European Parliament, 
framework and partnership agreements with the EU necessarily contain 
clauses relating to human rights. The upshot of the linkage clauses and 
the human rights inclusions is that in the event of a breach by a partner 
government, the EU could effectively suspend all bilateral agreements 
with that partner, including trade and economic agreements. Among 
developed economies this is considered an unlikely event; nevertheless, 
the clauses have been a sticking point in agreements with a number of 
countries negotiating with the EU, including Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand. The form of words agreed in the SPA has effectively provided an 
institutional workaround for this longstanding irritant.
An aspect of the CETA that has not yet been explored in any detail is 
the implications of the agreement for third countries. These will be most 
apparent in relation to the USA to the extent that the CETA impinges 
on North American economic integration. However, the third country 
implications will not be limited to the USA. Institutional provisions 
include a joint declaration (Chapter 30) towards the end of the CETA 
text, which encourages Canada to begin negotiations as soon as possible 
with countries who have an existing customs union with the EU and 
‘whose products do not benefit from the tariff concessions under this 
Agreement’ (European Union & Government of Canada 2016). Canada 
may need to add further trade deals to its current negotiating list. 
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Implications for Australia
Preliminary work on a possible Australia–EU trade agreement is being 
undertaken in both Canberra and Brussels. However, the case for such an 
agreement is still being made. Current indications are that the agreement 
will be launched in late 2017. In this context, the final terms of the CETA 
take on particular relevance for Australia. 
Kenyon and van der Eng have previously established the economic 
comparability of Canada and Australia in terms of suitability for an EU 
trade agreement (Kenyon & van der Eng 2014).4 Adams et al. concur, 
noting that the two share ‘substantial economies, similar economic 
structures and similar trade profiles with the EU’ (Adams, Brown & 
Wickes 2013). Without rehearsing this argument in full, if anything, this 
case has recently strengthened. Canada remains the larger economy, but 
the gap has narrowed. 
The two countries’ top 10 export commodities continue to bear a striking 
resemblance. Trade in services—and the EU’s role in that sector—
remains crucially important to both economies. Total services trade has 
been growing, basically doubling in value between 2000 and 2012 for 
both countries (UN Comtrade 2015a, 2015b). Canada is rated 22nd 
in the most recent Ease of Doing Business Survey and Australia is rated 
15th (World Bank 2016). Recent figures confirm that investment is the 
strongest dimension of the economic relationship for both Canada and 
Australia (see especially EU Delegation to Australia 2016). 
A key difference in the trade profiles between the two countries is the 
relative diversity of the Australian economy. Merchandise exports are 
moderately concentrated among partners for Australia, with the top nine 
partners accounting for 80 per cent or more of exports in 2013. Exports 
are described as highly concentrated among partners for Canada, with the 
USA accounting for almost 75 per cent of Canadian exports in 2013. 
Australian imports are even more diversified whereas Canadian imports 
are also concentrated (UN Comtrade 2015a, 2015b). The importance 
of the USA to the Canadian economy can hardly be overstated, and this 
alters the context of Canada’s trade negotiations significantly. 
4  See especially Table 2 on page 236, which sets out a comparison of economic indicators. 
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The history of Australian–EU relations also differs in important respects 
to Canadian–EU relations. Australia and Canada have achieved a similar 
set of cooperative agreements with the EU, although Canada has often 
been ahead. It was the first country to achieve an agreement with Euratom 
(1959) and the first industrialised country to arrive at a Framework 
Agreement on Economic Cooperation (1976). It can be no surprise that 
Canada was regarded by the EU as a suitable candidate for comprehensive 
trade negotiations. 
With these issues in mind and drawing on analysis of the CETA in the 
chapters outlined above, this section begins to draw out the possible 
implications for Australia in any forthcoming negotiation with the EU. 
In  general terms, the CETA does provide some clues for Australia: it 
confirms, for example, that enhanced market access to the EU is possible 
in sectors such as agriculture, and that the EU would bring to the 
negotiating table a high level of ambition in relation to ‘behind borders’ 
measures. 
The role of sub-national entities
The CETA raised unprecedented issues relating to the involvement of 
Canadian provinces and territories in trade agreements. While there are 
important differences in the functioning of the Canadian and Australian 
federations, it is clear that an Australia–EU agreement would raise many 
of these same issues. 
The first set of questions for Australia are about whether the EU would 
seek state and territory representation at the negotiations, and whether 
the Australian Government would accept this. Either way, the states and 
territories (and perhaps even local governments) would need to be involved 
in some form, and the importance of early and effective engagement on 
a possible agreement can hardly be overstated. This engagement would 
need to go beyond consultation to secure political commitment and 
ensure successful ratification and implementation. It is worth noting 
that the entire process may take some years. Further, if the EU was 
assured of successful Australian internal coordination on trade policy, the 
perceived need for direct involvement in the negotiations could perhaps 
be overcome. As negotiations progress, the Australian Government will 
need to be prepared to give specific details of how the proposed trade 
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agreement will benefit Australian states and territories,5 and how any 
negative implications will be dealt with. In the Canadian case, this meant 
federal government compensation in some sectors to secure provincial 
agreement. 
Mutual recognition of professional qualifications 
Specifically in relation to the provisions on mutual recognition of 
professional qualifications, the CETA measures in their current form 
constitute no obvious difficulty for the Australian Government. 
The  question here is whether a higher level of ambition would be 
warranted, rather than case-by-case painstaking construction of specific 
MRAs by sector. If the CETA provisions were replicated for Australia, it 
is likely that well-organised industry and/or professional bodies would 
be able to pursue mutual recognition in specific instances to good effect. 
It may take some time. On the other hand, in sectors where there has 
already been significant domestic and/or trans-Tasman efforts made, 
mutual recognition could potentially proceed faster. 
Government procurement 
On government procurement it is safe to assume that the EU would bring 
the same or similar negotiating requests to the table in the first instance, 
and that increased access would be pursued aggressively. The European 
Commission has stated that their demands were successful in the CETA 
(European Commission 2014a). This same ask would place new demands 
on Australian authorities. 
In the event that the Australian Government proceeds with plans to move 
from observer status to a member of the GPA (The Hon Andrew Robb 
AO MP, Minister for Trade and Investment, 2014) EU expectations 
could potentially line up with current Australian policy intentions in this 
sector. Recent changes to the GPA (2014) appear to be better aligned with 
Australian policy objectives.
The openness and barriers in the Australian procurement market are well 
summarised in recent WTO reviews. Recent European Commission 
reports on potentially trade-restrictive measures identify certain 
Australian procurement policies (at federal and state levels) as problematic 
5  See the Canadian Government’s breakdown of benefits by jurisdiction at www.international.gc.ca. 
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(European  Commission 2013, 2014b). The Buy Australian at  Home 
and Abroad and the Plan for Australian Jobs packages both feature, as 
do minimum local content targets, ‘buy local’ campaigns, and small 
and medium enterprises measures. These issues are likely to be raised 
in negotiations. 
Negotiations on government procurement would also draw attention 
to new opportunities inside the EU market for Australian companies. 
As outlined above, existing research shows that sound data around 
government procurement is scarce. Claims about the openness of the EU 
market should be carefully evaluated across the 28 member states. Claims 
that GPA membership (and commitments across all levels of government 
therein) somehow equate to open procurement markets should also be 
scrutinised. 
The procurement issue places state and territory involvement front and 
centre in any negotiations, and has the potential to raise the political 
profile of a potential agreement. One critical report argues that the CETA: 
will substantially restrict the vast majority of provincial and municipal 
government bodies from using public spending as a catalyst for achieving 
other societal goals (Sinclair, Trew & Mertins-Kirkwood 2014). 
The issue of ‘green procurement’ also came to the fore in the course of 
the  negotiations (Hubner 2010). Similar political sensitivities can be 
expected in the Australian context. 
Institutional provisions 
On the face of it, the institutional provisions present no special problem 
for the Australian Government. Robust review mechanisms and the 
prospect of a ‘living agreement’ are consistent with the approach taken 
in other bilateral deals. The principal institutional impediment to an 
Australia–EU trade deal was the incomplete framework agreement, which 
is now finalised.  
Conclusions 
So, is the CETA a ‘road map’ for Australia and the EU as a trade agreement, 
as canvassed in Canberra and Brussels? The answer is yes, and no. In many 
ways the CETA provides a suitable comparison for any agreement between 
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Australia and the EU. In the CETA, Canada and the EU were able to 
secure increased market access and progress a raft of ‘behind the border’ 
measures. Australia and Canada are similarly attractive as trade partners 
for the EU, and the two countries face similar asymmetrical difficulties in 
dealing with the EU28. 
In the CETA chapters examined in detail here, the agreement is an 
excellent guide as to what the Australian Government could expect in 
a negotiation. An optimistic assessment might conclude that an Australia–
EU agreement would yield a negative listing for trade in services (with 
significant reservations); improved access to government procurement 
markets for both parties; managed mutual recognition provisions on 
qualifications leading to greater people movement; and a set of institutional 
provisions enabling long-term economic cooperation to flourish. Impact 
on the states and territories would be significant, in a range of areas. 
Yet, offensive and defensive interests in a trade negotiation are unique to 
each bilateral relationship, and outcomes will differ. Australia and the EU 
have a more troubled, less institutionalised, history. Canada and Australia 
operate in different regional contexts and have adapted accordingly. 
The  overwhelming importance of the USA in Canada’s trade profile 
cannot be overlooked. Considering the EU’s stated intention to negotiate 
a comprehensive trade deal with the USA, it is impossible to escape the 
conclusion that both parties conducted the CETA negotiations with one 
eye on the TTIP. It is clear that the TTIP and the CETA are connected 
from the EU perspective. Prospects for the TTIP’s conclusion are presently 
poor, and the internal EU controversy relating to CETA has not helped.
This dynamic is not at work in the Australian case, and it changes the 
negotiating context significantly. The EU arguably has a ‘defensive 
interest’ in a trade agreement with Australia because of the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) negotiations (Adams, Brown & Wickes 2013), but this 
may not raise Australia as a priority for the EU—in terms of starting 
negotiations, or successfully completing them. Bauer et al. have argued 
that the EU should seek to address the ‘blind spot’ of Australia and New 
Zealand to advance its priorities in the Asia-Pacific, and there is a case to 
be made for this approach (Bauer et al. 2014). 
The timing of negotiations also matters a great deal, especially on 
traditional  market access issues. Adams, Brown and Wickes pointed 
out in 2013 that if the TTIP suddenly progressed the USA could ‘strip 
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the EU’s cupboard bare’ on agriculture in particular (Adams, Brown 
& Wickes 2013). A transatlantic deal looks increasingly unlikely, however 
the progress of other trade deals, and their implications for Australian 
trade with the EU has not escaped the attention of Australian exporters 
(Condon 2014). The advancement (or otherwise) of the mega-regionals 
may therefore impact prospects for an Australia–EU agreement.
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The Changed Architecture of 
the EU’s Agricultural Policy Over 
Four Decades: Trade Policy 
Implications for Australia
Alan Swinbank and Carsten Daugbjerg
When the European Economic Community (EEC)—today’s European 
Union (EU)—created its common agricultural policy (CAP) in the 1960s 
and 1970s it paid scant regard to the interests of other nations. That ‘old’ 
CAP attempted to increase farm incomes by manipulating farm-gate 
prices,  while a nascent, but rather ineffectual, structural policy sought 
to improve the competitive structure of European agriculture. Details 
differed  from one product to another, but market price support meant 
in the main that imports were heavily taxed, exports subsidised and 
intervention stocks accumulated. When, in 1973, the EEC was enlarged 
with the accession of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom 
(UK)—the latter a major importer of agricultural products from world 
markets—trade diversion was inevitable, and Australia in particular 
found its agricultural products displaced from the UK market. The CAP’s 
escalating budgetary costs in the 1980s led to some half-hearted attempts 
at reform, but it was the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations under 
the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that 
triggered a succession of ‘reforms’ that significantly changed the CAP’s 
policy mechanisms, while retaining its core focus of farm income support 
(Daugbjerg & Swinbank 2009, 2011, 2016). The latest recalibration 
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of the CAP, in 2013, established the policy framework for the period 
2014–20. The aim of this chapter is to briefly explain the succession of 
policy changes of the last four decades and how it has changed the policy 
context within which a free trade area agreement with Australia has to 
be considered.
Accession of the UK to the CAP of the 1970s
By the time of the UK’s accession to the EEC in 1973, the main outlines 
of the old-style CAP were firmly in place (see Box 1; and Harris, Swinbank 
& Wilkinson 1983). In the late 1960s, the then European Commissioner 
for Agriculture, Sicco Mansholt, had attempted a CAP reform, arguing 
that support prices were too high, and that significant structural change, 
and investment, was needed to improve the competitive position of 
European agriculture; but his efforts were rebuffed and for his pains he 
was dubbed the ‘peasant killer’ (‘Bauernkiller’) amid angry street protests 
(Merriënboer 2011: 511–8). All that was achieved was the adoption in 
1972 of three rather ineffectual ‘structural directives’, which had the 
objective of improving the efficiency of European agriculture (Harris, 
Swinbank & Wilkinson 1983: 222–4).
Box 1. The terminology of price support
The language differed from product to product, and has subsequently varied 
over time, but in the cereals regime, for example, the EEC’s institutions fixed an 
intervention price—at which the member states would purchase grain to add to 
intervention stocks . To stop cheaper imports from undercutting the higher EEC market 
price, at the border a threshold price was fixed, and a variable import levy was payable 
on imports to bridge the gap between the lower world market price and this threshold 
price. As the EEC’s level of self-sufficiency increased, exports became necessary if 
intervention stocks were not to continue increasing; but private traders would only 
export if they were paid subsidies to do so . Thus, export refunds were required . 
The costs of intervention, and export subsidies, were borne by the EEC’s budget . 
In 1995 the Uruguay Round’s Agreement on Agriculture placed a cap on subsidised 
exports, limited the extent to which domestic market prices could be supported, 
and through a process referred to as tariffication converted most border measures, 
such as variable import levies, into fixed tariffs, which were then reduced (Daugbjerg 
& Swinbank 2009: 54) .
The world food crisis of the early 1970s, together with the opening of 
the UK’s food market for surpluses from the European continent, meant 
that any internal constraints on generous increases in support prices 
in the annual farm price review could, for the moment, be ignored. 
The  Dillon (1960–62), Kennedy (1964–67) and Tokyo (1973–79) 
Rounds of multilateral trade negotiations in the GATT had little impact 
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on the CAP, as did attempts by the United States of America (USA), 
Australia and others to challenge aspects of the CAP through GATT’s 
dispute settlement procedures (Daugbjerg & Swinbank 2009: 76–80). 
Academics had criticised the CAP, and suggested alternative approaches 
(e.g. Corbet & van Riemsdijk 1973), but their comments were largely 
ignored. Consumer interests and, at the time, the environmental lobby 
had very little influence over the design of EEC farm policy; but with 
lower world market prices, and the increase in EEC production outpacing 
consumption, by the early 1980s the budget cost was beginning to bite 
(Moyer & Josling 1990: 24–7).
The frustrations felt by Australia at the time were forcibly expressed by 
Australia’s Minister for Special Trade Representations in the House of 
Representatives in March 1978. He declared that trade was ‘causing great 
strains between Australia and the EEC’. A major problem was the CAP:
We are efficient producers of agricultural products … Yet the EEC is 
denying us the opportunity, the right, to compete in its markets. Worse, 
the EEC is disposing of the surpluses caused by its policies at heavily 
subsidised prices on third markets in which we would otherwise sell 
our products (Garland 1978).
In particular, he claimed that ‘Australia is the country worst affected 
by the  enlargement of the EEC and its common agricultural policy’. 
He asserted that exports of beef had been badly affected ‘as a result of 
the imposition of increasingly protective mechanisms’, and that the 
‘application of the EEC’s common agricultural policy to United Kingdom 
imports has wiped out our trade in sugar and butter to the EEC’ (Garland 
1978). The  Australian Government commissioned its own research to 
demonstrate the follies of the CAP (e.g. Bureau of Agricultural Economics 
1985) for presentation at workshops in Europe.
A brief history of CAP reform
The CAP of the mid-2010s is significantly different from the ‘old’ CAP 
of the 1970s and ’80s, as described above. In particular, it can be claimed 
with some justification that it is much less trade distorting, that the costs it 
imposes on European consumers (and the economy as a whole) are much 
reduced, and that more care is taken to ensure that its environmental 
impact is benign. This section outlines the policy changes that have 
brought this about, while highlighting the international trade dimension.
AUSTRALIA, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE NEW TRADE AGENDA 
80
Budget pressure in the 1980s prompted the first policy changes. 
In 1984, milk quotas were introduced to curb the upward trend in milk 
production, much of which was surplus to the EU’s requirements and had 
been converted into butter and skim milk powder for sale to intervention. 
Although a temporary measure, milk quotas lasted until 2015. Then in 
1988, with the budgetary costs of the CAP still increasing, partly because 
of the need to subsidise a growing surplus of cereals, a new system of 
agricultural stabilisers was introduced. Limits were placed on the growth 
in the CAP budget—although no policy mechanisms would be directly 
triggered if the limit was breached—and for key commodities such as 
cereals the intent was that automatic reductions in support prices would 
apply if production exceeded a maximum guaranteed quantity (Swinbank 
& Tanner 1996: 85–6).
The changes introduced in 1992 were far more significant. Although 
prompted in part by a continuing budget crisis, in reality the major 
problem that the EU had to address was the stalemate over agriculture 
in the Uruguay Round negotiations. The Uruguay Round had been 
launched in 1986 as a single undertaking, in which nothing was agreed 
until everything was agreed. The USA had demanded sweeping changes 
in the rules governing farm support, with the Australian-led Cairns Group 
playing a mediating role (Kenyon & Lee 2006).
The EU had been reluctant to make significant concessions on agriculture, 
but in the lead-up to the ministerial meeting at the Heysel conference 
centre in Brussels in December 1990—initially arranged to ceremonially 
close the Round—it became obvious that the EU would have to reform 
its CAP if it were to achieve its wider ambitions for the Uruguay Round. 
Following the breakdown of the Heysel ministerial meeting, the European 
Commissioner for Agriculture, Ray MacSharry, launched his CAP reform 
plan. Agreement was secured in May 1992 with the Portuguese farm 
minister, Arlindo Cunha, chairing the Council of Agricultural Ministers. 
As Cunha has noted, ‘after the Heysel deadlock, GATT negotiations and 
CAP reform were inevitably linked, despite the politically correct official 
line of denying such a link in public’ (Cunha & Swinbank 2011: 82).
The MacSharry reform began the decoupling of support for European 
farmers. The core agreement concerned cereals. Here support prices 
were cut by a third. Furthermore, they were fixed in nominal terms for 
an indefinite period: no longer would an annual price review result in 
inflationary increases in intervention prices. To compensate farmers for 
the implied loss in revenue they could claim an arable area payment. 
81
5 . THE CHANGED ARCHITECTURE OF THE EU’S AGRICULTURAL POLICY
Thus,  the incentive to increase yields, or even harvest the crop, was 
lessened. The per hectare payment was based on a regionally determined 
historic yield, multiplied by the reduction in support prices. Larger farm 
businesses had to set aside (i.e. not use) 15 per cent of their arable area, 
although the arable area payment was still payable on the land set aside 
(Swinbank & Tanner 1996: 94–5). The oilseed, beef and sheep meat 
regimes were also amended, and provisions for support for environmental 
policies were introduced.
A critical juncture in the two negotiations came in the spring of 1992 
when it became clear that the USA would accept the concept of a blue 
box of domestic support into which the area and livestock payments being 
negotiated in the CAP reform could be slotted (Cuhna & Swinbank 2011: 
83).1 This encouraged ministers to press ahead with CAP reform, which 
was an important step in enabling the Uruguay Round negotiations on 
agriculture to be concluded satisfactorily. Thus, not only did the Uruguay 
Round negotiations put pressure on the EU to reform its agricultural 
policy (Kenyon & Lee 2006), but as Tanner (1996: 31) has pointed out, 
within the Uruguay Round’s ‘consensus framework, the pace of change 
[was] determined by the extent to which the most recalcitrant participant 
[was] prepared to proceed’. Thus, ‘the imprint of the European Union’s 
domestic reforms [was] clearly stamped on the final agricultural outcome’.
Moreover, as Tangermann (2004: 40) highlighted, the Uruguay Round 
‘also affected the nature of the policy debate in agriculture. The WTO has 
become a relevant factor in agricultural policy making’. Thus, it was  in 
the Agenda 2000 reform of 1999, and the Fischler reforms of 2003–04, 
that the  EU sought to anticipate the likely future outcome of trade 
negotiations in what was now the World Trade Organization (WTO), and 
was obliged to make changes to its sugar policy to bring its sugar exports 
into conformity with a ruling from the WTO’s Dispute Settlement 
Body in a case brought by Australia, Brazil and Thailand (Daugbjerg & 
Swinbank 2009: 114–5).
1  For developed economies the final agreement made provision for three categories of domestic 
support. Support deemed to be decoupled, with ‘no, or at most minimal, trade-distorting effects 
or effects on production’, and as defined in Annex 2 to the Agreement on Agriculture (the green 
box), would not be subject to reduction commitments. Blue box measures—direct payments under 
production-limiting programmes—such as the EU’s area and livestock payments, were also exempt 
from reduction commitments. All other ‘domestic support measures in favour of agricultural 
producers’—the amber box—would, after a transitional period, be limited to 80 per cent of the 
support granted in a historic base period (Daugbjerg & Swinbank 2009: 54).
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The Agenda 2000 CAP reform was negotiated in the run-up to the WTO 
ministerial meeting in Seattle, at which it was thought a Millennium 
Round of trade negotiations might be launched. The EU at the time was 
of the view that any agreement on agriculture in a Millennium Round 
could be limited to a further tranche of reductions (to import tariffs, 
domestic support and export subsidies) similar to those agreed in the 
Uruguay Round. But the EU was worried about its ability to abide by 
the existing export subsidy limits on cereals. It was also keen to appeal 
to the Uruguay Round agreement’s reference to the need to respect the 
non-trade concerns of WTO members, particularly the multifunctionality 
of European agriculture (Daugbjerg & Swinbank 2009: 157–9). 
The Agenda 2000 package was also concerned with establishing a new 
Financial Framework for the 2000–06 planning period, a reform of the 
structural funds, and preparation for enlargement to embrace up to 10 
former communist regimes from Central and Eastern Europe (Cunha & 
Swinbank 2011: 107).
With regard to the CAP market price regimes, Agenda 2000 resulted in 
a further decoupling of farm support. This involved another cut in support 
prices for cereals and beef, and one for butter and skim milk powder to 
apply from 2005, with partially offsetting increases in area and livestock 
payments, and a new blue box payment for milk producers. Support 
for environmental enhancement on farms, investment in restructuring 
European agriculture, and a new dimension of rural development were 
packaged together as the second pillar of the CAP, although the budget 
devoted to the second pillar remained small in relation to first pillar 
expenditure on market price support and direct payments. In a further 
effort to enhance the CAP’s green credentials, member states had the 
option of introducing cross-compliance, making full disbursement of area 
and livestock payments conditional upon the farmer having complied 
with a number of environmental conditions. But few did. Although the 
package covered the period until 2006, a little noticed provision provided 
for a mid-term review in the early 2000s.
In his second term as European Commissioner for Agriculture and Rural 
Development, Franz Fischler took the opportunity of turning this mid-
term review into another substantial reform of the CAP in 2003 and 2004: 
the Fischler reform. This resulted in more decoupling of support, in two 
respects. First, all the direct payments that had been introduced by the 
MacSharry and Agenda 2000 reforms, but that were still linked to areas 
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planted or the number of livestock kept, were transferred into the new 
single payment scheme. Although farmers had to have agricultural land 
at their disposal on which to claim their entitlement, and this land had to 
be kept in good agricultural and environmental condition and other cross-
compliance conditions respected, in the main the link with production was 
broken. For example, ex-dairy farmers could continue to claim a payment 
in compensation for the cuts in milk support, but they no longer had 
to keep cows, and could instead engage in other agricultural activities. 
Second, in 2004 and subsequent years, the decoupled single payment 
scheme was extended to other products that had not been touched by the 
MacSharry and Agenda 2000 reforms, such as olive oil, processed fruit 
and vegetables, and hops (Swinbank & Daugbjerg 2006).
Although some member states engaged in the full-decoupling allowed 
under the single payment scheme, others opted for only partial decoupling. 
For example, member states had the option to link 25 per cent of the 
displaced area payment for cereals to continued planting of a cereal crop. 
Most of these residual partial decoupling options were, however, removed 
by the Health Check of 2008 (Daugbjerg & Swinbank 2011).
At the outset of the Doha Round in 2001 the EU had been on the 
defensive, still seeking to defend the CAP and limit the impact of any 
new agreement on agriculture. But CAP reform and WTO negotiations 
interacted, and the Fischler reform allowed the EU to adopt a more 
proactive stance. Franz Fischler claimed, after the reform package had 
been agreed in June 2003, that:
Today marks the beginning of a new era. European agricultural policy will 
change fundamentally. In future, our products will be more competitive, 
and our agricultural policy will be greener, more trade-friendly and more 
consumer-oriented. …
The reform’s message to the world is clear: today we have largely said 
goodbye to an old system of support which distorted trade. The new 
agricultural policy is trade-friendly, particularly as regards its effects on 
developing countries.
This will put us on the offensive at the WTO negotiations in Cancún 
in September (Fischler 2003).
The WTO ministerial meeting in Cancún in September 2003, however, 
failed to conclude the Doha Round.
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Figure 1. EU budget expenditure on the CAP, 1980–2014, in € billion 
and as a percentage of EU GDP, current prices
Source: Data compiled and supplied by the EU’s Directorate General for Agriculture 
and Rural Development .
Figure 1 shows the evolution of EU budget expenditure on the CAP 
from 1980 to 2014, through the MacSharry, Agenda 2000, Fischler and 
Health Check reforms, and as it enlarged from nine to 28 member states. 
For the last decade the level of expenditure has been more or less constant 
in nominal terms (and thus has declined in real terms), while falling as 
a percentage of the EU’s gross domestic product (GDP). In the 1980s, 
under the ‘old’ CAP, expenditure on market support (e.g. intervention) 
and export subsidies dominated, and the ‘rural development’ budget was 
poorly developed.
The 1992 MacSharry reform (and Agenda 2000) reduced expenditure on 
the area labelled ‘other market support’ in Figure 1, with an offsetting 
increase in coupled direct payments. In the WTO, these area and livestock 
payments were declared as blue box measures, with a corresponding 
decrease in amber box support. Then the Fischler reforms of 2003–04, 
and subsequent changes, switched most of the coupled direct payments, 
and some expenditure on market support, into the decoupled single 
payment scheme—labelled ‘decoupled direct payments’ in Figure 1. These 
were declared as green box expenditure in the WTO.
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Another notable development was the decrease in the use of export 
subsidies. In the early 1980s, half of the EU agricultural budget was 
spent on export subsidies while they only accounted for a small fraction 
in the late 2000s. This development was partly a result of the MacSharry 
and Agenda 2000 reforms, which lowered internal support prices. With 
a smaller price difference between EU internal and world market prices, 
less subsidisation was needed to compensate exporters for the price 
difference. Improved world market prices further contributed to the 
decrease in the use of export subsidies. 
Thus by 2010 export subsidies were largely a matter of the past. Indeed, 
the EU had already agreed to ban their use in the context of an overall 
agreement to the Doha Round. Then, at the Ministerial Conference in 
Nairobi in December 2015, it was decided that ‘Developed Members’ 
would eliminate their remaining export subsidy entitlements for most 
products with immediate effect, with the remainder to go by the end 
of 2020 (WTO 2015: paragraph 6). Australia, however, continues to 
monitor the export of sugar from the EU (Swinbank 2015), and is entitled 
to do so until the EU’s quota regime for sugar expires in 2017.
Although some analysts have queried how decoupled the EU’s policies 
really are, particularly in the aggregate, the declarations of domestic 
support to the WTO have not been seriously challenged. The numbers 
suggest that the decoupling of the CAP over the period 1992 to 2008 
meant that no further changes would be required to meet the stricter limits 
on domestic support that were envisaged in the Revised Draft Modalities 
for Agriculture circulated in 2008 (Swinbank 2015; WTO 2008).
What these policy reforms have not done, however, is change the EU’s 
protective tariff regime. Tariffs remain at the levels established in the 
Uruguay Round, and it is unlikely that the EU will agree to reductions 
except in the context of a multilateral agreement in the WTO (although 
temporary suspensions have applied in response to high market prices). 
Thus, for example, the most-favoured-nation (MFN) tariff on white sugar 
remains at €419 per tonne despite the fact that the 2006 sugar reform 
reduced the support price from €631.9 to €404.4 per tonne (Noble 
2012: 12–13). High tariffs have a particular significance when considering 
free trade areas, such as that being considered between Australia and the 
EU; this is discussed below.
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Multifunctionality
In the run-up to the Seattle ministerial meeting, the EU and its allies 
(‘the friends of multifunctionality’) were keen to stress that in the densely 
populated Old World the use of agricultural land had a wider social 
and environmental dimension than the simple provision of agricultural 
products. Thus, European agriculture sustained a diverse fauna and 
flora, a treasured landscape, cultural diversity, and so on. Furthermore, 
if these alleged public goods were to be produced in the future, then the 
farm sector had to be protected, or else overseas producers who were not 
expected to meet the same environmental norms (those located in the New 
World in particular) could flood the European market with lower-cost 
produce, and Europe’s multifunctional agriculture would be threatened. 
Although the European Commission soon desisted from using the term 
‘multifunctionality’ in Geneva, because of the adverse reaction of its 
trading partners, the basic idea still pervades much European thinking 
about agriculture.
Critics suggest that the public goods associated with the concept of 
multifunctionality could be delivered on the basis of a series of contracts 
between the EU and individual farmers. Thus, for example, Anderson 
(2000: 491) concluded that the WTO’s green box provisions ‘are adequate 
for dealing with the main issues raised’. However, there is a trade-off 
between the administrative costs of negotiating, and monitoring, tens 
of thousands of contracts with individual land managers for the delivery 
of environmental services, and a more generic approach in which 
the expectation is that land managers will produce a multifunctional 
agriculture although, in strictly contractual terms, not required to do so. 
In the 2013 recalibration of the CAP, and the so-called greening of direct 
payments, this broad-brushed approach prevailed, as discussed below.
The single market and its regulatory provisions 
Although a number of regulatory provisions relating to European 
agriculture are governed by national rules—taxation of farm business 
profits, landlord–tenant relations, land zoning and planning laws, for 
example—the opposite is the case for legislation that might affect the free 
movement of goods within the EU’s single market. Thus, geographical 
indications of origin, wine denominations, food law, plant health and 
veterinary rules are either regulated by EU legislation, or the principle of 
mutual recognition that guarantees the free movement of goods between 
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member states provided fundamental public safety provisions are not 
compromised. One prominent domain in which this basic single-market 
concept is potentially threatened relates to the use of genetically modified 
products in animal feed and human food (Agra Facts 2015).
The concept of a single market is very important to EU policy makers, 
and it extends beyond the territorial domain of the EU. Countries 
such as Norway that are not members of the EU, but are members of 
the European Economic Area (in essence a ‘GATT-plus’ FTA), have to 
apply the EU’s single-market regulatory provisions just as they would 
were they EU member states. Similarly, as the EU has extended its web 
of FTAs around the world, so it has attempted to extend its regulatory 
regimes, particularly geographical indications, to its FTA partners 
(Kerr & Hobbs 2015).
The post-2013 CAP
The 2003 (Fischler) and 2008 (Health Check) reforms had not been 
linked to the determination of the periodic financial frameworks that 
the EU had been operating for two decades, but it was agreed that the 
CAP budget (and thus the CAP itself ) would be reviewed in establishing 
the 2014–20 financial framework. That review was concluded under the 
second College of Commissioners headed by José Manuel Barroso, with 
Dacian Cioloş serving as European Commissioner for Agriculture and 
Rural Development.
Circumstances had changed. One consequence of the price gyrations 
experienced on world commodity markets since the mid-2000s was that 
a number of EU governments and members of the European Parliament 
were extremely wary of a neo-liberal approach to agricultural policy, 
canvassed for a ‘strong’ CAP, and expressed concerns about food security. 
The near collapse of the world financial system following the Lehman 
Brothers debacle of 2008, the sovereign debt crisis and austerity budgets 
experienced by many EU member states, and the stark suggestion that 
one or more countries might have to abandon their use of the euro, 
suggested to others that the CAP budget should be reduced to reflect the 
straightened circumstances of the time: if social welfare programs were 
being cut why should CAP income support be spared?
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Following ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament 
had enhanced decision-making powers over the CAP—it had become 
the co-legislator with the Council of Ministers—boosting the power 
of the European Parliament’s Committee on Agriculture and Rural 
Development (COMAGRI). Moreover, the new member states that had 
acceded in 2004 and 2007 were expressing more forcibly their criticism 
of a system of farm income support that they believed disadvantaged their 
farmers in favouring those in most of the old member states. And the 
Doha talks remained in deep freeze.
The recalibrated CAP that emerged after an extended negotiation is, in 
its broad outlines, not hugely different from its pre-2013 predecessor, 
but the detail is exceedingly complex (despite the declared objective 
of simplification!), and member states have considerable discretion in how 
they apply important provisions.
The trade regime is unaltered. As in previous reforms the EU’s import 
tariffs have not been touched, and legislation would still have allowed the 
use of export subsidies. The residual elements of domestic market price 
support have not, in substance, been changed; although milk quotas were 
abolished in 2015 and sugar quotas will go in 2017, both of which may 
affect the EU’s net trade balance.
The European Commission proposed a CAP budget for 2014–20 more 
or less unchanged from 2013 in nominal terms, although declining in 
real terms, and this was accepted with some modification by the co-
legislators. It is widely believed that Commissioner Cioloş had argued 
in the College of Commissioners that a substantial budget was needed 
to enable the CAP to face the challenges of climate change. Whether the 
outcome of the reform matched that expectation is not explored here. 
Despite the environmental and greening rhetoric, there was no marked 
switch in the budget from Pillar 1 (market price and income support) to 
Pillar 2 (rural development), but in drawing up their rural development 
plans member states have had to pay more attention to promoting a low-
carbon and climate-resilient economy.
On direct payments (the successor to the previous single payment scheme) 
there are a number of changes, three of which are highlighted here. First, 
most noticed in the media was the decision to devote 30 per cent of the 
direct payments budget to a new greening component. What is now 
known as the basic payment will be claimed and paid annually as under 
the old single payment scheme: farm businesses have to have enough 
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agricultural land at their disposal to match, hectare by hectare, their 
basic payment entitlements, and cross-compliance means that a number 
of environmental, food safety, and animal welfare provisions must be 
observed if payments are to be received in full. In addition, to claim the 
greening component on their land a series of requirements will apply, 
outlawing, for example, mono-cropping on larger arable farms. 
Whether these measures in a cost-effective way will help retain soil 
carbon  and combat global warming, and enhance environmental 
provision,  are questions under debate in Europe. The European 
Commission offered little evidence to support its contention that greening 
would achieve significant environmental benefits, and the Council of 
Agricultural Ministers and the European Parliament significantly watered 
down the Commission’s initial intent in legislating for the post-2013 
CAP (Hart 2015). The green box status in the WTO of these greening 
payments might also be queried (Swinbank 2015).
Second, in addition to the need to meet the new greening requirements, 
some of Europe’s farmers will find that the level of their payments 
changes significantly. There is a limited redistribution of funds between 
member states, boosting payments, for example, in the Baltic States where 
payments were seen to be significantly below the EU norm. Elsewhere, 
if member states had not already moved to a flat-rate per hectare payment 
on a regional basis, they will now be obliged to do so. Farmers who, for 
a  variety of reasons, had accumulated large payment entitlements on 
their farms may now see their payments decline to the regional average, 
while others gain.
Third, member states now have a variety of options to recouple part of 
the basic payment to specific production activities; known as voluntary 
coupled support (Daugbjerg & Swinbank 2016). Some member states 
have announced that they will make little use of this provision; others 
plan to do so to the maximum extent permitted. Overall, the European 
Commission (2015: slide 19) believes that 10 per cent of the direct aid 
budget will now be coupled—more than was the case in the pre-2013 
CAP, but less than was allowed following the 2003 reform. The change 
will not jeopardise the EU’s ability to meet its current domestic support 
commitments in the WTO, but international observers might have noted 
that the French farm minister referred to ‘an historic turning-point that 
breaks with the process of decoupling aid that has prevailed since 1992’ 
(Embassy of France 2013).
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Free trade area agreements and the CAP
The EU is proud of its achievements in liberalising the import of 
agricultural products from selected developing countries. Thus, under 
its Everything but Arms (EBA) initiative it offers duty- and quota-free 
access for products originating in the least developed countries (LDCs), 
and it is party to a series of free trade area agreements—known as 
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs)—with African, Caribbean 
and Pacific Group of States (ACP) countries (Daugbjerg & Swinbank 
2009: 162–3). Both allow for the free importation of white sugar, and 
raw cane sugar for refining, for example. Agreements with states around 
the Mediterranean Basin give access for fruit and vegetables, olive oil and 
other Mediterranean products.
Given the failure to progress the Doha Round, attention has refocused on 
bilateral trade deals—FTAs—with non-LDC and non-ACP developing 
countries in Asia and South America, and with developed economies such 
as Australia, Canada and the USA. Negotiations on a Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with Canada, for example, 
began in 2009 (Kerr & Hobbs 2015: 437), but the European Parliament’s 
approval was only secured in February 2017.
When countries form an FTA they are supposed to ensure that ‘duties 
and  other restrictive regulations of commerce … are eliminated on 
substantially all the trade between the constituent territories in products 
originating in such territories’ (GATT Article XXIV: 8, emphasis added). 
Despite an attempt in the Uruguay Round to clarify what ‘substantially 
all the trade’ meant, it remains an unclear, and untested, provision. 
It seems doubtful, however, that an entire sector such as agriculture could 
be excluded, as had been the case prior to 1995. As the Commission of 
the European Communities (1995: 4) commented at the time: ‘To date, 
the free trade agreements concluded by the Union have been restricted 
in terms of product coverage. In particular, they have generally excluded 
all or most agricultural trade’. With exceedingly high import tariffs on, 
for example, sugar, beef and dairy products, and the ‘old’ CAP’s support 
arrangements designed to keep EU prices well in excess of those prevailing 
on world markets, it was indeed difficult to see how the EU’s protected 
agricultural sector could be included in an FTA with a competitive 
agricultural exporter.
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Despite the changes to the CAP over the last two decades—the 
MacSharry, Fischler and other reforms—the tariffs on many agricultural 
products remain stubbornly high. Thus, a competitive supplier of sugar 
or beef, for example, might aspire to the inclusion of these products in an 
FTA with the EU, while EU producers can be expected to object. If one 
competitive supplier gains entrée in this way, others will want to negotiate 
(or renegotiate) their own FTAs to gain comparable access to the EU’s 
protected market: precedents do matter. Thus, as Kerr and Hobbs (2015) 
document, ‘sensitive’ agricultural products tend to be excluded from the 
draft Canada–EU CETA, or—like European cheeses into the protected 
Canadian market, or Canadian beef (but hormone free) into the EU—are 
granted restricted access based on tariff rate quotas. As Commissioner 
Cioloş (2014) acknowledged, ‘the EU capacity to absorb additional 
concessions in the beef sector is limited … The composition and size 
of tariff quotas are most relevant in this respect’. Moreover, he noted: 
[b]eef was one of the most important elements for Canada in this 
negotiation, and this concession should be seen as part of a wider 
agricultural package: The EU obtained results on its offensive interests 
in agriculture including protection of Geographical Indications and very 
significantly improved market access for key products including dairy. 
The willingness of the EU to open its market for increased beef 
imports—a politically sensitive issue—may indicate that agriculture is not 
a deal-breaker to the extent that it was in the past. Nonetheless, Kerr and 
Hobbs (2015: 454) conclude, perhaps overly pessimistically: ‘The sub-
sectors of agriculture in each market that were heavily protected prior to 
the CETA remain heavily protected at the conclusion of the negotiations. 
No areas of substantial liberalisation in agri-food trade are included in the 
text of the CETA’. Whether Australia could do better remains an open 
question. 
In 1973, Australia’s agricultural exports were adversely affected by 
the UK’s  accession to the then EEC. The world has moved on, and 
agricultural  markets are significantly different now to what they were 
then. The CAP has changed, but many of the EU’s agri-food sectors 
are still protected by prohibitively high MFN tariffs. An FTA with the 
EU that incorporates these products in a meaningful way is an outcome 
to be prized by a competitive agricultural exporter, even if it means 
incorporating some of the EU’s regulatory measures, such as recognition 
of the EU’s geographical indications, into the free trade area agreement. 
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The result of the UK’s June 2016 referendum on EU membership, and 
the government’s subsequent decision to trigger the withdrawal process 
(‘Brexit’), could well mean that the UK will have left the EU by the end of 
March 2019 (Swinbank 2017). Is it an FTA with the remainder of the EU 
that the Australian farm sector would want to secure, one with the UK, 
or perhaps with both?
Concluding comments
This chapter has acknowledged that the ‘old’ CAP of the 1970s was highly 
protectionist, causing significant distortions to world trade, particularly 
for efficient agricultural exporters such as Australia. However, it has 
also sought to show that the policy has changed significantly, and that 
its distortions to international trade are much reduced (although there 
has been no attempt here to demonstrate this empirically). A number of 
pressures have borne down on EU policy makers that help explain this 
policy shift, but international pressure exerted through the GATT/WTO 
has—the authors believe—been crucial. This is why we deplore the failure 
to conclude the Doha Round, which would have the effect of locking in 
past CAP reforms. Despite the policy changes, the high tariffs on agri-
food products established by the EU at the conclusion of the Uruguay 
Round remain in place—another reason to deplore the international 
community’s failure to conclude the Doha Round. But this does mean 
that an FTA with the EU that effectively sidesteps these trade barriers is 
potentially important for an efficient agricultural exporter.
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1  Such agreements are also called preferential trade agreements (PTAs), for example by the WTO, 
but in this chapter we will use the more commonly used term free trade agreement.
Agriculture in the Australia–EU 
economic and trade relationship
Karen Hussey and Carl Tidemann
Introduction
Following the collapse of the Doha Development Agenda, two dominant 
trends have emerged in the international system of trade. The first is the 
proliferation of bilateral and regional free trade agreements1 (FTAs) as 
an ‘operational second best’ approach to multilateral regulation (Bonciu 
& Moldoveanu 2014). Such agreements are second best because they 
impose significant transaction costs on the international system of trade 
(i.e. exporters can be forced to handle sometimes dozens of different 
regulatory regimes concurrently), and they only occasionally produce 
significant trade gains in those areas that are particularly sensitive such 
as in agriculture and labour-intensive manufactured products (WTO 
2013; Viju & Kerr 2011). Despite these drawbacks, hundreds of FTAs 
have been negotiated over the last two decades and some optimism is 
warranted; at the very least, the size of the markets and the number of 
countries covered by some FTAs suggest that it may eventually be easier 
to return to the World Trade Organization (WTO) for a truly global trade 
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agreement because some regulatory reform under FTAs are intrinsically 
non-discriminatory, leading to a de facto most-favoured-nation dividend 
(WTO 2013: 24).
The second trend in recent years has been the rise of non-tariff barriers 
(NTBs) as impediments to trade between nations. Other than to tell us 
what they are not, the term NTB itself does not reveal any of the details 
of what they include. Nevertheless, they are, generally, all measures other 
than tariffs that restrict or otherwise distort trade flows (OECD 2005). 
More broadly, such measures could be customs rules and procedures, 
competition-related restrictions on market access, public procurement 
practices, or internal taxes or charges. Specifically, they may relate to 
requirements around labelling, certification, packaging, and health and 
safety standards. The challenge for the international system of trade 
governance is to balance the imperative of free trade with legitimate 
domestic concerns and expectations relating to social and environmental 
public good outcomes, a challenge acknowledged by the WTO:
While a convergence of public policy design would facilitate matters from 
a purely trade perspective, we recognise that respect for differing social 
preferences is paramount. We must work towards a shared understanding 
of what constitutes a level playing field (WTO 2013: 29).
Establishing ‘convergence of public policy design’ is where regional 
and bilateral agreements can be very useful. Despite the fact that high 
tariffs are still evident in key product areas, including agricultural 
products, more than four-fifths of international trade flows take place 
on a non-discriminatory basis, which means that regulations are far 
more important as potential trade barriers and sources of discrimination 
(WTO 2013: 25–6). Thus, while such FTAs can never achieve the same 
gains as multilateral agreements, they do nevertheless provide significant 
opportunities for trading partners to forge ahead in reducing traditional 
trade barriers as well as behind-the-border trade barriers (Hussey & 
Kenyon 2011). In very recent years there has been a revival in anti-free 
trade sentiment, most vehemently in the United States where vocal 
members of both the Republican and Democrat parties have objected 
to US ratification of the 12-nation Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement 
and negotiations for the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(Irwin 2015). Similar sentiments are also evident in parts of Europe, and 
the BREXIT ‘Leave’ campaign based at least some of their campaign 
on the perception that free trade between the EU and UK had failed to 
deliver promised gains. 
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However, those sentiments notwithstanding, the opportunities that an 
EU–Australia FTA offer are the motivation for the recent announcement 
on 15 November 2015 by the Australian Prime Minister, together 
with the President of the European Council and the President of the 
European  Commission, to start the process towards a ‘comprehensive 
and high-quality’ FTA (DFAT 2015). As a bloc, the European Union 
(EU) is Australia’s second-largest trading partner and largest source of 
foreign investment: in 2014, the EU’s FDI in Australia was valued at 
A$169.6 billion and Australian FDI in the EU was valued at A$83.5 billion 
(DFAT 2015). 
For Australia, a bilateral agreement with the EU could provide better 
access  to over 500 million consumers and help it to attract additional 
investment, technology, and skilled workers from Europe. However, as 
was the case in the Canada–EU negotiations towards the Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA, see Chapter 4 in this 
volume),  some of the predictable, sensitive issues that will challenge 
the Australia–EU negotiations relate to agriculture. They include tariffs 
and quotas, but negotiators will also have the opportunity to deal with 
a range of NTBs, including packaging, labelling, certification (technical 
barriers to trade—TBTs), and health and safety standards (sanitary and 
phytosanitary—SPS standards) (Viju & Kerr 2011). 
The objective of this chapter is to assess the major challenges that 
Australian and European negotiators will face in tackling the agricultural 
trade barriers that exist between the two trading partners. The asymmetry 
of the relationship prompts us to take a largely Australian perspective on 
the benefits to be gained in the agricultural sector from an Australia–EU 
FTA. This chapter is informed by statistical analysis of the current trading 
relationship; 15 interviews with key industry peak bodies and government 
departments; analysis of previous FTAs involving Australia and the EU; 
submissions to government enquiries; and the peer-reviewed academic 
literature. It begins by outlining the agri-trade relationship between 
Australia and the EU, then assesses the extent of traditional barriers that 
exist in agricultural trade between the two markets. It analyses the range 
of NTBs that currently impinge on the trading relationship and which 
could therefore usefully form the focus of trade negotiations, and proposes 
a number of ways forward to achieve greater convergence and coherence 
between the EU’s and Australia’s trade rules and the policies, norms and 
standards in other areas of public policy that create NTBs. 
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Agricultural trade between Australia 
and the EU
The EU and Australia have a long economic and diplomatic history 
governed most recently by the 1997 Australia–EU Partnership Framework, 
the 2008 Wine Agreement and a mutual recognition agreement (MRA) 
relating to industrial products. However, the relationship has historically 
been characterised by a high level of antagonism, caused by, on the one 
hand, the EU’s trade-distorting policies under the common agricultural 
policy (CAP) and their immovable stance on geographic indicators 
(see Chapter 7 in this volume), and on the other hand, Australia’s strict 
quarantine and biosecurity regimes (Kenyon & Lee 2006; Kenyon & 
Kunkel 2005). However, iterative reform of the CAP throughout the 
1990s, and especially since 2003, introduced a number of important 
innovations including a fundamental change to the decoupling of income 
support payments to farmers freeing them up to produce for the market 
and not for subsidies (i.e. a less trade-distorting approach) (Costa et al. 
2009; and for further detail see Chapter 5 in this volume). 
Two further reforms included the introduction of cross-compliance to 
ensure that farmers only receive financial support if they meet minimum 
good agricultural, animal welfare and environmental practices; and 
a shift from market support to rural development objectives (i.e. building 
capacity and diversification in regional areas, retaining young farmers on 
the land etc.). In the following years, those sectors still considered to be 
in surplus (e.g. sugar, fruit and vegetables and wine sectors) were also 
reformed, and a new rural development policy for the financial period 
2007–13 was prepared. The ‘heat’ in the relationship has also lessened 
owing to a shift in focus by Australian exporters to growing markets in 
Asia and the Middle East, and a relative decline in Australia’s market share 
to the EU due to increased competition from Brazil, China and South 
Africa—the same dynamics that saw the United States of America (USA) 
share of the EU market decline. 
Despite the rise of Asia and the Middle East as key trading partners, 
at the time of writing the EU is second only to China as Australia’s largest 
trading partner (DFAT 2017b). The EU is the third-largest export market 
for Australian goods behind China and Japan, and is the largest source of 
Australia’s imports ahead of both China and the USA. But the relationship 
is an entirely asymmetrical one: Australia represents just 1.7 per cent of the 
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EU’s export market and a mere 0.5 per cent of EU imports (DFAT 2017a). 
Imports from the EU are made up almost completely of manufactured 
goods as well as medicines and pharmaceutical products (Figure 1). 
Figure 1. Top five Australian imports from the EU
Source: DFAT 2017a .
Australia’s agricultural exports to the EU represent 18 per cent of all exports 
to the EU, with a total value of A$2.77 billion (coal is Australia’s second-
largest export commodity to the EU at 15 per cent) (ABARES 2014; 
DFAT 2017b). Figure 2 shows the key agricultural export commodities. 
Figure 2. Value in AUD of Australian exports of key agricultural products 
to the EU in 2013–14
Source: ABARES 2014 .
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However, like the USA and Japan, the EU employs strict quotas and high 
tariffs for a number of agricultural products that act as significant barriers 
to Australia’s exports. Figure 3 compares the extent of tariff measures in 
both Australia and the EU for key agricultural commodities. 
Figure 3. Average bound and applied tariffs for Australia and the EU 
of selected trade categories
Source: WTO 2014 .
As well as tariffs and quotas, the EU continues to subsidise its agricultural 
sector in a complicated system of payments, governed by the CAP. Since 
1986–88, the EU has worked to reduce its level of agricultural support, 
which now sits at 19 per cent as measured by the percentage producer 
support estimate (PSE),2 declining from a rate of 39 per cent—the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
average sits at 18 per cent (OECD 2014). Though the EU’s level of support 
to farmers is declining, that support remains high when compared with 
Australia’s rate of PSE of just 2 per cent (Table 1). The EU’s above average 
support highlights that even beyond the considerable reforms of the CAP, 
support to European farmers continues to be a trade barrier. Conversely, 
Australia places no tariffs on fresh or unprocessed products. There is, 
however, a flat rate of 5 per cent on almost all processed agricultural 
products (PAPs) of which the EU is a large exporter. 
2  The percentage producer support estimate (PSE) represents policy transfers to agricultural 
producers, measured at the farm gate and expressed as a share of gross farm receipts.
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Australia 2 11 1 0 .1 None None
EU 19 27 1 .05 0 .8 26 Sugar (13), 
beef and veal 
(24), poultry 
(12)
* TSE = total support estimate
Source: OECD 2014 .
Much of the consternation surrounding the CAP also relates to the EU’s 
use of export subsidies, even though these have also been significantly 
reduced in recent years. In 2014, export subsidies were €12 million, 
compared with €67 million in 2013, and €3.7 billion in 2004 (OECD 
2014). The EU continues to use trade-distorting subsidies, with average 
prices received by EU farm producers remaining 5 per cent above world 
prices, compared to Australia where farmers receive average prices that are 
at par with world prices (OECD 2014). Overall, while the EU market has 
declined in importance for Australian agricultural producers, there is still 
an opportunity and appetite to negotiate reforms to the tariff and quota 
arrangements of the EU in some key markets: oilseeds, beef and veal, 
lamb and mutton, dairy and wheat—each explored in turn now. 
The EU is a very significant market for Australian oilseeds, with canola 
alone making up 18 per cent of all agricultural exports to the EU. Demand 
for that product has skyrocketed since 2006–07. The EU Renewable 
Energy Directive (2009) further intensified demand, with canola being 
used in the production of biodiesel. The market is not subject to tariffs 
or quotas, but reflecting the product’s use in biodiesel, there are two 
significant European certification schemes for sustainable production that 
Australian exporters are required to adhere to. In essence, those schemes 
enforce sustainability standards in the production of canola along the 
whole supply chain—‘from the paddock to the Peugeot’—with current 
requirements demanding a 35  per cent reduction in greenhouse gas 
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emissions in comparison to fossil fuels3 (EC 2015). Those standards will 
increase to a minimum 50 per cent reduction in 2017 and 60 per cent 
reduction in 2018. However, based on current scientific evidence, 
Australian producers are likely to meet those thresholds. Somewhat 
ironically, it is unclear whether European oilseed producers will be able to 
do the same. While the EU market pays a premium price for Australian 
canola, almost two-thirds of the certification schemes’ criteria are irrelevant 
for the Australian environment so there are significant opportunities for 
negotiators in this sector. 
Beef and veal exports have also enjoyed strong recent growth between 
2007–08 and 2013–14, with exports to the EU more than tripling from 
7.3 thousand tonnes to 22.8 thousand tonnes, including an extraordinary 
33  per  cent increase from 2013 to 2014. The continued growth in 
grain-fed beef shipments has allowed Australia to diversify its markets 
in the EU, with further growth in exports to Italy (up 9 per cent), the 
Netherlands (up 29 per cent) and Denmark (up 12 per cent) (MLA 2015). 
Australian beef and veal, though they face no in-quota tariff, are restricted 
by two major quotas, the high-quality beef (HQB) Hilton quota (Australia’s 
share of this quota is 7,150 tonnes swt/year) that has a utilisation average 
from 90 per cent to 100 per cent, and the HQB grain-fed quota (48,200 
tonnes swt/year—on a ‘first come first served’ import allocation). 
To put this in perspective, Australia exported over one million tonnes of 
beef and veal globally in 2013–14 (ABARES 2014), so the EU quotas are 
hugely restrictive. Nevertheless, the EU remains the highest value market 
for Australian beef on a per tonne basis, averaging A$10,550/metric tonne 
in 2014 (MLA 2015). Australia’s access to the HQB Hilton quota and 
grain-fed HQB quota means that the majority of cuts exported to the EU 
are high quality and subsequently of high value (MLA 2015), and the fact 
that the quota is almost always filled suggests there would be significant 
gains for Australian exporters if that quota could be increased. In contrast 
to US and Canadian beef, Australian beef does not contain hormones and 
is therefore not subject to the EU’s ban on hormone-treated beef.
3  To be considered sustainable, biofuels must achieve greenhouse gas savings of at least 35 per cent 
in 2015 in comparison to fossil fuels, 50 per cent in 2017, and 60 per cent in 2018, but only for new 
production plants; cannot be grown in areas converted from land with previously high carbon stock 
such as wetlands or forests; and cannot be produced from raw materials obtained from land with high 
biodiversity such as primary forests or highly biodiverse grasslands. 
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The Australia–EU relationship in the dairy sector has been strained for 
the better part of four decades. In contrast to Australia, New Zealand 
dairy producers have enjoyed privileged access to the EU for New Zealand 
butter and cheese dating back to the United Kingdom’s (UK) accession to 
the EU in 1973. At that time, New Zealand’s access to the UK market was 
safeguarded on the grounds that New Zealand’s economy was so utterly 
dependent on it. For similar reasons those privileges were subsequently 
extended to an EU-wide bound commitment in the Uruguay Round 
negotiations (Kenyon & Lee 2006). No such privileges were afforded to 
Australian producers—then or since—with the result that dairy exports 
to the EU have been limited. 
The Australian dairy industry faces perhaps the most restrictive barriers 
with quotas and in-quota tariffs existing for most products: butter is 
limited to 10,000 tonnes from all third parties and an in-quota tariff of 
€950 per tonne; cheddar, of which Australia is a large exporter, is limited 
to 15,000 tonnes from all third parties and an in-quota tariff of €210 
per tonne; all other cheeses are limited to 19,500 tonnes from all third 
parties with in-quota tariffs ranging from €690 to €1,060 per tonne, 
depending on the variety of cheese. Not surprisingly then, dairy exports 
from Australia have declined in all categories since 2007–08 and the 
main market for Australian exports—the sale of cheese to the UK—has 
also declined over recent years.4 The EU accounts for just 2 per cent of 
Australia’s exports, and in-quota tariffs are partly to blame. However, 
of all the agricultural commodities exported to the EU, the dairy industry 
is arguably most affected by NTBs, especially in the areas of environmental 
standards and geographic indicators. On the latter there is little prospect 
that the EU will soften its stance in the foreseeable future (see below).
Interestingly, as with dairy products, NZ exports of lamb were similarly 
privileged after the UK’s accession to the EU and again Australian 
producers enjoyed no such access. Today, lamb and mutton exports to 
the EU are limited by a 19,186 tonne carcass weight equivalent tariff 
rate quota (TRQ)—a quota that is almost always filled. When compared 
with New Zealand’s quota (just over 228,000 tonnes), it is clear just how 
significant New Zealand’s privileged market access is. Indeed, the volume 
of lamb exports to the EU has increased slightly since 2006–07, with 
the main market being the UK. Importantly, the value of lamb exports 
4  This correlates with a reduction in production of dairy product in Australia between 2007–08 
and 2013–14, though average export unit values have continued to increase over time. 
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has almost doubled in the last five years, with the UK and EU attracting 
high-end, high-value lamb exports from Australia. At the other end of 
the value spectrum, mutton exports to the EU have also increased but 
neither the volume nor the value is very significant. Nevertheless, as is the 
case with beef exports, any leeway made in relation to lamb quotas would 
see considerable benefits accrued to Australian exporters, although New 
Zealand exporters might be less than enthusiastic about such an outcome.
Like lamb and dairy exports, Australian sugar exports to the UK had 
a  similar (but sadder) history with the demise of the Commonwealth 
Sugar Agreement in 1973 when the UK joined the EU. Again, the 
Uruguay Round failed to deliver similar market access arrangements for 
Australian sugar, and that sector has been exposed to significant tariffs and 
quotas in almost all major foreign markets as a consequence of the EU 
and USA in particular being major sugar producers themselves. Australian 
exports face a quota of just below 10,000 tonnes and an in-quota tariff 
of €98 per tonne; the quotas of Brazil (334,000 tonnes) and Cuba 
(69,000 tonnes) as well as all other third parties (254,000 tonnes) dwarf 
the Australian figure. In recent years, sugar exports decreased between 
2006–07 and 2011–12, though they have rebounded since. Exports to 
the EU are statistically insignificant, but for reasons mentioned above 
they will likely prove to be a sticking point in trade negotiations not 
least owing to the controversies of the Australia–United States Free Trade 
Agreement (AUSFTA) negotiations. In that case, the sugar industry was 
assured of positive outcomes but in reality was completely removed from 
the agreement. 
Australian wine exports to the EU have decreased significantly with 
the volume of imports into the major markets—Germany, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, and the UK—more than halved since 2006–07. However, 
the value of these exports remains very high. Tariffs on Australian wine 
are at 3 per cent—described by one interviewee as ‘a nuisance more 
than anything else’—and the treaty-level Australia–EU wine agreement 
has established an effective forum in which to resolve emerging issues. 
Indeed, while the EU’s regulations relating to geographic indicators and 
environmental sustainability (and associated labelling) are still problematic 
for Australian wine producers, both bilateral and multilateral dialogues 
are effective in addressing them, thus limiting the value of including wine 
in negotiations for an EU–Australia FTA. 
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Less significant markets for Australian agricultural products include fish 
and seafood exports and wheat. However, the EU is a net exporter of 
both commodities, so the potential to increase market share in those 
products is limited, with two exceptions. The first is the opportunity to 
expand exports of specialised grains, building on Australia’s reputation 
for producing high-quality durum wheat for use in pasta production. 
The second opportunity lies in the area of plant energy systems. However, 
in both cases the EU’s standards in relation to environmental sustainability 
and genetic modification could prove to be prohibitive to trade. 
Expectations from an Australia–EU FTA
As the previous section indicated, despite the gains made from the 
Uruguay Round of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and 
reforms to the EU’s CAP, significant trade barriers continue to impede 
trade in agricultural products between the EU and Australia. Certainly, 
the existence of highly restrictive tariffs and quotas in the EU suggests 
that trade negotiators could reasonably be expected to begin negotiations 
there. But the experience of other FTAs is sobering. In the lead-up to the 
AUSFTA, for example, it was predicted that there would be significant 
gains for the Australian agricultural industry as the USA maintained 
some of its highest trade barriers for agricultural goods (Krever 2006). 
The outcomes were far from ideal. Though there were seemingly positive 
changes made with respect to in-quota tariff removals in beef and dairy, 
safeguards were included by the USA ensuring that tariffs would remain 
in place in case of declines in the domestic value of those commodities 
(Clarke & Gao 2007; Krever 2006). Sugar was excluded from the 
agreement altogether. In Australia’s FTA with Japan, most Australian tariff 
lines will be reduced to zero. However, for cheese, various vegetables and 
a number of fresh and dried fruits, tariffs remain and they are not trivial. 
With respect to NTBs, in the Australia–Japan FTA little progress was 
made, with the text simply stating that each party shall not implement 
a measure unless it is allowable under the WTO and that such measures 
need to remain transparent. 
In contrast, CETA did deliver significant tariff reductions on agricultural 
products, with almost all tariff eliminations to be undertaken immediately. 
However, a key difference with the case of Australia mutes one’s optimism: 
the EU has been a significant net agricultural exporter to Canada for 
a number of years (Viju & Kerr 2011), which is a fundamentally different 
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relationship to that enjoyed by Australia and the EU. Success in agriculture 
in an Australia–EU FTA will almost certainly rely on Australia’s willingness 
to offer concessions in other sectors. 
In reality, the major opportunities for trade liberalisation in agricultural 
trade between Australia and the EU lie in the area of NTBs. These can be 
divided into technical and nontechnical measures and they are regulatory 
in nature (WTO 2013: 25). 
Technical measures include SPS standards (covered by the SPS agreement); 
rules for product weight, size or packaging;  ingredient or identity 
standards; mandatory labelling; shelf-life restrictions; and import testing 
and certification procedures. Nontechnical measures include bureaucratic 
restrictions, subsidies or other legal measures that hinder trade, such as 
failure to provide adequate and effective intellectual property protection 
(Nathan Associates 2013: 2). 
Both types may have legitimate purposes, especially in the eyes of 
enforcers, but both can also be misused to covertly impede trade. They 
may be designed to limit trade or they may have that effect because of the 
way they are implemented, either with a lack of transparency, inefficiency 
or corruption. 
Estimating the costs of NTBs is therefore understandably complex (Boza 
2013), but estimates run into the millions per annum. Beghin and 
Melatos (2012) examined the impact of Australia’s quarantine regime on 
pig meat imports. They concluded that the effects on welfare and trade 
of the Australian quarantine regime were very significant and estimated 
that the withdrawal of the regime resulted in a staggering welfare gain 
to consumers of A$409 million and the expansion of revenue to three 
exporting nations of A$479 million. 
The WTO’s Sanitary and Phytosanitary and Technical Barriers to Trade 
agreements do allow countries to adopt appropriate measures to protect 
human, plant and animal health, but to reduce compliance costs and 
minimise disputes, countries are encouraged to base their domestic 
technical regulations or standards on those developed by international 
organisations, including the Joint FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius 
Commission (Codex) for food safety; the Office International des 
Epizooties (OIE) for animal health; and the International Plant Protection 
Convention (IPPC) for plant health (WTO 2010). However, member 
109
6 . AGRICULTURE IN THE AUSTRALIA–EU ECONOMIC AND TRADE RELATIONSHIP
states are allowed to impose more stringent guidelines under the GATT 
if a risk assessment—supported by sufficient scientific evidence—deems 
such an approach to be justified. 
When third countries question those more stringent guidelines, they raise 
a specific trade concern (STC) with the appropriate committee. If  the 
number of bilateral STCs raised in the WTO is any indication of the 
level of NTBs used by countries, then the EU and Australia have much to 
gain by exploring opportunities for regulatory cooperation. Figures from 
Horn et al. (2013: 737) (Figure 4) illustrate that the EU and Australia 
received the greatest number of STC notifications in relation to SPS 
issues, while Figure 5 illustrates the same statistics for STCs relating to 
TBTs. Clearly,  both jurisdictions have imposed barriers to trade that 
third countries find worrisome. Somewhat ironically, the fact that both 
the EU and Australia impose comparatively stringent regulations on 
imports suggests that they may have more in common than either side 
cares to admit. 
Figure 4. Members that most frequently face SPS ‘Bilateral’ STCs
Source: After Horn, Mavroidis & Wijkstrom 2013: 737 .
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Figure 5. Members that most frequently face TBT ‘Bilateral’ STCs
Source: After Horn, Mavroidis & Wijkstrom 2013: 737 .
Increasingly, NTBs reflect with public policy objectives and consumer 
preferences and they therefore raise issues of far greater complexity than 
tariffs. As Philip Stephens of the Financial Times put it:
The nature of free trade deals has changed. They used to be about tariffs. 
Now they focus on regulatory standards and norms, intellectual property 
rights, data privacy and investment protection. These are issues that cut 
deep across national political and cultural preferences. Lowering import 
duties is one thing; persuading voters to relax the rules on data protection 
or accept new rules on food safely is another (Stephens 2016).
Furthermore, while the purpose of some NTBs is very specifically to 
restrict trade—for example in the prohibition of harmful products—
often that restriction is an unintended, perverse consequence of pursuing 
a given public policy objective. As the WTO phrased it:
[d]ivergence can occur for different reasons. It may be a reflection 
of different social preferences and values. In this case, the notion of 
‘levelling the playing field’ in trade relations takes on an additional layer 
of complexity – the search cannot be for uniformity in cases where an 
attempt to homogenize societal preferences would be an intrusive step 
too far. Cooperation in this case can only be about avoiding unnecessary 
friction or unwarranted discrimination (WTO 2013: 25).
111
6 . AGRICULTURE IN THE AUSTRALIA–EU ECONOMIC AND TRADE RELATIONSHIP
Where do NTBs exist in the Australia–EU agri-trade relationship? 
The  following issues all impede trade to varying degrees on either side 
of the relationship:
• custom surcharges
• high level of food and safety standards resulting in high SPS measures 
that are more stringent than international standards or that are not 
relevant to the exporting environmental conditions
• long and difficult authorisation procedures
• labelling requirement laws 
• direct and indirect government support through tax relief and 
concessions or protective legislation to EU farmers
• traceability and labelling of biotechnology foods 
• maximum limits on mycotoxins for a variety of foodstuffs (including 
cereals, fruit and nuts)
• product process, production or labelling requirements relating to the 
classification of ‘organic’ foods.
Following Berden et al. (2009), NTBs and regulatory divergence can have 
two main effects: 
a. Those NTBs that increase the cost of doing business for firms result 
in increased commodity prices for end users, because firms increase 
prices to cover the higher cost of doing business, which constitutes 
a welfare loss to society.
b. Those NTBs that restrict market access for firms increase the market 
concentration and economic power (and thus revenue profits) of 
companies in the importing country, with the result that commodity 
prices may increase anyway—reducing welfare gains overall—and 
welfare is redistributed away from consumers towards domestic 
producers (i.e. protecting them, not consumers). 
NTBs can be especially cumbersome for small and medium-sized 
enterprises in exporting countries, which lack the resources to deal with 
multiple regulatory regimes in multiple markets (noting that when dealing 
with the EU, sometimes there are multiple regimes at the level of member 
states). 
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An oft-suggested method of overcoming these barriers is mutual 
recognition of regulations in exporting and importing countries (see, 
for example, Nicolaidis & Shaffer 2005; Trachtman 2007; and Kerber 
& van den Bergh 2008). Mutual recognition across different regulatory 
jurisdictions assumes an equivalence of regulatory and public policy goals 
across jurisdictions but accepts that there are differences in regulatory 
approach or detail in how those goals are met; in this way, it is possible to 
‘mutually recognise’ (usually with exceptions) each other’s regulation so as 
to facilitate trade. Kerber and Van den Bergh (2008: 447) suggest ‘mutual 
recognition is often recommended as a nearly ideal solution for removing 
obstacles to free trade without embarking on a pathway to harmonisation’. 
Mutual recognition has been a part of trade negotiations and bilateral 
agreements for some time; however, this has generally been limited to 
conformity assessment procedures and, more often than not, specifically 
excludes SPS measures (see, for example, the multiple MRAs of the 
EU, the Australia–Singapore MRA, CETA and the China–Australia 
FTA). Conformity assessment measures in these agreements have always 
related to technical products or medicines (e.g. telecommunications 
and electronics) whereby a consumer may be at risk or a product may 
simply not work when imported. However, there is precedent for 
mutual recognition to spread beyond simply technical measures to those 
measures  affecting agricultural products (see, for example, the Trans-
Tasman Mutual Recognition Arrangement (TTMRA) between Australia 
and New Zealand). 
The arguments against using mutual recognition centre on fears that 
regulatory competition can undermine public interest concerns such as 
health and safety standards and environmental goals, and lead to lowest-
common-denominator outcomes or a ‘race to the bottom’. It follows, 
therefore, that the acceptance of ‘equivalence’ in regulation between 
jurisdictions demands a high degree of trust between trading partners. 
Arguably, this was particularly problematic in the context of the WTO’s 
multilateral trade negotiations, but there is some justification for 
suggesting that it is less of a problem when states negotiate bilateral or 
plurilateral trade agreements. In the case of an FTA between Australia and 
the EU, the potential to embark on significant arrangements to mutually 
recognise each other’s regulatory frameworks is, arguably, very large, 
for three reasons. 
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First, the underlying intent of many of the NTBs in the agricultural 
sector in both jurisdictions is the same. Australia and the EU have similar, 
very stringent, robust regulatory frameworks governing the agricultural 
sector. Whether in the area of waste management, water and air pollution 
control, management of non-point source pollution, tracing systems, or 
even occupational health and safety requirements, the objectives of  the 
respective frameworks are very similar. Moreover, the high level of 
institutional capacity in both markets ensures that the regulatory regimes 
are upheld, thus providing the necessary trust for a form of mutual 
recognition. Nevertheless, there have been some major disagreements 
between Australia and the EU regarding the use of sanitary measures since 
the WTO SPS agreement came into force. 
As has been the case in disputes between the EU and Canada, these 
disagreements relate to both the science itself and whether or not science 
should be the sole, or a contributing, factor in the establishment of 
sanitary import regulation (Viju & Kerr 2011). For example, Woolcock 
(2007: 6) suggests:
[owing to] shifts in European consumer preferences in favour of higher 
food safety and environmental standards, the EU has sought to use 
the precautionary principle in the regulation of risk which implies an 
approach that views science-based risk assessment as an important but 
not the only criterion. 
Another source of tension is the ‘blanket’ approach of some of the EU’s 
import requirements aimed at sustainability objectives. In many cases, 
those requirements are irrelevant to the Australian landscape. Australia 
could, for example, seek agreement from the EU that a thorough review 
of EU schemes for Australia be undertaken, so that at the very least those 
conditions that do not affect Australia could be excluded. 
Second, the gains from cooperating on regulatory divergence accrue to 
both sides of the trade, particularly for NTBs in the agricultural sector. 
As Figure 4 demonstrated, the EU and Australia are both onerous in their 
regulatory regimes in the eyes of rest of the world. Thus, there is much to 
be gained from exploring opportunities to cooperate. In contrast to the 
situation with tariffs and quotas, regulatory cooperation on NTBs would 
deliver welfare gains to all. 
AUSTRALIA, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE NEW TRADE AGENDA 
114
The third reason relates to the increased influence the EU and Australia 
would be able to exert in non-trade forums if they could cooperate more 
on NTBs, especially in emerging issues. There is no point in pursuing 
public policy objectives in one forum, if they are going to be undermined 
by WTO trade rules; this is particularly the case in the ‘trade environment’ 
domain:
Convergence between trade and public policy NTBs requires greater 
coherence between trade rules and policies, norms and standards in other 
areas of international cooperation (WTO 2013: 7). 
If the EU and Australia—two jurisdictions with very high levels of SPS 
protection—were to establish common ground at an early stage in the 
trade of new products, they could possibly prevent NTBs from setting in. 
For example, momentum is building internationally to address climate 
change, and domestic regulation to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions has 
already been brought in front of the WTO dispute settlement panel. Four 
WTO disputes have been filed since 2010 that challenge government 
programs supporting renewable energy, and a number of related disputes 
have yet to reach the WTO (Meyer 2013). Other emerging areas relate 
to environmental tariffs at the border, particularly in the area of border 
carbon adjustments to ‘level the playing field’ between those countries 
or regions that have a robust climate mitigation policy, vis-à-vis those 
without one. What is almost certain is that the conflation of environmental 
concerns with international trade is likely to increase in the coming years, 
but the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment is unlikely to find 
meaningful solutions in the foreseeable future. 
Another potential future NTB to trade and investment is ‘nanotechnology’. 
Berden et al. (2009: 85) suggest that ‘while the technique itself is not 
being challenged, the regulatory, trade and investment consequences of 
introducing nanotechnology can potentially lead to high NTBs, especially 
in the food-producing and processing sectors’. Further advancements in 
the area of genomics, as well as increasing pressure from consumers and/
or companies in relation to the traceability of agricultural products, are 
other areas of potential future tension. To the extent that bilateral and 
plurilateral FTAs can be used to mitigate such disputes, they should be. 
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Conclusion
Given the failure of the Doha Development Agenda to secure the further 
reduction of tariffs in the agricultural sector, or to overcome some of 
the complex extant issues in the SPS and TBT agreements, it  is hardly 
surprising that OECD countries quickly found an alternative mechanism 
through which to pursue trade liberalisation. The fact that so many 
bilateral and regional FTAs have been concluded in recent years is 
testament to the fact that the gains must surely outweigh the significant 
transaction costs that so many simultaneous negotiations incur. Indeed, 
the capacity for these agreements to tackle the ‘new trade agenda’ issues 
that this volume examines—the expansion of services trade, the rise of 
TBTs and the shifting geopolitical sands in the international system of 
trade—has no doubt spurred the announcement of the Australia–EU 
FTA negotiations. However, as our analysis above illustrates, the potential 
for an Australia–EU FTA to deliver significant market access concessions 
in agriculture is limited; gains in relation to tariffs and quotas are likely 
to be sector specific and limited. Nevertheless, there are significant 
opportunities in the negotiations to overcome many of the NTBs that 
plague the relationship, in both the SPS and TBT domains. 
The reasons lie in the fact that Europe and Australia are more similar than 
either would care to admit: both have strong regulatory regimes relating 
to biosafety and environmental sustainability and as a result both enjoy 
enviable reputations for clean and green agricultural sectors; both have 
strong institutional arrangements to ensure risk frameworks are enforced; 
and both would prefer to see a gradual return to the WTO for all-matters-
trade. And with the rise of Asia and the Middle East as export markets, 
politicians and bureaucrats in Brussels and Canberra have been allowed 
to settle into a comfortable détente, in the knowledge that they now have 
more in common than ever before. These factors combined mean that 
a comprehensive and considered review of where regulatory coherence 
could be achieved in agriculture is both desirable and feasible. As the 
reforms of Australia’s biosafety regime relating to pork demonstrated, the 
welfare gains that arise from removing TBTs can be enormous. 
That said, there have been and remain profound differences in the 
way the EU and Australia reconcile public policy objectives with trade 
liberalisation. One area that is likely to prove particularly divisive 
in the  negotiations is that of geographic indicators. Past FTAs have 
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indicated that the EU has very little motivation to concede on geographic 
indicators,  but Australian negotiators will need to be careful to ensure 
that tensions over geographic indicators don’t scupper market access gains 
in other areas from being realised. In short, we are cautiously optimistic. 
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1  The discussion in the earlier sections of this chapter draws on two more detailed papers on 
geographical indications (Moir 2015a, 2015b).
2  The sixth—with Vietnam—was agreed on 2 December 2015.
Geographical Indications: 




Modern ‘trade’ treaties cover a wide range of market interventions and 
regulations. The five post-2006 Global Europe treaties are no exception.2 
As with US trade agreements they all include intellectual property (IP) 
regulations. IP regulations sit uneasily in a trade agreement as their purpose 
is to limit competition, not to increase it. The major benefits from trade 
agreements are through their impact on increasing competition.
The European Union (EU) and the United States of America (USA) failed 
to achieve their full IP agenda in the Uruguay Round. Undaunted, both 
have been pursuing their unmet IP goals through a series of bilateral 
and regional agreements, often with quite small trading partners. This 
chapter focuses on the issue that most distinguishes EU IP demands: 
geographical indications (GIs) for foodstuffs. GI demands are often 
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referred to as a deal-breaker. All five post-Global Europe agreements 
include GI provisions, and it is unlikely that any EU agreement could 
proceed without at least some coverage of this area. 
This chapter commences by reviewing the provisions on GIs in the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS), and then turns to how GIs have been implemented in the EU in 
the period since the Uruguay Round negotiations began. The discussion 
of the EU’s experience allows a focus on the rationales that have been 
put forward for the GI intervention in the market. These rationales are 
critically assessed. This provides essential background to the final section 
of this chapter—evaluating the EU’s GI demands in bilateral trade 
agreements, and Australia’s potential responses.
TRIPS and GIs
GIs are about what things can be called. They are about labelling, 
packaging and marketing. Nothing in GI rules prevents any producer 
anywhere from using the techniques specified as being associated with the 
GI name. But they may not use the name to communicate the production 
techniques they have used. 
GIs are collective marks signalling the region from which a product 
comes. The product characteristics must derive from the land and climate 
(the ‘terroir’). GIs originated in Europe and are currently available only 
for agricultural products. 
TRIPS makes only modest provisions for GIs and provides substantial 
protection for trademark owners (Articles 22 to 24). Both from the 
perspective of the EU and major New World agricultural exporters, such 
as Australia, the TRIPS outcome was a compromise (Geuze 2009).
In TRIPS, the EU gained ‘strong-form’ GIs for wines and spirits. With 
strong-form GIs, no producer from outside the designated region may 
use the protected name, even with qualifiers. While an identical product 
may be produced, any reference to a protected name—for example, 
‘champagne-style wine, product of Australia’—is not allowed. 
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For all other products, TRIPS mandates only ‘weak-form’ GIs. Countries 
are free to determine the form GIs take. New World countries have 
generally used a trademark system of collective and/or certification marks. 
This allows producers from outside the named region to use labels such as 
‘Parmesan-style cheese, made in New Zealand’. 
TRIPS has substantial ‘grandfathering’ safeguards3—even strong-form GIs 
do not have to be adopted. TRIPS safeguards generic names and existing 
trademarks, protecting the community and trademark owners from 
expropriation. Article 24 provides that those with existing trademarks, 
or having used a name continuously for at least 10 years, may continue 
to use those names, with no provisos, even if they are for wines or spirits.
Nonetheless, some countries have signed EU wine and spirit agreements, 
adopting strong-form GI privileges in exchange for improved access to 
EU wine and spirit markets. Australia was one of the first countries to sign 
a wine agreement with the EU, in 2004. The EU also has wine agreements 
with other New World countries.4 The improved market access provisions 
of these agreements effectively compensated wine producers for their re-
labelling and associated marketing costs. Because GI issues on wines have 
been largely settled through these agreements, this chapter concentrates 
on GIs for foodstuffs. 
EU GI policy for foodstuffs
The EU framework for the protection of GIs for foodstuffs was established 
in 1992,5 building on earlier systems in place in a few member countries. 
The system was revised in 20066 following a dispute brought against the 
EU by Australia and the USA to the World Trade Organization (WTO).7 
3  A provision in which an old rule continues to apply to some existing situations while a new rule 
will apply to all future cases.
4  See ec.europa.eu/agriculture/wine/third-countries/index_en.htm. 
5  Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2081/92 of 14 July 1992 (eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31992R2081&from=EN). 
6  Council Regulation (EC) No. 510/2006 of 20 March 2006 also incorporated some other 
changes, including dropping the requirement for a published list of generic names (see Profeta et 
al. 2009: 633) (europa.eu/legislation_summaries/internal_market/businesses/intellectual_property/
l66044_en.htm).
7  WTO dispute DS290, EC – Trademarks and Geographical Indications (www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds290_e.htm).
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It was revised again in 2012.8 The system identifies three separate 
types of designation: protected designation of origin (PDO), protected 
geographical indication (PGI), and traditional specialty guaranteed 
(TSG). TSGs are little used at present and are not further discussed in 
this chapter. They provide few difficulties for competition policy because 
production need not take place in the specified geographical area. 
Recently, the EU has begun to consider extending GIs to non-agricultural 
products.9 This issue too is beyond the scope of this chapter, which looks 
only at GIs for agricultural products and foodstuffs.
While the privileges provided by PDOs and PGIs are identical—in 
neither case may a competitor from outside the designated region use 
the name, even with clear qualifiers—the requirements are very different. 
PDOs have strict production controls and the key ingredients must, in 
theory, be produced within the designated area.10 In contrast, PGIs are far 
more flexible in terms of the sourcing of inputs, and seem to be able to 
have limited association with the designated region. Indeed, issues have 
been raised that this flexibility in the origin of materials for PGI products 
can make such labelling misleading for consumers (London Economics 
2008: 86–91). 
There have been a number of initiatives to promote the use of GIs 
within the EU,11 and there have been impressive increases in the number 
of registered PDOs and PGIs; from 1993 to the end of 2012, PDOs 
8  Regulation (EU) No. 1151/2012 of 21 November 2012 (eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/
EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32012R1151&from=en) followed a rather poor-quality evaluation 
of the GI program, largely because of the absence of relevant data. The EU’s Impact Assessment 
Board considered that the added value of the GI schemes had not been demonstrated (European 
Commission 2010a: 6).
9  The two EU studies are at trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/may/tradoc_147926.pdf and 
ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/docs/geo-indications/130322_geo-indications-non-agri-
study_en.pdf. France has recently promulgated regulations for non-agricultural GIs (www.inta.org/
INTABulletin/Pages/France_7015.aspx). 
10  In practice, raw materials can come from a far wider area for PDOs registered before May 2004 
(Calboli 2014). 
11  A special fast-track registration system was initially used to encourage GI applications, but in 
2003 this was abandoned in favour of financial incentives (Evans & Blakeney 2006: 584). Some 
member states provide direct financial and administrative assistance for producer groups to establish 
GIs (London Economics 2008: 118–19). 
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increased by 19 per cent and PGIs by 40 per cent (Figure 1).12 The initial 
set of GIs, with 369 PDOs and 281 PGIs, were largely names transferred 
from national registers to the EU register.
Figure 1. Growth in EU-registered GIs
Source: Author analysis from data from the DOOR database .
Of the 1,188 registrations filed by end 2012, 75 per cent (887) were 
owned by France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. These five countries 
had 87 per cent of initial PDO registrations and still have 85 per cent of 
such registrations. They had 75 per cent of initial PGI registrations, but 
this share had fallen to 64 per cent by the end of 2012. 
London Economics (2008) has noted that the countries dominating 
the GI system have large agricultural sectors. Other relevant variables to 
benchmark the relative use of GIs are population and size of the total 
economy, variables that reflect aspects of consumer demand. These 
benchmarks put the dominant use of GIs by France, Italy and Spain into 
perspective. The three right-hand columns of Table 1 provide summary 
indicators of whether a country has more or fewer GIs than would be 
expected simply on the basis of population, gross domestic product 
(GDP) or agricultural value added shares. 
12  Data are from the DOOR database (ec.europa.eu/agriculture/quality/door/list.html). Data were 
downloaded on 6 July 2015 and are analysed by application year (the point at which the decision to 
seek registration of a GI is first recorded). All applications from EU member states registered by 6 July 
2015 are counted. Unless otherwise specified, data in all tables and figures are from this source.
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On an agricultural value added basis, the proportion of GIs owned 
by France is what one would expect were GI ownership based solely 
on agricultural value added. Similarly, Spanish GI ownership is only 
10 per cent higher than expected. But Italian GI ownership is 50 per cent 
greater than would be expected on the basis of the size of its agricultural 
sector, and 90 per cent higher than expected based on population or GDP 
share (Table 1). 
The two countries that are truly over-represented in terms of GI ownership 
are Greece and Portugal. The proportion of GIs owned by Greece is more 
than twice what one would expect based on the size of the agricultural 
sector, more than five times as large with respect to GDP share and nearly 
four times as large based on population. Portugal’s over-representation in 
terms of GI share is even more striking—between five and seven times 
larger than expected. In contrast, Germany and the United Kingdom are 
substantially under-represented in terms of the share of registered names.
What these data do not tell us is how important GI products are and 
to whom. There are few data on the number of producers involved in 
any registered GI.13 There are few data on the value of output, and often 
output values are given without any context. Thus, we may be told how 
many millions of PDO output is sold, but not the proportion of total 
agricultural output or agricultural and food-processing output. Indeed, 
such data are available only for France and Spain. But even here we do 
not get a good denominator for the French data—while GI products are 
6.3 per cent of total French agricultural output, many GI products are 
processed and we do not know what percentage they are of total French 
output from agriculture and food processing. For Spain, this figure is just 
1 per cent.14 
While much of the discussion on GIs implies that most GI producers are 
small operators, it is clear that in some product lines very large producers 
play an important role. Rangnekar, for example, points out that in a case 
study of Tuscan extra virgin olive oil less than 2  per  cent of certified 
production was by small producers (Rangnekar 2004: 5).
13  London Economics (2008: 107) provides data for total producers involved in all registered 
names for only six countries, and some of these data are partial. The proportion of all producers/
processors involved in GI products is available only for France and Italy. 
14  London Economics 2008: 107–9. Although more data are available in a separate European 
Commission commissioned report, this study too avoids giving relevant comparators for most statistics 
(AND-International 2012). The one useful comparison figure is that PDO/PGI agricultural products 
and foodstuffs represented about 2 per cent of the total value of extra-EU food exports in 2010.
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Rationales for the GI intervention
The EU regulations, introduced in 1992 and amended in 2006 and 
2012, show clearly that GIs are an important element of EU agricultural 
policy, with the additional stated aim of reducing consumer confusion. 
This  second  aim, the basis for using an IP mechanism, requires 
interrogation. It is based on economic theories about information 
asymmetries, developed in respect of consumer durables.15 But most 
food and drink purchases are regularly repeated events, and so differ 
substantially from durable goods. The frequency of food purchases means 
that consumers quickly overcome any initial information asymmetry. 
This is rarely noted in the GI literature.16 
This leaves the sole consumer information asymmetry argument for 
GIs as being that high-end agricultural products are credence goods—
that despite purchase and use, the consumer may still be misled as to 
quality attributes. This argument applies to situations where the quality 
of a GI product does not noticeably vary between the GI region and 
non-GI regions. The core of the EU argument on GIs is therefore the 
presumption that consumers are confused, even if they are not—even if 
the taste experience is identical, consumers will be confused if their cheese 
is labelled ‘brie-style cheese, product of Australia’. 
Given the failure of consumer confusion justifications to stand up to 
scrutiny, are there producer arguments for the GI intervention? GIs are 
similar to trademarks, though their associated privileges are much stronger 
and they cannot be individually owned or traded. The producer argument 
for trademarks is that producers are protected from counterfeiter trading on 
their reputation. But the strong-form GI privilege prevents clear labelling 
that advises consumers clearly of the origin of the goods. Further, in the 
EU the registered GI name is protected well beyond the class of goods 
to which a similar trademark would apply. This might be justifiable if it 
increased net welfare; that is, if the gains to these producers and previously 
‘confused’ consumers were greater than the losses to other producers and 
consumers who are not shopping for high-end food products. This is an 
empirical matter.
15  For an excellent and brief summary of this literature, see OECD (2000, Annex 1).
16  See, for example, Bramley, Biénabe & Kirsten (2009). An important exception is Teuber (2011), 
who also provides a sound analysis of the economic literature to date. 
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There is surprisingly little empirical literature on GIs. The literature on 
willingness to pay shows variable outcomes except for one issue: only 
a very small share of consumers are willing to pay a price premium for 
a higher-quality product (Bramley, Biénabe & Kirsten 2009). This finding 
is reflected in the outcome of the 2008 EU GI evaluation—retailers 
report that GI products have little impact on their profitability as they 
constitute a very low proportion of goods sold (London Economics 2008: 
147–50). The even sparser empirical literature on the economic impact 
of GIs shows that the impact of GIs on rural development is variable and 
contingent, as is the overall economic impact (Callois 2004; Zago & Pick 
2004; Bramley, Biénabe & Kirsten 2009; Grote 2009; Teuber 2011). 
The above analysis suggests that agricultural goals remain the sole 
justification for GIs. But the policy is implemented in the form of an IP 
right, and in the best traditions of IP policy, the implementing processes 
are all formalities and procedural matters. There are no economic criteria 
brought to bear on key issues such as how regions are defined, what 
proportion of a production chain is designated, or how the proposed GI 
will impact on competitors. European GI policy trumps competition 
policy, without any questions asked.
Case law on GIs shows that there are few, if any, competition controls on 
the registration of a GI name. The Parma ham case raises doubts as to the 
processes in place for defining the length of the production chain covered 
by a registered GI (Evans & Blakeney 2006). The Melton Mowbray pork 
pie case raises doubts as to the processes in place for defining designated 
regions (Gangjee 2006). And the feta case shows that GIs are allowed to 
override existing trademark rights without any compensation mechanisms 
(Gangjee 2007).17 As GIs are defined as ‘industrial property’ they are 
excluded from the application of the EU treaty articles that prohibit 
quantitative restrictions on exports. These articles are fundamental to 
the creation of a single competitive European market. Either GIs should 
be recognised as agricultural policy instruments and removed from 
this exemption, or procedures should be introduced to minimise anti-
competitive elements in GI registration processes. 
The EU’s approach contrasts sharply with Australia’s processes for 
certification marks. The Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (ACCC) is required to examine any proposed certification 
17  These cases are discussed in Moir (2015b: 14–18). 
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mark ‘to ensure [the proposed rules] are not to the detriment of the public, 
or likely to raise any concerns relating to competition, unconscionable 
conduct, unfair practices, product safety and/or product information’.18 
Only after an application has passed ACCC scrutiny can it be registered 
as an Australian certification mark. To date, only foreign organisations 
have used Australia’s certified mark system to register geographical 
names, though there are two pending domestic applications, one for 
the Mornington Peninsula and one for Hinchinbrook shire.19 Clearly, 
overseas GI producers are using the system. Equally clearly, there is as yet 
little demand from Australian producers. 
EU GI goals and recent trade 
treaty outcomes
The analysis of the EU’s GI demands is based on a close reading of the EU’s 
new generation economic agreements with Canada, Central America, 
Columbia/Peru, Korea and Singapore. The EU’s principal goals in GI 
negotiations with other countries are sui generis register-based systems, 
strong-form protection for all GIs, and administrative enforcement. 
Register-based systems
Two of the EU’s post-Global Europe treaties appear to require sui generis20 
register-based systems. These are with Central America and Singapore.21 
Three have clauses specifying systems that sound like sui generis register-
based systems. But the legal language used in treaties can mislead. 
18  www.accc.gov.au/business/applying-for-exemptions/certification-trade-marks. 
19  As at the end of 2015 there were 474 registered certified marks in Australia, of which 116 were 
exclusively for agricultural products and a further 47 for both agricultural and non-agricultural classes 
of goods. An additional 41 certified marks for agricultural products were pending. Excluding the 21 
registered marks for wines, only 19 marks were geographic marks registered (12 from Italy, two each 
from India, Jamaica and the USA, and one from the United Kingdom).
20  That is, a special form of protection regime outside the existing frameworks, or a regime 
especially tailored to meet a certain need.
21  Singapore has passed legislation that will come into force when the Treaty with the EU 
commences (www.wongpartnership.com/index.php/files/download/1259). At present the 
Intellectual Property Office of Singapore (IPOS) advises that GIs can either be protected as GIs 
or under the Trade Marks Act (www.ipos.gov.sg/AboutIP/TypesofIPWhatisIntellectualProperty/
Whatisageographicalindication.aspx). This parallels the EU, with regulations governing both GIs and 
Community Trade Marks (CTMs). For a useful discussion of the relative merits of EU GIs or EU 
CTMs see Evans 2010.
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From the treaty text it sounds like Korea agreed to such a system,22 but 
the Korean Intellectual Property Office website clearly states that in 
Korea GIs are registered under the trademark system as collective marks.23 
Canada also retains its trademark-based system for GIs. The EU–Andean 
treaty does not directly touch on this issue; it is far shorter and less 
prescriptive than the other four treaties. 
Associated with a register-based system is the requirement for transparent 
processes including opposition and appeal procedures. Other associated 
elements in the treaties are all very process-oriented, a characteristic of 
most IP regulations. As such, they are ideally suited to delivery of GIs 
through a trademark system, itself usually register based. The EU’s Korean 
and Singaporean agreements have the largest number of EU-specified 
elements in the agreed GI procedures. 
All five treaties include procedures for adding new GI names, and all list 
names that are to be recognised as GIs in the other jurisdiction.24 These lists 
are subject to examination and opposition procedures in each country and 
there is a process for ensuring that names that have passed these processes 
are protected as GIs.25 In all cases, the lists of names are very much longer 
for the EU than for the other party, and the EU lists have expanded. In the 
agreement with Colombia/Peru the EU listed 34 foods; in the EU–Korea 
agreement they listed 60 foods; in the EU–Singapore agreement they 
listed 82 foods; and in the 2014 Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA) the EU listed 173 foods. In contrast, Colombia/Peru 
listed only three foods and two non-foods. As yet, there is no information 
on GIs that Singapore and Canada might list. Korea appears to be one 
country that might use GIs as much as the EU—they listed 60 foods. 
The 2014 implementation report on the EU–Korea agreement notes 
that the GI Working Group met for the first time in October 2012. 
The  Working Group had discussed but not yet adopted rules of 
22  Article 10.18.6, ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/south-korea/. 
23  ‘In the Republic of Korea, geographical indications have been protected as a collective mark 
under the Trademark Act (Act No. 7290) since July 1, 2005’ (www.kipo.go.kr/kpo/user.tdf?a=user.
english.html.HtmlApp&c=930002&catmenu=ek04_01_01, dated 20 February 2013 and accessed 
22 February 2015). 
24  Though the documents available as at December 2015 do not yet show GI name lists for 
Singapore or Canada. 
25  In general, the treaties specify that opposition and examination procedures for listed GIs have 
already been completed or will be completed by the time the treaties come into force. As at the end 
of 2015, no GIs listed in Global Europe treaties for partner countries appear on the DOOR register. 
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procedure. Clearly, the priority for the Working Group was the new GIs 
that the EU had already proposed. The implementation report (European 
Commission 2014: 8) advises that:
The EU emphasised the interest that EU Member States attach to GIs 
and the importance of increasing the list by as many GIs as necessary. 
Korea also announced the intention of proposing Korean GIs to the 
said Annex.26 
Strong-form protection
A second EU priority is to gain strong-form protection for all GIs. Strong-
form privileges lead to clawback of names that are generic in some parts of 
the world. The EU has achieved strong-form protection for many non-wine 
foodstuffs in the agreements with Korea, Central America, Singapore and 
Canada. In the cases of Colombia and Peru, the agreement allows weak-
form GIs for wines and spirits, but leaves the door open for the adoption 
of strong-form protection, including for foodstuffs. It also extends GI 
protection beyond agricultural products. The EU–Andean agreement also 
covers misleading packaging, advertising or other practices. The use of 
flags and other images to denote a specific country or region is considered 
by the EU to undermine GI privileges. 
Canada has agreed to allow coexistence of EU GIs with pre-existing 
Canadian trademarks. The EU claims this as a strong precedential victory, 
as it ‘“establishes for the first time in a common law” country like Canada 
a deviation from the principle “first in time first in right”’ (European 
Union 2014: 14–15). Canada has, however, grandfathered certain GI 
names, providing for perpetual rights for existing users of the names feta, 
asiago, gorgonzola, fontina and munster. New producers will also be able 
to use these names, but with qualifiers.27 Canada has also specified that 
any new GI names cannot be the same as existing trademarks, so the 
agreed coexistence is very limited in scope. 
26  See trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/march/tradoc_152239.PDF. As at January 2016, this 
was the latest available information about the implementation of agreed GI policy in the EU–Korea 
agreement.
27  The agreement also contains similar protections for the names of three meat products (Article 7.6). 
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These privileges need to be assessed side-by-side with the agreed safeguards. 
Like TRIPS, all five new generation EU treaties include important 
safeguards.28 All provide that a GI will not be registered if it will cause 
confusion with an existing reputed or well-known mark, at least partially 
protecting trademark owners from appropriation. Existing trademarks 
may continue under all five treaties.
Some of the treaties allow continued trading using a geographical name if 
that has been past practice (Singapore, Canada). Some allow refusal of a GI 
if the name is customary.29 Generally there is some form of prohibition 
on the use of plant variety or animal breed names—sometimes limited 
to where this will cause confusion (Korea), or to new GIs (Canada).30 
All allow a person to use their own name to trade as long as this will not 
cause consumer confusion.
Administrative enforcement
The third EU GI priority is administrative enforcement—this shifts 
enforcement costs from individual rights-holders to the overseas taxpayer. 
This appears to have been achieved in both the EU–Korea and EU–
Canada agreements, but the EU has claimed neither as a precedent-setting 
win.31 But as the benefit of a GI goes to the producer, the rationale for 
overseas taxpayers to pay enforcement costs is unclear. With a trademark 
the benefit accrues to the producer and enforcement is a responsibility of 
the producer. Why should enforcement costs for GIs be shifted to either 
domestic or overseas taxpayers? 
The analysis paper accompanying the explanatory memorandum provided 
to the European Parliament for the 2012 revision of the EU’s GI regulation 
considers a number of options for reform. The most important option—
one that would ease trade negotiations—is that of using Community 
28  The EU treaties with the Andean and Central American countries are more general than the 
other three treaties, with far fewer operational details specified, and fewer safeguards spelled out. 
29  The EU–Central America treaty even allows continued use of customary names for wines 
and spirits.
30  Oddly, the EU–Singapore agreement states that a conflict with the name of a plant variety or 
animal breed will not prevent a GI being registered (Article 11.22.8). This may well be a typographical 
error as the EU regulations on GIs prohibit a GI ‘where it conflicts with a name of a plant variety or 
an animal breed and is likely to mislead the consumer as to the true origin of the product’ (Article 6.2, 
EU Regulation No. 1151/2012 and Article 3.2 in the 1992 and 2006 regulations).
31  The CETA wording is ambiguous and may simply allow GI owners to use administrative processes 
to resolve disputes rather than requiring official authorities to enforce GI names (Article 7.4). 
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Trade Marks (CTMs).32 Important reasons given for dismissing this 
option include complexity (i.e. trademark registration would be needed 
in each country), cost (of trademark registration and enforcing such 
trademarks) and the lower degree of privilege. In respect of the latter, the 
paper notes that CTMs would allow competitors to use the registered 
name ‘provided he [sic] uses them in accordance with honest practices 
in industrial or commercial matters’ (European Commission 2010a: 33). 
Essentially, the lower degree of privilege would mean that potentially 
infringing practices would not actually infringe if consumers were not 
misled and the indication was used honestly. New World countries find 
this position hard to understand and hard to accept.
Evaluating the EU’s GI demands
It was the EU who alone pushed for the inclusion of GIs in TRIPS. 
The EU remains committed to the extension of strong-form GI protection 
globally. In the Doha Round negotiations, the EU linked the agenda of 
yet stronger GI rights to developing country demands for fair sharing 
of genetic resources and protection of traditional knowledge, potentially 
extending GIs to non-agricultural products. This has created two blocks, 
divided both on the GI issue and on recognition of genetic resources. 
As at 2009, 111 countries had sui generis GI systems and 56 had trademark 
systems (Giovannucci et al. 2009: 14). 
There are reports that GIs are a deal-breaker for the EU in relation to 
preferential economic agreements. Given that the multilateral trade 
negotiations are stalled, it is as yet impossible to say whether this is 
a  deal-breaker globally. Certainly the post-2006 EU trade agreements 
all include GIs, though in some cases GI privileges do not move much 
beyond TRIPS. 
To date, Australia has refused absolutely to consider any extension of 
strong-form GIs beyond wines and spirits. Unless Australia is able to bring 
together interested parties and be more open to other options on the GI 
issue, there is little point in commencing trade negotiations with the EU.
32  The system for EU-wide trademarks only came into operation in 1988, just four years before 
the first EU GI regulation was issued. In complete contrast to the GI system, a nation can object to 
a CTM being registered if it is a word that is generic in that country, and this prevents the CTM being 
registered. 
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The door to a more accommodating position has been opened by the recent 
report for the Rural Industries Research and Development Corporation 
(van Caenegem, Drahos & Cleary 2015). Further, the actual GI changes 
to Canadian policy consequent on CETA appear modest. It would seem 
possible, on this basis, that Australia might begin a domestic consultation 
and reform process to identify a GI strategy that both suits Australian 
interests and meets minimum EU demands. Such work could usefully 
incorporate an evaluation of the value of certification marks for GI policy 
purposes and explore why there is so little domestic demand for GIs for 
foodstuffs. Any GI strategy should learn from and avoid the worst pitfalls 
of EU GI policy. There should be clear economic criteria used in defining 
GIs, and a process, such as that in place for certification marks, to ensure 
anti-competitive effects are minimised. Consideration should be given to 
excluding GIs from the IP exception to competition laws. 
Another missing element in EU GI policy is compensation for losers. 
Indeed, EU GI policy eliminates the absolute safeguards that are part of its 
CTM policy.33 Should a new GI policy lead to trademark expropriation, 
there needs to be a clear procedure for providing sufficient compensation 
to create new marketing images. Ideally, this should be provided by the GI 
winners. For New World wine and spirit producers, such compensation 
took the form of increased access to EU markets. 
In designing a GI system, Australia might be mindful:
• of the value of retaining weak-form GIs—these provide for consumer 
recognition of known products while allowing reasonable competition 
among producers. Canada has been able to protect important generic 
names such as feta in its negotiations with the EU, and Australia might 
develop a shortlist of generic names that are important in our markets;
• of the need to protect trademark rights or provide compensation 
where these rights have to be surrendered. The compensation should 
be from the winning party to the party that will have to begin anew on 
its marketing and market positioning; 
• of the effectiveness of certified trademarks in providing appropriate 
protection for regional producers; and
33  Under the CTM policy any member state can object to a proposed registration, including on 
grounds that the name has become common or generic in their state, and the CTM registration will 
then fail. 
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• GIs being a government-enforced privilege that allows the users to 
extract a higher price from their consumers. These privileges come 
at a cost to consumers and to some producers. It is not reasonable, 
therefore, for enforcement action (and costs) to be shifted from the 
privilege-holders to taxpayers.
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8
Gains for Trade in 
Services in an EU–Australia 
Free Trade Agreement: 
A European Perspective
Pascal Kerneis 
The European Union (EU) and Australia are like-minded partners who 
share many common concerns in today’s international trade environment, 
such as the initiatives to further liberalise the trade of goods and services 
and advance the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) that is currently 
under  discussion. This chapter will discuss the common interests and 
then assess the potential content of an EU–Australia free trade agreement 
(FTA) that may benefit companies operating in the services sectors. 
It  will analyse the traditional elements of market access related to the 
trade in services, and also the key concerns for services companies that 
seek to maximise their returns on the basis of a modern trade agreement, 
particularly where the agreement may cover issues of investment, public 
procurement and regulatory cooperation.
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Services in the EU–Australia trade 
relationship
It is essential to demonstrate the importance of trade in services between 
the EU and Australia, in particular since, for too long, the bilateral 
trade discussions have been dominated in the political arena by the 
issues of agricultural trade, notably in the context of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). Currently, Australia and the EU maintain close 
economic relations. In 2013, Australia ranked as the 15th-largest trade 
in goods partner of the EU, while the EU was Australia’s third-largest 
trading partner after China and Japan. Total bilateral trade in goods that 
year amounted to €42.3 billion (Eurostat 2015). Traditionally, Australia’s 
exports to the EU have been dominated by minerals (fuels and mining 
products) and agricultural products, while the EU’s exports to Australia 
are predominantly manufactured goods. But services have become an 
important and growing part of the EU–Australia trade relationship. 
In 2013, total trade in commercial services amounted to €27.0 billion and 
represented 39 per cent of the total bilateral trade (Eurostat 2015). This 
is a significant increase from a share of 26 per cent in 2000, as Figure 1 
shows, and demonstrates that the bilateral trade of services has increased 
faster than the trade of goods. It is also higher than the 20 per cent average 
share of trade in services in 2014 global trade (WTO 2015: Tables A4 
and A5), and underlines that trade in services now plays an important role 
in this bilateral trade relationship.
The EU and Australia conduct their trade and economic relations under 
multilateral agreements to which both are signatories, such as the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS). Both also cooperated in the Doha Round of 
multilateral discussions on various issues that impact on bilateral trade, 
including services trade. The Doha Round has not yet been completed, 
but it has offered an opportunity to build consensus between the EU 
and Australia and to establish a foundation for further discussions about 
bilateral trade. In addition, the EU–Australia Partnership Framework 
of October 2008 has relevance for the EU–Australia trade relations. 
Although most of its clauses do not relate to issues of trade, the framework 
expresses a commitment to further cooperation including on trade issues. 
It is most explicit about reconfirming the bilateral mutual recognition 
agreement (MRA), which was revised a year later. Although the scope 
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of this agreement is largely limited to mutual recognition of testing 
procedures that apply to certain products traded bilaterally, it leaves open 
opportunities to expand areas of mutual recognition in the future. 
Figure 1. Share of services in the EU’s total bilateral trade with 
Australia, 2000–13
Note: Total trade includes imports and exports .
Source: Calculated from Eurostat 2015 .
The world economy is increasingly dependent on services. According 
to the WTO, international trade in services (excluding intra-EU trade) 
reached over US$3.7 trillion in 2014 (WTO 2015: Table 1.10). The value 
of international services trade has increased faster than the trade of goods 
during 2004–2014 (WTO 2015: Tables A4 and A5). Services provide 
essential components in all global supply chains and represent a growing 
share of the value added embodied in traded goods. Indeed, according 
to the WTO and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), global trade in services represents approximately 
one-quarter of global trade in terms of the value of final products, but 
nearly half of global trade in terms of the international trade in value 
added (TiVA) associated with these goods (OECD 2015). 
This phenomenon is a consequence of the increasing internationalisation 
of supply chains, which not only involves semi-manufactured goods, but 
importantly also a wide range of services. In turn, this development is 
related to the rise of knowledge-based activities and the growing importance 
of intangible assets in all economies, together with the development 
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of  internet-based communications and applications, and the enhanced 
interplay between the services and the manufacturing and agricultural 
sectors. Major advances in computer networks, telecommunications, 
express delivery and air transportation have contributed this economic 
shift. These changes have provided the platform for raising countless small 
and large services companies from local establishments to international 
businesses. Together they are now creating millions of jobs worldwide.
The EU is by far the biggest exporter (€831 billion in 2015) and importer 
(€685 billion in 2015) of services in the world, with a significant positive 
trade balance of €146 billion (Eurostat 2017). The EU is also the world’s 
biggest investor in services sectors, with nearly 60 per cent of its total 
outward foreign direct investment (FDI) directed at services sectors.1
Services components in the EU–Australia 
FTA: Building on TiSA
The EU–Australia FTA should be an ambitious and balanced, deep and 
comprehensive agreement. It should include provisions on all the key 
subjects: trade in goods and services, investment, intellectual property 
rights, public procurement, competition policy and dispute settlement. 
It should also contain provisions that allow for further consultation and 
cooperation with an eye to future regulatory reforms. Concerning the 
goods-related issues, the agreement should aim at removing tariffs with 
only few exceptions and should address non-tariff barriers and rules 
of origin issues. It should also look at possibilities to set up regulatory 
cooperation processes aiming at convergence of product standards and 
certification.
It will be important for the two negotiating parties to ensure that this 
FTA will deliver the best possible market openings for firms and establish 
rules that encourage firms to increase their bilateral activities. To that end, 
Australia will most likely look closely at the Comprehensive Economic 
and Trade Agreement (CETA), which the EU has negotiated with Canada 
in 2013, and which is currently the benchmark for FTAs with the EU. 
In turn, the EU will have a close look at the commitments Australia has 
made in its recent FTAs, including the content of the Australia–Korea 
1  €3.5 trillion out of €6 trillion of extra-EU outward FDI stocks in 2014 (Eurostat 2017).
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FTA, the Australia–Japan FTA and the China–Australia FTA, concluded 
in 2014, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in which Australia 
participates, concluded in October 2015. Despite the fact that the US 
decided to withdraw from TPP in January 2017, the text of this agreement 
remains a benchmark and an implementation of the agreement with the 
other 11 partners is still possible.
The rest of this chapter will address the possible content of an EU–
Australia FTA as it applies to services companies. The chapter will discuss 
the market access pillar, including all modes of supply and access to 
the public procurement market, and then the regulatory cooperation 
and other rules that the agreement should include to be a really ‘deep 
and comprehensive’ FTA, as the EU prefers to label the ‘new generation’ 
or ‘WTO-plus’ FTAs it seeks to pursue. 
To begin with, to have a real added value, the EU–Australia FTA should go 
beyond all aspects of the TiSA, which is currently still under negotiation. 
The fate of TiSA is uncertain after the cancellation of a TiSA Ministerial 
meeting on 9 November, one day after the US presidential elections. 
The ministerial was scheduled beginning of December 2016 to try to 
conclude the talks. However, parties agreed to keep all texts and offers as a 
starting point for any further resuming talks in due time. This chapter will 
therefore briefly discuss the TiSA and its components, before analysing in 
more detail the possible relevant elements of the bilateral agreement for 
services companies. 
With the impasse in WTO negotiations in the Doha Round with respect 
to services, the idea of moving the trade agenda forward through a stand-
alone agreement on trade in services was proposed in 2012. The process 
was an initiative of Australia and the United States of America (USA) 
and it was proposed to a group of countries that met in Geneva under 
the moniker the ‘Really Good Friends of Services’ (Vastine 2005). These 
countries took the initiative to craft the TiSA, which is currently being 
negotiated by 23 members of the WTO (or 50 countries in all, including 
all individual EU member countries).2 Together, these countries account 
for approximately 70 per cent of world trade in services. 
2  Australia, Canada, Chile, Taiwan, Colombia, Costa Rica, EU, Hong Kong, Iceland, Israel, 
Japan, Korea, Liechtenstein, Mauritius, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, 
Switzerland, Turkey, USA.
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Since April 2013, TiSA participants completed 21 negotiating rounds on 
the core text of the agreement. Relevant topics include domestic regulation, 
transparency, entry of business persons and sector-specific negotiations 
focusing on the new and enhanced trade rules for, inter alia, e-commerce 
and telecommunications, financial services, professional services, air and 
maritime transportation, information and communications technology 
(ICT) services and energy services. Regarding the market access pillar 
of the talks, participating countries have confirmed that they will use 
a  ‘hybrid approach’, where commitments in the TiSA market access 
schedule will use a ‘positive list’ approach, meaning that only the services 
listed on the schedule are to be liberalised. In contrast, the national 
treatment commitments will be scheduled on a ‘negative list’ basis, which 
means that for any services where a party does not commit to apply full 
national treatment, a reservation must be listed (Broude & Moses 2016).
The countries participating in TiSA decided to start market access 
discussions by agreeing to table the highest level of commitment expressed 
by each party under its best (implemented) FTA at the date when 
negotiations started. However, the aim of TiSA is not to simply repackage 
existing commitments in completed FTAs, but to create genuine new 
opportunities through new market access commitments that go beyond 
current openness. For example, firms aim to provide the best customised 
service to their clients. An essential aspect of this commitment is ‘talent 
mobility’, the ability to move highly skilled services personnel rapidly to 
international locations where firms require their acumen (OECD 2008). 
The TiSA seeks to address this important issue of talent mobility to allow 
market access to service providers in a predictable and expedited way 
across all participating countries. 
In almost every country the majority of the services sectors are subject 
to strict rules and regulations that govern their daily functioning, 
such as licensing and authorisation requirements, competition rules, 
product quality requirements and consumer protection. TiSA offers an 
opportunity to draft horizontal disciplinary provisions for the issues that 
are likely to become new challenges in the 21st century, such as cross-
border data flows, forced localisation, and the conditions under which 
state-owned and state-sponsored enterprises compete in international 
commercial markets.
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Going beyond TiSA: EU–Australia 
market access
Taking these elements into consideration and accepting that the EU–
Australia FTA will want to go beyond the TiSA, what should be added? 
In short, to facilitate the bilateral trade of services further, the agreement 
should aim at facilitating cross-border trade in services and movement of 
people by removing remaining market access barriers of all kinds to the 
maximum degree possible. The question is, what degree is possible? 
Many services are traded across borders as a consequence of service-
providing firms investing in the establishment of a commercial presence in 
the form of a foreign subsidiary company. Ideally, the FTA should provide 
pre-establishment market access in all economic sectors, including in all 
services sectors. It should also offer post-establishment protection that sets 
clear protection for firms establishing foreign subsidiaries through FDI 
and puts into place a state-of-the-art investor–state dispute settlement 
(ISDS) mechanism (e.g. Bronkers 2015; Nottage 2015). 
In addition, the FTA should also contain an intellectual property 
rights section that addresses the relevant issues related to copyright of 
software and patents of hardware used by services companies such as in 
ICT, energy, water and waste management, etc., as well as related to the 
transfer of data. The agreement should also ensure better mutual access 
to public procurement, including for services sectors in all public entities 
(Adlung & Mamdouh 2014: 203; Sheffler 2015). And the FTA should 
include chapters on rules, such as establishing a regulatory cooperation 
mechanism, provisions on competition and sustainable development, 
and a state-to-state dispute settlement body. 
It must be remembered that the starting point of discussions about 
issues related to market access for services is the 1994 GATS, particularly 
Article XVI. An EU–Australia FTA would be a historical opportunity 
to substantially improve Australia’s market access to the EU. Hence, the 
market access pillar in a bilateral FTA should be ambitious. If possible, 
it should correspond to a GATS + TiSA, or a GATS + TPP arrangement. 
To achieve this, the FTA should remove all caps on equity, although 
possibly with negotiated exceptions. It should also bind the practices 
that go beyond existing commitments (i.e. higher market access than in 
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existing FTAs), and FTA negotiations should seriously consider removing 
existing barriers, so as to effectively create new market opportunities for 
service providers from both sides. 
As in CETA, the FTA should include so-called ‘standstill’ and ‘ratchet’ 
clauses (Adlung & Mamdouh 2014: 200–1) to ensure that parties to the 
agreement will not revert to trade legislation and regulation that was in 
place at the time of the signing of the agreement, unless provided for in 
the agreement. This would warrant the spreading of trade liberalisation on 
a non-discriminatory basis after a party to the agreement has unilaterally 
decided to open up the market. The FTA should be particularly ambitious 
in the sectors of professional services, telecommunication services, postal 
and express services, and financial services that are often left behind in 
such negotiations.
The scheduling of market access and national treatment commitments 
should follow the negative list approach. A schedule of commitments 
undertaken under the negative list approach would simply provide 
a much better visibility for a company, clear indications of what it cannot 
do, and hence which sectors are open for investment and trade (Hufbauer 
et al. 2012: 5–7, 35–37). This would therefore be the preferred choice 
of the EU services industry.
In this approach, each country compiles a list of restrictions on the 
existing measures (also called Annex I) and another list of restrictions 
on future and sensitive measures (Annex II). Furthermore, most of the 
recent trade agreements that have used the negative list approach list 
the restrictions in financial services in a separate annex (Annex III), with 
the restrictions on existing measures in financial services in a Section A, 
and the restrictions on future measures in a Section B. Everything that is 
not listed is considered open and unrestricted. The listed restrictions are 
called ‘non-conforming measures’, as they do not conform to the norm 
of being liberalised.
The standstill and ratchet clauses, that prevent the signatories from 
implementing protectionist measures and that bind any measures 
implemented by the signatories that goes beyond what was agreed on 
in the agreement, are tools that ensure spreading of trade liberalisation 
on a non-discriminatory basis, once a party has unilaterally decided to 
open up the market. They fully respect the democratic control, and allow 
avoiding the necessity to renegotiate out-dated agreements.
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There, the participation of all administrative levels of the signatories 
would be a sine qua non condition to the use of the negative list. Since 
this list is much more exhaustive than the positive list, it requires a clearer 
view of what can or cannot be done at Australian sub-federal level and 
at EU member state level. Not involving the signatories at sub-federal 
levels would result in a great lack of transparency and could lead to 
situations in  which local entities could refuse to comply with the text 
of the agreement (Kukucha 2015).
Going beyond TiSA in all modes of  
EU–Australia services trade
A major issue with services trade is that services are heterogeneous and 
intangible. It is therefore relevant that the EU–Australia FTA ensures that 
the parties will take substantial commitments that apply to all possible 
modes in which services are supplied. GATS identifies four modes 
of international services trade (UNStats 2010: 3–5). 
Firstly, a mode of delivery in which neither the supplier nor the client 
moves across borders, but stay in their respective countries. The EU and 
Australia will have to make particular significant efforts in taking new 
commitments in this type of cross-border trade of services. This mode 
includes shipping or other transport services. It also includes a growing 
range of services that are traded through electronic transmission; not only 
the e-commerce of goods, but also financial services and architectural 
services, etc. There is a huge undiscovered potential to increase the cross-
border trade of such services through ICT advances. An EU–Australia 
FTA would be a real opportunity to go beyond what has been done so 
far in identifying and addressing the issues in this services delivery mode.
The commitments related to this category may also include transactions 
that require the consumer to move to the country of the supplier, which 
is the second mode of delivery identified under GATS. It typically includes 
tourism, travel, education and, increasingly, health services. Arguably, 
there are very few remaining barriers in this mode of supply, but the FTA 
will be an opportunity to identify those and resolve ways to remove them.
The third mode of delivery involves the establishment by the service 
company of a commercial presence in another country through FDI. 
This is a preferred route for services companies to undertake international 
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activities. Companies using this delivery mode generally need to establish 
a physical presence in another country in order to be able to transact 
with clients on a face-to-face basis. Contrary to the production of goods, 
the services are often produced at the same time that they are delivered 
to the consumer. It is crucial, therefore, for many services companies 
to have direct contact with their customers. A wholly owned or joint-
venture subsidiary, or possibly a branch that is controlled by headquarters, 
generally serves this purpose. 
The FTA will have to ensure that the companies that would wish to use 
this mode of service delivery are able to establish a subsidiary in any legal 
form that they see fit for themselves, and also that firms are able to own 
and control their foreign establishments, which would involve the removal 
of all equity caps. A particular aspect of this mode of service delivery is 
that after access to the market is granted, the activity of the subsidiary 
company will, in the vast majority of cases, be accounted for in the GDP 
of the host country, rather than the host country’s data on international 
services trade. The only data that are accounted for in international 
trade under this service delivery mode are the eventual profits that are 
repatriated to the parent firm in the home country. The initial inflow of 
capital to create a greenfield establishment or to acquire or merge into 
an existing local firm is calculated as an inflow of FDI. Nevertheless, the 
guarantee of market access needs to be provided for in international trade 
agreements. 
With the 2007 Lisbon Treaty, the EU members granted new 
supranational competences to the EU in the area of FDI, starting in 2009 
(Meunier 2014). Hence, FDI issues can now formally be negotiated with 
the EU in the context of FTAs. Nevertheless, there is limited precedent 
for negotiation partners in this respect. Pre-market access FDI by services 
companies was actually already part of the EU’s competence through its 
responsibility for trade policy. And even before the Lisbon Treaty came 
into force, the EU had negotiated pre-market access commitments for 
FDI in non-services sectors. Particularly, the 2008 EU–CARIFORUM 
Economic Partnership Agreement included such commitments. However, 
it does not cover the protection of investments, post-market access. 
The FTAs that the EU negotiated before the Lisbon Treaty—such as those 
with South Korea, Columbia, Peru and six Central America nations—
do not include an investment protection chapter at all. In other words, 
should companies from such countries encounter a problem of market 
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access in the EU, the only way for them to seek redress is to hope that the 
government of their country of origin is willing to spark up the state-to-
state dispute settlement specified in the relevant FTA.
On the other hand, the EU member states have now granted—through 
new or revised mandates—negotiating power to the EU on foreign 
investment protection in the context of the concluded agreements 
with Canada and Singapore, and for the ongoing negotiations with the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries (Vietnam, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand), with India, and with USA and Japan. 
Consequently, there is little doubt that the EU–Australia FTA will 
include an investment protection chapter, covering pre-market access 
commitments as well as post-establishment protection. 
In addition, before the Lisbon Treaty, FDI protection was the competence 
of the member states of the EU. The current EU member states themselves 
have concluded over 1,400 bilateral investment treaties (BITs) of high-
level protection since the end of the 1950s (UNCTAD 2015). Australia 
has signed 21 BITs, including five with relatively new EU member states 
(Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland and Romania). Investment 
is about trust. Investment protection, including the right to defend it 
through a neutral dispute settlement, provides that trust. Most of these 
existing 1,400 BITs include an ISDS mechanism. There is a clear positive 
correlation between the volume of investment and the presence of an 
FTA and a BIT, and to a lesser extent of an ISDS mechanism (Berger et 
al. 2013). Investors take a decision to invest knowing that, should there 
be a problem with their investment, there is a means of redress. Hence, 
BITs and ISDS are an integral part of the trust that investors require 
in making investment decisions. 
The competences between the EU and its member states in terms of 
FDI and BITs are still fluid (Burgstaller 2011). Nevertheless, it will 
be vital that discussions about the EU–Australia FTA include high-
level investment protection with a neutral, binding and efficient ISDS 
mechanism. This mechanism is likely to include some reforms, notably 
new transparency obligations. The question of ISDS is of great sensitivity 
within the EU (Burgstaller 2014), and possibly Australia as well, and 
further public debate may have the advantage of making the process more 
accountable to the public. This may need to be taken into consideration 
in the process towards an FTA.
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The fourth mode for supplying a service involves the temporary 
movement of natural persons associated with a services company from one 
country to another. It includes both the independent services suppliers 
and the employees of foreign services suppliers. Provisions facilitating the 
issue of the mobility of the services suppliers should have a key priority 
in the EU–Australia FTA. ‘Talent mobility’, or the mobility of highly 
skilled business personnel, is a key component of the daily activities of 
services companies (OECD 2008). Commitments to facilitate mobility 
and expedite business visas and work permits are a matter of high 
importance to internationally active service providers. The FTA should 
cover temporary movement only, rather than permanent migration. 
Migration policy is not a full competence of the EU, and decisions for 
granting visas and work permits are taken at the member state level. 
However, some progress has been made within the EU among some 
countries with the establishment of the so-called Schengen Area in 1995, 
which now covers 26 European countries (including non-EU members, 
such as Switzerland). As a consequence of this agreement, movement 
of residents across these countries is now entirely free, although recent 
terror and refugee-related events are imposing challenges on the Schengen 
Area. However, this freedom does not apply to third countries and 
negotiations of GATS Mode Four commitments (movement of natural 
persons) are a first step to facilitate greater legal access for business 
travellers. The commitments taken by the EU under this service delivery 
mode are divided into the following four sub-sections: (i) movement of 
business visitors; (ii) movement of intra-corporate transferees/employees; 
(iii) movement of a services supplier to a client in the host country under 
the terms of a contract between two companies (contract service supplier); 
and (iv) movement of an independent services supplier in contract with 
a company in the host country.
Firstly, in terms of intra-company transferees across borders, the EU’s 
2014 Intra-Corporate Transferees Directive should be of great interest to 
Australia. Together with several directives that aim to simplify procedures, 
and also the so-called 2009 Blue-Card Directive, the 2014 Directive—
despite imperfections (Schmitz 2015)—should offer new opportunities 
for an Australian services firm to dispatch its personnel to supply services 
across different EU member countries before returning home. 
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The conditions allowing for an intra-corporate transferee should be that the 
natural person must have worked within the company (juridical person) 
for at least one year, and that they are only transferred temporarily in the 
context of the provision of a service through a commercial presence in the 
territory. Entry and stay in the EU should be limited to a maximum of 
three years for managers and specialists (with some longer periods in some 
EU countries) and of one year for trainees. Intra-corporate transferees 
should not be submitted to any economic needs tests, limits or quotas.
Secondly, the conditions allowing for contract service suppliers into 
the EU must be that the person is employed by a company (juridical 
person) that has no commercial presence in the EU; that the company 
has obtained a service contract for a maximum period of 12 months from 
a final consumer; that the person has worked for the company for at least 
one year before the contract; and that the person possesses a university 
degree or the required technical and professional qualifications, and has at 
least three years of professional experience in the sector. Where the degree 
or qualification has been obtained in a third country, an EU member state 
may evaluate whether this is equivalent to a university degree required in 
that member state.
Replicating GATS, the EU has allowed professional service suppliers 
from  several partner countries to be contracted for transactions on 
a bilateral basis. 
These ‘contract service suppliers’ are restricted to legal services, accounting 
and bookkeeping, taxation advisory services, architectural services, urban 
planning, engineering services, integrated engineering services, computer 
and related services, research and development services, advertising, 
management consulting services, services related to management services, 
technical testing and analysis services, related and technical consulting 
services, maintenance and repair of equipment in after sales of after-
lease services contracts, translation services, construction services, site 
investigation work, higher education services, environmental services, 
travel agencies and tour operator services, entertainment services, and 
services related to the sale of equipment or to the assignment of a patent. 
Of course, these sectors are the result of bilateral negotiations, and might 
either be extended or restricted, depending on the reciprocity that will be 
granted by the partner country to EU service providers. Commitments 
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might also be subject to the application of a numerical ceiling 
(i.e. a minimum quota, but without a fixed cap) that will be determined 
during the negotiations.
Going beyond TiSA: EU–Australia public 
procurement
The FTA should also provide comprehensive market access to public 
procurement of services, with low thresholds and substantive coverage 
of all public institutions and entities, committing the partners to remove 
any discrimination in the tender process by any EU or Australian firms. 
It is of crucial importance to increase access for services companies to all 
public entities that use public procurement processes. This is obviously 
true for construction and construction-related professional services, 
such as architectural and engineering services, and urban planning. 
But on a daily basis all public administrations and entities also purchase 
telecommunications and ICT services, insurance and banking services, 
transport and logistic services, cleaning and catering services, legal and 
accounting services, and so on. 
The FTA negotiations could generate considerable gains in public 
procurement, given that Australia is only an observer of the international 
Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), not a signatory. It is 
currently negotiating its accession to the GPA, and it is not clear when 
this process will come to a conclusion. It must be emphasised, however, 
that this accession should not be seen as the end of the road for Australian 
FTA negotiators, because their EU counterparts are likely to insist on 
commitments beyond the GPA from Australia.
Australia is a federal state composed of sub-federal entities. Although this 
is likely to be a ‘balancing act’ (Sheffler 2015), negotiators should ensure 
that all the provisions apply not only at the federal level, but also to the 
sub-federal levels (states and territories). 
The EU public procurement directives have, over the years, opened 
up the public procurement markets across EU member states, and 
have established transparency and process rules that opened up public 
procurement in the EU. The EU is the GPA party that has the most 
significant package of commitments, but it has also kept some domains 
exclusively reserved to EU member states or to partners of recent FTAs 
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who agreed to open their markets beyond the GPA. This has been the 
case for Canada (Kukucha 2015), and it could therefore also be the case 
for Australia. 
For example, the EU has not just opened up ‘government’ procurement 
only, but has opened up ‘public’ procurement more generally. 
This  includes all public entities that are using procurement processes 
for their daily operations—from provinces, counties and municipalities 
to public schools, universities and hospitals. This is clearly an issue that 
will be put forward in the EU–Australia negotiations. Some aspects may 
then already be covered by Australia’s GPA commitments. Nevertheless, 
the added value of the FTA could therefore be the reduction of the 
thresholds at which companies from either trade partner will be allowed 
to participate in tender processes of public entities in general.
As a minimum commitment, the EU will likely require Australia to allow 
upfront that all European companies already established in Australia 
and hence incorporated as an Australian enterprise should be treated 
as domestic companies and granted an automatic right to participate in 
tender calls of all Australian public entities. This is a proposal that the 
EU has also carried into the ongoing TiSA negotiations.
Going beyond TiSA: Regulatory disciplinary 
arrangements and other rules
To be effectively a deep and comprehensive FTA that embraces all new 
elements of 21st-century trade deals, the EU–Australia FTA would 
have to go beyond the traditional market access commitments. For 
example, beyond the traditional commitments on public procurement, as 
mentioned. But to become an agreement that sets a really new benchmark 
for others to consider, the EU–Australia FTA will also have to deal with 
beyond-the-border issues. Here we will not discuss the provisions that 
are likely to tackle labour and environmental rules in the sustainable 
development chapter of the FTA, although labour provisions will also 
have an impact on services companies, which are together by far the 
biggest employers in the EU and in Australia. Instead, we will analyse 
the obligations that both parties will have in relation to discrepancies in 
domestic regulation, as well as other ‘horizontal’ rules such as cross-border 
data flows.
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The FTA should include a strong horizontal chapter with disciplinary 
provisions for domestic regulation. This chapter should establish 
obligations that go beyond the rules that could be adopted in the context 
of the WTO’s post-Bali 2014 work programme, or in the TiSA agreement, 
which will essentially establish basic rules for better transparency in 
licensing and qualification procedures. Such a chapter of the FTA should 
be divided into two sections: one on regulatory coherence and one on 
regulatory cooperation. A concrete example might be envisaged in the 
area of mutual recognition of qualifications of some professional services 
(Kerneis & Prentice 2011).
Principles such as regulatory transparency, prior consultation with 
stakeholders before adoption of new or revised rules, impartiality and 
due process with regard to licensing and qualification requirements and 
procedures, and a right of appeal are already normal practice in Australian 
and EU jurisdictions and are part of most of their respective recent bilateral 
trade agreements. These regulatory principles and practices should be 
applied systematically in the FTA at all levels of the market regulation, 
to help limit the degrees of regulatory divergence in the future.
The relevant chapter should therefore include an impact assessment 
mechanism. Both the EU and Australia already use this classical ‘better 
governance’ principle at home (Dunlop & Radaelli 2015; Kupiec 2015). 
Before adopting a new regulation or revising an existing legislation, the 
relevant regulatory body must conduct an impact assessment study of 
the new proposed rules to evaluate their potential impact on the targeted 
market, on the economy in general, on labour and the environment, 
and on the public budget. 
In 2014 the EU started a process to revise its own rules so as to make 
them more efficient, suggesting that impact assessments should be made 
not only at the beginning of the drafting process, but also at the end 
of the legislative process, since the proposal might have changed in the 
meantime. It is likely that the EU will propose similar processes for 
inclusion in the EU–Australia FTA to establish the potential and actual 
impact of regulatory activities on bilateral trade. The purpose will be 
to establish a mechanism for information exchange between regulating 
agencies in sectors in order to increase transparency and inform possible 
changes to achieve better regulatory coherence. When implemented, the 
process should, for instance, provide full transparency about the licensing 
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requirements and procedures, particularly the objectives of the regulator, 
obligation proportionate to the goal, least burdensome administrative 
costs as possible, short and predefined delays, right of appeal, etc.
Closer regulatory cooperation could be important to progressively achieve 
a more integrated international marketplace as well as to ensure that 
both trade partners together promote the development of international 
regulations applicable to all economic sectors. Changes towards greater 
regulatory coherence is a necessary first step, but the ultimate goal will be 
the reduction of unnecessary costs associated with regulatory differences by 
promoting greater compatibility through equivalence, mutual recognition 
or other agreed means. The outcome would be avoiding the cost of double 
licensing, double certification, double qualification procedures, etc. 
Apart from accommodating the principles in the FTA, implementation 
would require sector-specific regulators of both trade partners to meet 
with their counterparts and exchange views on the respective objectives 
and methods of regulation. This may facilitate in some instances the 
identification of procedures that instil mutual trust and provide a basis 
for the authorisation of equivalence or the mutual recognition of the 
authorisation process of the trade partner. 
To allow such a result, the horizontal regulatory cooperation chapter 
in the EU–Australia FTA could establish a mechanism whereby the 
regulators would agree to meet and exchange. The regulators will remain 
independent. They will not be subject to any obligations as a result. 
It may be appropriate for such a chapter not to be subjected to the dispute 
settlement system in the FTA, but to impose an obligation of cooperation 
on the regulators in case an issue of mutual interest is identified. 
The regulators could establish an annual or pluri-annual program, report 
on the progress of their discussions, and provide explanatory notes. In this 
way, the chapter will establish a living process that would put into place 
a regulatory cooperation mechanism on a long-term basis with the aim 
of achieving regulatory compatibility.
The FTA could also include sector-specific disciplinary provisions that 
could be included either in the sector-specific chapters of the FTA, such 
as telecommunication services or financial services, or in sector-specific 
annexes attached to the horizontal regulatory cooperation chapter. 
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All specificities should indeed be taken into consideration; the regulators 
themselves are better positioned to set up specific arrangements as they 
would see fit for their own sector.
One example where regulatory cooperation could lead to concrete 
results is in the domain of professional services (Kerneis & Prentice 
2011). Even full market access and national treatment commitments 
in the FTA in all areas of professional services—including in allowing 
temporary movement of professionals in regulated professions, such as 
architects, lawyers, engineers, accountants and auditors—will not result 
in substantial increases in bilateral trade if service providers are forced to 
re-qualify before being able to provide services across borders.
The EU–Australia FTA, through regulatory cooperation provisions, could 
put in place a mechanism encouraging and enabling the regulators of these 
sectors to achieve—when there is a mutual demand from the professional 
bodies—mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) in professional 
qualifications in an EU–Australia FTA. They could, for instance, follow 
the example set in the EU–Canada CETA. Research shows that mutual 
recognition in the 2005 Services Directive enhanced services trade in the 
EU (Nordås 2016). A similar effect may be possible in the EU–Australia 
context. While the EU Treaty gives full competence to EU institutions 
on all external aspects of the internal market, including on professional 
qualifications, the EU still needs to find a way to reconcile its authorities 
in the areas of professional services (shared by the DG GROW, relevant 
member state ministries, and professional bodies), and of the international 
trade (shared by the DG TRADE, the Trade Policy Committee comprising 
member state trade representatives, and the European Parliament).3
For many years, the private sector in the EU was expected to work on the 
details of mutual recognition in professional services via ‘profession to 
profession’ agreements, which would then be examined by the relevant 
regulatory institutions of two trading partners, before becoming an annex 
to a binding international treaty. But this was not that easy, and some 
MRAs finalised by private sector organisations in the areas of architecture 
services were never implemented due to the lack of coordination across 
all involved parties.
3  DG GROW is the Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and 
Small and Medium-sized Enterprises of the European Commission; DG TRADE is the Directorate-
General for Trade of the European Commission.
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With the framework agreement that is part of CETA, the European 
Commission and Canada have found a way forward. It describes the 
modalities of how MRAs on sector-specific professional qualifications—
once concluded by the private sector together with the ‘licensing bodies’—
will finally be transformed into the binding international treaty, i.e. CETA 
(Sosnow, Kirby & Stephenson 2014: 255). All the competent authorities 
in the member states and the provinces have been involved in reaching 
this solution.
Thus, the framework agreement is an enabling tool containing guidelines 
for the services sectors that ensure legal security to the agreement, if—
and only if—the professional services sectors want to conclude an MRA. 
Even though CETA is not yet in force, the associations of architects 
have already started to work on an MRA. This model reveals quality and 
efficiency and it could be followed in the EU–Australia negotiations. 
It is,  however, important to emphasise that such a model can only be 
relevant if all administrative levels of the signatories—that is to say the 
EU member states and the Australian states and territories—are involved.
Finally, the FTA should include other disciplinary provisions that are of 
cross-sectoral nature, but that will have a direct impact on the services 
companies. These rules should reflect what is already under consideration 
in other trade agreements, such as the TPP or the TTIP, as well as possibly 
the TiSA, since they should contribute to establishing international 
standards. 
Although cross-border commercial data flows are a very sensitive subject 
in the EU, they are the real backbone of the digital economy, and 
important to sustaining growth of output and employment in all sectors 
of the economy, including small and medium-size enterprises (Meltzer 
2015). The EU–Australia FTA will have to include rules on cross-border 
data flows. The commitments taken on this issue should be applied across 
all services sectors, including financial services. Any exceptions to these 
provisions would have to be limited to legitimate public policy objectives 
and only in full compliance with the provisions of GATS covering data 
privacy (GATS Article XIV). With the objective of enhancing trust of 
users and certainty of companies, and thus trade in goods and services, 
it  is essential that firms comply with data protection and security rules 
in force in the country of residence of the data subjects. 
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Nevertheless, the FTA should seek to ensure that cross-border data flows 
are not limited by a requirement to establish a local presence; with only 
few mutually agreed and well-justified exceptions. The parties should 
allow cross-border data flows without the requirement of locally based 
servers. The obligation to use local infrastructure or to establish a local 
presence should not be required as a condition for supplying data services. 
Preferential treatment to national suppliers should be prohibited in the 
use of local infrastructure, national spectrum, or orbital resources. Finally, 
the EU and Australia should ensure that local infrastructure used to 
convey signals on electronic communications networks is made available 
to services suppliers under fully non-discriminatory terms and conditions.
Lastly, the agreement should look at stating specific rules to ensure that the 
competition legislation also applies to state-owned and state-sponsored 
enterprises that compete in commercial markets. These rules could be 
part of the provisions in the competition chapter of the agreement. 
Consideration could be given to the EU regime on state aid. It imposes 
obligations of transparency on state-owned companies in EU member 
countries. It also ensures that the companies have transparent accounting 
rules, and it prohibits any cross-subsidisation transfers between different 
departments of a state-owned firm. 
Conclusion
Services are an important and growing part of bilateral EU–Australia 
trade flows; they now account for close to 40 per cent of total trade flows 
between Australia and the EU, significantly higher than the 1990s, and 
higher also than the 20 per cent share of services trade in global trade flows. 
Against this background, both the EU and Australia can be expected to 
commence FTA negotiations with high ambitions on both market access 
and regulatory cooperation. The starting point for FTA negotiations on 
services would have four elements: (a) the 1994 GATS, supplemented 
by the current TiSA negotiations under WTO auspices in which both 
the EU and Australia are active participants; (b) the plurilateral GPA on 
government procurement within the WTO, which Australia is currently 
negotiating access to; (c) the EU–Canada CETA, which is currently 
considered the trade liberalisation benchmark for an FTA with the 
EU; and (d) the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which was signed in 
Auckland in February 2016 and to which Australia is a party.
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An ambitious FTA outcome on services between Australia and the 
EU would go beyond TiSA by providing pre-establishment access for 
investment capital in all sectors without restriction, and post-establishment 
investment protection through an ISDS mechanism. An ambitious EU–
Australia FTA should also go beyond the GPA and CETA by opening up 
access to public procurement tenders and contracts issued by sub-federal 
and regional governments and by removing all equity caps in inwards 
investment.
Strong regulatory cooperation powers and the pursuit of greater regulatory 
coherence through mutual recognition, and the recognition of differing 
certification requirements of equivalent intent in relation to services, 
should also be an important feature of an EU–Australia FTA. MRAs on 
professional qualifications of, for example, architects, lawyers, engineers, 
accountants and auditors could be a significant trade-creating outcome of 
such cooperation. The recent EU–Canada CETA has broken new ground 
in this field.
Finally, an ambitious FTA between the EU and Australia should be one that 
encompasses two key issues. First, market access and national treatment 
commitments are to be taken on the basis of a negative listing, rather than 
a positive listing. Such an approach provides for all services sectors to be 
liberalised other than those reserved to an ‘exceptions’ list. A negative-
listing approach to commitments provides for greater transparency and 
is more trade creating. Second, liberalisation commitments should be 
taken on all the modes through which international services are traded 
internationally, i.e. cross-border trade in services, commercial presence 
abroad through FDI, and the movement of natural persons.
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‘Mutual Evaluation’: A New Policy 
Tool for Dealing with ‘Behind the 
Borders’ Barriers
Anne McNaughton and Jacqueline Lo
Introduction
Continued economic integration increasingly reveals measures behind 
borders that may or may not be non-tariff barriers. These measures may be 
the result of differing policy imperatives or lack of regulatory equivalence. 
The principle of mutual recognition, first created by the Court of Justice 
of the European Union, was a response to dealing with such measures. 
In some instances, the measures under challenge were held incompatible 
with EU law; in other instances, although incompatible with EU law, the 
measures were permitted under one of the accepted derogations under the 
treaty or as a result of EU case law. The principle was quickly taken up in 
EU legislation, becoming a centrepiece for the European Commission’s 
approach to continued economic integration in the EU.
However, as economic integration proceeded, the measures challenged 
as ‘behind the borders’ barriers to trade were increasingly associated 
with areas in which the member states retained significant legislative 
competence and around which there were greater national sensitivities. 
This was highlighted in the controversy around the promulgation of the 
2006 Services Directive. The original draft directive proposed that service 
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providers be regulated only in accordance with their country of origin 
(the so-called country of origin principle set out in Article 16 of that 
document) without any intervention or veto from the host state. This 
was met with great resistance with many in the ‘older’ member states 
fearful they would be inundated by service providers who were governed 
by unsatisfactory regulatory requirements in their country of origin. Such 
fears, however unrealistic or unreasonable, almost caused the proposed 
Directive to founder. The version of the Directive that finally entered 
into force in 2006 contained a milder version of the concept of mutual 
recognition—what has been described elsewhere as a form of ‘managed 
mutual recognition’ (Nicolaïdis 2001).
What lay at the heart of this resistance to the application of the country 
of origin principle (mutual recognition in its strongest form) was a lack of 
trust between member states; a lack of trust that the regulatory framework, 
particularly in the newer member states, was sufficiently rigorous to 
ensure that consumer interests in host states would be at least as well 
protected as they were by the host state regulatory environment. There 
was and is no empirical evidence to suggest that the concerns were well-
founded, nor that the Directive in its final form would increase or reduce 
transaction costs. The Directive was an example of politics being the art 
of the possible. What it also introduced, however, was a novel policy tool 
for dealing with this lack of trust: the process of mutual evaluation. That 
process and its relationship with the principle of mutual recognition is the 
focus of this chapter.
Origins of the concept of mutual recognition 
in the EU
Mutual recognition was expressly referred to in the original European 
Economic Community Treaty (EECT) in the title on the free movement 
of persons and services. Article 57 of the EECT required the member 
states to adopt directives ‘for the mutual recognition of diplomas, 
certificates and other evidence of formal qualifications’. However, the 
treaty was silent on mutual recognition in relation to the production 
and marketing of goods. It was not until the 1970s that the concept of 
mutual recognition was developed and applied in that context and, then, 
it was as a result of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice. 
The first relevant decision concerned the importation of Scotch whisky 
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from France to Germany.1 This decision was a preliminary ruling of the 
court on the interpretation of Community (now EU) law. Before dealing 
with the  decisions themselves, it is therefore necessary to speak briefly 
about this aspect of the court’s jurisdiction.
In the Treaty of Rome, the member states had committed themselves 
to creating a common market for the purpose, among other things, of 
enhancing the welfare and standard of living of their citizens. The treaty 
provided for the member states to develop Community measures to 
that end. However, at the time, the voting procedure for such measures 
required unanimity. This—combined with a period of political paralysis 
in the late 1960s as a result of France’s resistance to measures it perceived 
to be harmful to its national interest2—resulted in a failure on the part of 
the member states to act to bring about the common market. In the face 
of the member states’ inaction, the European Court of Justice, in effect, 
took the lead in pushing forward the integrative process to which the 
member states had committed themselves in the Treaty of Rome.
In 1962, no doubt concerned that the member states (and their Community 
institutions) could not be relied upon alone to drive that process, the 
court had established a doctrine of Community law: the doctrine of 
direct effect. According to this doctrine, if certain criteria were satisfied, 
a person or economic agent of a member state could rely directly before 
their own national courts on provisions of Community law to protect 
themselves against domestic laws of their state that were incompatible 
with the Community measure. In effect, the European Court of Justice 
empowered member states’ nationals to hold their own governments to 
account for failing to comply with the latter’s treaty obligations. Member 
states, for their part, could have avoided such actions if they had given 
effect to their obligations under the Treaty of Rome in the time frame 
they had stipulated in the treaty. This is the context of the two decisions 
that are the foundation of the principle of mutual recognition in the EU: 
Dassonville, and the more famous ‘mutual recognition’ decision of Cassis.3 
1  Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville (C 8/74) (1974) ECR 837.
2  Leading to the ‘Luxembourg Compromise’, a political compromise in which the six member 
states agreed that a qualified majority vote would not be used on any issue on which a member state 
felt that important (national) interests were at stake. Although this formally did not amount to a veto 
by a member state, practically that was the result.
3  REWE-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (C-120/78) (1979) ECR 649 
(‘Cassis’).
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Dassonville
In 1970 Belgian wine merchants sought to import into Belgium whisky 
that had been imported legally into France from Scotland. France did not 
require a certificate of origin for such imports whereas Belgium did. This 
meant that the merchants were unable to bring the Scotch whisky across 
the border from France into Belgium. In order to resolve this issue, the 
merchants made their own certificates of origin, which they affixed to the 
whisky being imported. The forgeries were discovered and the merchants 
prosecuted under Belgian law. In their defence, they argued in effect that 
the Belgian requirement for a certificate of origin on goods already in 
circulation within the Community was incompatible with Belgium’s 
obligations to avoid maintaining measures having an effect equivalent to 
a quantitative restriction. In making its ruling, the court stated [7]: 
All trading rules enacted by Member States which are capable of hindering, 
directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade are 
to be considered as measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative 
restrictions.
Cassis
It was in the context of this broad definition of what is now Article 
34 of  the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 
(ex  Article 30 EECT) that the court later ruled in the better-known 
decision of Cassis de Dijon. In that case, a German company, REWE-
Zentral AG, sought authorisation from the German Federal Monopoly 
for Spirits to import certain spirits into Germany from France, including 
a liqueur, Cassis de Dijon. This liqueur had an alcohol volume content 
of 15–20 per cent. German law at the time, however, stipulated that only 
spirits with an alcohol volume content of 32 per cent could be marketed 
in Germany. On this basis, the Germany Federal Monopoly for Spirits 
refused to grant the authorisation requested. The company appealed this 
decision and a question was referred to the European Court of Justice 
on the interpretation of the term ‘measure having equivalent effect 
[to a quantitative restriction]’ (an MEQR). In effect, the court was asked 
to rule on whether the interpretation of that term meant that a national 
measure setting a minimum alcohol content that was above the content 
of traditional spirit products of other member states would amount to 
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an MEQR. In answering this question, the court made two significant 
statements in that judgment relevant to the development of the concept 
of mutual recognition. At [10] it noted:
In the absence of common rules relating to the production and marketing 
of alcohol … it is for the Member States to regulate all matters relating to 
the production and marketing of alcohol and alcoholic beverages on their 
own territory. Obstacles to movement within the Community resulting 
from disparities between the national laws relating to the marketing of 
the products in question must be accepted in so far as those provisions 
may be recognized as being necessary in order to satisfy mandatory 
requirements relating in particular to the effectiveness of fiscal 
supervision, the protection of public health, the fairness of commercial 
transactions and the defence of the consumer. [emphasis added]
The statement from the judgment more usually quoted is in [16]:
There is … no valid reason why, provided that they have been lawfully 
produced and marketed in one of the Member States, alcoholic beverages 
should not be introduced into any other Member State … 
This statement is the basis of the mutual recognition concept although 
the court did not label it as such. In fact, the court has been reluctant to 
‘unambiguously’ embrace the concept (Janssens 2013: 12). This reticence 
on the part of the court has resulted in a variety of alternative terms being 
used to refer to the concept including the principle of equivalence and the 
principle of home states control (Janssens 2013: 12). The statement from 
[10] of the judgment is also relevant here for two reasons. 
First, the court acknowledged the broad legislative discretion left to the 
member states to legislate where the Community institutions had failed 
to act. Second, it created an inexhaustive list of grounds (the so-called 
mandatory requirements) that would justify member states derogating 
from the application of the mutual recognition approach it subsequently 
introduces. At [10] the court is acknowledging that, in the absence 
of common rules, an absence of regulatory equivalence in the common 
market may be justified. These ‘mandatory requirements’ are distinct from 
the ‘derogation power’ contained in Article 36 TFEU (also ex Article 36 
EECT) and only apply to indistinctly applicable measures (i.e. those 
that apply equally to domestic and imported goods but in fact impose 
a heavier burden on imports).
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A rich and complex case law has developed since these decisions, generating 
considerable academic comment including discussion about the limits of 
the meaning of ‘measure having equivalent effect’, and the relationship 
with the case law on the derogations and mandatory requirements. 
Such developments also gave rise to a directive on mutual recognition 
(European Union 2006a; subsequently repealed); a regulation (European 
Union 2008) and non-binding guidelines developed by the European 
Commission.4 
Evolution of the concept of mutual 
recognition
In its strongest form, the concept of mutual recognition requires 
the jurisdiction of an importing or host state to accept the regulatory 
determination of the exporting or ‘home’ state. Bhagwati and Hudec 
(1997: 91) define it as requiring jurisdictions to accept: 
[f ]or domestic purposes certain regulatory determinations of other 
jurisdictions even though those determinations and the criteria on which 
they are based are not harmonized.
The mutual recognition concept now also appears in its strongest form in 
the TFEU in Title V (Area of Freedom, Security and Justice) in relation to 
the recognition of criminal judgments and civil judgments and extrajudicial 
rulings (e.g. arbitrations) (Arts 70, 81 and 82 TFEU). However, the 
principle is hardly ever given effect in that form.5 Far more frequently, it 
is given effect as ‘managed mutual recognition’, a term coined by Kalypso 
Nicolaïdis.6 She defines this as a form of regulatory cooperation motivated 
primarily by trade liberalisation concerns (Nicolaïdis 2001: 107): 
The ‘managed’ character of mutual recognition entails the reintroduction 
of regulatory imperatives ‘through the back door’, as it were, in the 
process of trade liberalisation. The management of recognition is the 
trick that regulators have found to satisfy their political masters and trade 
colleagues while at the same time minimising the effects of recognition in 
terms of regulatory competition. The conditions and caveats attached to 
4  Found at ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/goods/free-movement-sectors/mutual-recognition/
index_en.htm. 
5  A notable exception is the Trans-Tasman Single Economic Market (TTSEM). See further, Leslie 
& Elijah (2015). 
6  See, for example, Nicolaïdis (1997). 
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recognition are meant to ensure against such competition by transforming 
mutual recognition into a sophisticated form of regulatory co-operation. 
In short, the ‘management’ of recognition can be thought of as the 
contribution of regulators to the process of recognition. 
The extent to which ‘mutual recognition’ is ‘managed’ varies depending 
on the nature of the regulatory regime to be recognised. The attributes 
of mutual recognition that give it a ‘managed’ character for services have 
been summarised (Nicolaïdis 2001: 107). They consist of prior conditions 
for equivalence between national systems; automaticity and regulatory 
scope; and scope of market access. ‘Prior conditions for equivalence’ 
involves the relevant parties establishing equivalence of some sort between 
their national regulatory systems (Nicolaïdis 2001: 107). ‘Equivalence’ is 
defined as meaning that the parties are agreed on what are the acceptable 
differences between their systems and that their respective systems have 
reached such equivalence either through convergence or by agreement to 
respect supranational regulations (Nicolaïdis 2001). 
‘Automaticity’ refers to automatic recognition of the beneficiaries of 
mutual recognition: the automatic right of economic agents—a service 
provider, for example—of one member state being able to access the host 
state market without first having to satisfy some initial requirement. Such 
a requirement might be as simple as providing evidence that the service 
provider is duly authorised in its home state to provide the service in 
question. The greater the number of requirements, the less automatic the 
recognition, the less one can speak of ‘horizontal delegation’ (Nicolaïdis 
2001: 107). Regulatory scope refers to the scope of regulation that will be 
recognised; the narrower the scope, the less ‘automatic’ the recognition. 
A host state might recognise the licensing regulation of a home state 
for particular service providers, but may retain considerable residual 
regulatory jurisdiction to determine where, when and how such licensed 
service providers may operate in the host state’s market. Related to this 
last point is the third criterion for ‘managed’ mutual recognition, the 
scope of market access. For this criterion, it is necessary to ask what kind 
of market access is granted as a result of mutual recognition and on what 
terms (Nicolaïdis 2001: 108).
In its strongest form, mutual recognition results in regulatory 
harmonisation in the field in question. The work on the ‘management’ of 
mutual recognition reveals the reluctance of states, for a variety of reasons, 
to undertake the regulatory reforms that result in such harmonisation. 
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The risk of too much ‘management’ of mutual recognition is that the 
result can be that nothing is in fact recognised mutually in any substantive 
way. There are many reasons why states are reluctant to pursue mutual 
recognition in its strongest form: resistance from domestic agencies fearing 
a loss of authority; concerns within a market that domestic operators 
will be forced out of the market by operators from other states; and fear 
among consumers that operators from other states will not be regulated 
as rigorously as those from the home state. Most of these concerns can be 
allayed if trust and confidence in the home state’s regulatory practice can 
be fostered and promoted. One of the most effective ways of achieving 
this is to share information about differing practices and to engage in 
dialogue around similarities and differences of approach. The new policy 
tool of mutual evaluation is directed to this end. 
The concept of mutual evaluation as 
established in the EU Services Directive
The process of mutual evaluation was first introduced by the European 
Commission in the EU Services Directive in 2006. It is set out in Article 
39 of that Directive under the heading ‘Mutual Evaluation’. The procedure 
involves member states reporting to the Commission essentially on three 
matters: the measures they have retained in their systems with which service 
providers from other member states must comply in order to be able to 
provide services and/or establish themselves in the host member state; the 
justification for these measures, including demonstrating that they have 
complied with the essential criteria of non-discrimination, necessity and 
proportionality; and the measures they have abolished in relation to the 
delivery of cross-border services and the right of establishment. 
The next steps in the process are fascinating and potentially contain the 
strength of this process. Having received the reports from the member 
states concerning all the measures they have maintained, together with 
the reasons and justifications for them, the Commission then circulates 
these to the member states for their observations. Essentially, the member 
states comment on each other’s restrictions and compliance measures and 
forward those comments to the Commission, which collates them and 
forwards them to a committee established under the Directive (Article 40) 
to assist the Commission. The committee may make observations and the 
Commission then presents a summary report to the European Parliament 
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and the European Council in light of the observations of the member 
states and of the committee. Where appropriate, the Commission’s 
summary report will also be accompanied by proposals for additional 
initiatives (Article 39[4]).
The mutual evaluation process was an evidence-based ‘peer review’ 
exercise following a methodology established by the Commission across 
30 states, including the European Free Trade Association states of Iceland, 
Liechtenstein and Norway. The Commission reported on the outcomes of 
the process in 2011 (European Commission 2011a). The strength of this 
procedure is, by putting in place a structured dialogue between member 
states, the process has created transparency around the implementation 
of the Directive itself and helped in identifying and promoting good 
regulatory practice (European Commission 2011a: 6). A  detailed 
consideration of the process and the methodology adopted by the 
Commission must wait for another occasion. The relevance to the present 
discussion is the Commission’s findings concerning development of a 
practice of engaging in dialogue and the resulting benefits of transparency 
of process and promotion of goods regulatory practice. These are the 
aspects the Commission sought to strengthen in its 2013 amendment to 
the Professional Qualifications Directive (European Union 2013). 
The concept of mutual evaluation as set out 
in the Professional Qualifications Directive
The concept of mutual evaluation, developed by the European 
Commission, was first introduced in the EU Services Directive discussed 
above. The same process was included in the Professional Qualifications 
Directive of 2005 (amended in 2013). However, the process was varied 
slightly in the latter instrument, ostensibly due to the different legal bases 
of the two directives.
The Professional Qualifications Directive was first enacted in 2005 
(European Union 2005). The aim of the Directive is to facilitate 
mobility of professionals within the EU by defining a set of rules 
allowing professionals qualified in one member state to exercise their 
profession in another member state. The Directive consolidates a system 
of mutual recognition based on 15 directives. It provides for automatic 
recognition for a limited number of professions based on harmonised 
minimum training requirements (sectoral professions), a general system 
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for the recognition of evidence of training and automatic recognition of 
professional experience. In 2011, the Commission evaluated the Directive 
against the criteria of effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, consistency 
and acceptability (European Commission 2011b: 5). The Commission 
involved a wide array of stakeholders in the assessment, resulting in 
revisions to the amendment being made by directive in 2013. The mutual 
evaluation process was incorporated into the Professional Qualifications 
Directive by the amending directive.7 
The Recitals in the Professional Qualifications Directive specifically refer 
to the ‘positive experience’ with the mutual evaluation process in the 
Services Directive. Curiously, however, the Professional Qualifications 
Directive has a similar but not identical evaluation process and it is not 
referred to as ‘mutual evaluation’. At [35] of the Recitals and Article 59, 
the concept of ‘transparency’ rather than ‘evaluation’ is highlighted. 
This ‘similar’ evaluation system was included in the Professional 
Qualifications Directive to ‘contribute to more transparency in the 
professional services market’ (Recital [35]). The original version of 
Article 59 was replaced by a provision with the heading ‘Transparency’. 
This is an interesting choice of title for the section, given that it was 
simply called ‘Mutual Evaluation’ in the Services Directive. It is explained 
in the Directive’s preamble (at [35]) on the basis that such a system would 
contribute to more transparency in the professional services market. 
Casting the mutual evaluation process in the Professional Qualifications 
Directive as a means of enhancing transparency might well be explained 
by the fact that whereas the free movement of services is a fundamental 
freedom established by the primary law of the treaty, the recognition of 
professional qualifications is not. This distinction is significant for the 
following reason: the Services Directive is a secondary measure of EU law 
intended to give effect to primary obligations under the treaty, i.e. the 
freedom to provide (and to receive) services within the internal market; 
and the right of establishment (Article 49, TFEU: Establishment; Article 
56, TFEU: Services). The treaty prohibits restrictions on the freedom of 
establishment of nationals of a member state in the territory of another 
member state (Article 49, TFEU). This prohibition also applies to 
7  Directive 2013/55/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 November 2013 
amending Directive 2005/36/EC on the recognition of professional qualifications and Regulation 
(EU) no. 1024/2012 on administrative cooperation through the Internal Market Information System 
(‘the IMI Regulation’) [2013] OJ L354/132.
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restrictions on the setting up of agencies, branches or subsidiaries by 
nationals of one member state in the territory of any other member state. 
The Article defines ‘freedom of establishment’ to include the right to 
take up and pursue activities as self-employed persons and to set up and 
manage undertakings under the same conditions as a member state’s own 
nationals.
The Services Directive is anchored in the fundamental freedoms of 
services and establishment. Since the 1970s, the treaty provisions 
establishing these freedoms have been directly effective in the EU legal 
system. This means that citizens have rights under EU law corresponding 
to the obligations imposed on the member states in those treaty 
provisions. More significantly, from the perspective of the member state, 
it means that the member states cannot legislate inconsistently with 
their obligations under EU law. In the context of services, this means 
that member states may not introduce measures that could constitute a 
restriction on the freedom of establishment (Article 49) or the provision 
of services (Article 56). Now, in both treaty provisions, the obligation is 
qualified by the phrase, ‘Within the framework of the provisions set out 
below …’. The Services Directive is a measure that has been introduced 
within that framework and it is one of the more recent pieces of secondary 
legislation in the field of services. As a matter of EU law, when the EU 
institutions begin to legislate in a  particular field, the member states 
lose their legislative competence in that field, to the extent that the EU 
measure covers it. Practically speaking, what this means is that, in respect 
of services, the member states retain little unilateral legislative competence 
in the field of services. It was in this context that the Services Directive 
was developed. The political compromise in the Services Directive was, 
on the one hand, to preserve to member states the right to establish or 
maintain authorisation schemes for the establishment in their state of 
service providers, provided such schemes met criteria of EU law of non-
discrimination, necessity (overriding reason relating to the public interest) 
and proportionality. On the other hand, member states are required under 
the Directive to report to the Commission on their authorisation schemes 
(under Article  9[2]), the criteria they require to be evaluated (under 
Article  15[5]) and the restrictions they maintain on multidisciplinary 
activities (under Article 25[3]). The Commission is required under Article 
39 to circulate these reports to all member states for their comment and 
to consult interested parties on those reports.
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Similarly, restrictions on the freedom to provide services within the EU 
are also prohibited in respect of nationals of member states who are 
established in a member state other than that of the person for whom 
the services are intended. The rights of establishment and freedom to 
provide services are subject to the qualifications in Articles 51–54. In 
these provisions, activities that may, even occasionally, be connected with 
the exercise of official authority of a member state are exempt (Article 51); 
national measures providing for special treatment for foreign nationals 
on the grounds of public policy, public security or public health prevail 
over the right of establishment and freedom to provide services (Article 
52); activities of self-employed persons are subject to measures of EU law 
concerning the mutual recognition of qualifications and the coordination 
of member states’ laws concerning taking up and pursuing activities as 
self-employed persons (Article 53); and legal entities are to be treated in 
the same way as natural persons in respect of the right of establishment 
and freedom to provide services (Article 54).
Professional qualifications, on the other hand, do not benefit from any 
primary obligation on the part of the member states for cross-border 
recognition. 
The Professional Qualifications Directive is justified under what are now 
Articles 46, 53(1) and 62, TFEU. Article 46 authorises the European 
Parliament and the Council to issue directives or make regulations 
setting out the measures required to bring about freedom of movement 
for workers. Article 53 requires the European Parliament and Council 
to issue directives and make regulations for the mutual recognition of 
diplomas, certificates and other evidence of formal qualifications and 
for the coordination of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or 
administrative action in member states concerning the taking-up and 
pursuit of activities as self-employed persons. Article 62 stipulates that the 
provisions of Articles 51–54 shall apply to the freedom to provide services. 
In other words, the Professional Qualifications Directive is an ancillary 
measure intended to facilitate the realisation of the fundamental freedoms 
of services and establishment. This would seem to have implications for 
the way in which the mutual evaluation concept can be implemented 
in this context. 
175
9 . ‘MUTUAL EvALUATION’
The evaluation process that has been incorporated into the Professional 
Qualifications Directive differs from that in the Services Directive in 
one significant aspect: whereas in the Services Directive, member states 
are required to report to the Commission on both those measures they 
have dismantled and those measures they have retained (including 
demonstrating that such measures satisfy the essential criteria of non-
discrimination, necessity and proportionality), under the Professional 
Qualifications Directive, states are only required to report on those 
measures they have dismantled. There is no requirement for states to report 
on the measures they have retained and the justification for doing so. 
The reason for this difference in reporting requirements may be explained 
by the fact that, as explained above, the balance of legislative competence 
(although shared) is weighted more heavily in the sphere of the member 
states in the case of professional qualifications and in the sphere of the EU 
institutions in the case of services. 
However, if that is the explanation, it is difficult to understand why 
this distinction was not made from the beginning. A review of the 
Commission’s draft proposal for the amendments to the Professional 
Qualifications Directive reveals that it was not until the very last stage 
of the legislative process that the text was amended, apparently without 
explanation, to require that only one, rather than both reports, be 
circulated among the member states. The text that was accepted by the 
European Parliament seemed to require both the report on the measures 
that had been retained as well as that on those measures that had been 
abolished, to be submitted to the Commission for subsequent circulation 
among the other member states.8 
The final text on which the Council voted, however, only required the 
report setting out the measures that had been dismantled to be submitted.9 
It may be that the change was simply a textual correction to remove 
a perceived ambiguity in the language (after all, without comparing the 
same provision across all the official language versions of the instrument, 
8  European Commission 2011c: 50, Article 59(6): ‘The Commission shall forward the reports 
to the other Member States which shall submit their observations within six months. Within the 
same period, the Commission shall consult interested parties, including the professions concerned’ 
(emphasis added).
9   European Union 2011: 145, Article 59(7): ‘The Commission shall forward the reports referred to 
in paragraph 6 to the other Member States which shall submit their observations within six months. 
Within the same period of six months, the Commission shall consult interested parties, including the 
professions concerned’ (emphasis added). The reports in paragraph 6 deal only with requirements that 
have been removed or made less stringent.
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it is impossible to say whether the change only occurred in the English-
language version). It is unclear why the mutual evaluation process set out 
in the Services Directive was not simply replicated in its entirety in the 
amendments to the Professional Qualifications Directive. However, it is 
still an improvement on what was in place prior to those amendments. 
It is also encouraging that the mutual evaluation principle, more broadly, 
appears to have been accepted as a useful and effective policy tool in the 
market integration process.
Structuring dialogue through mutual 
evaluation
Mutual recognition, whether managed or not, concerns the acceptance 
of the ‘other’ as being as trustworthy as one’s ‘own’ system. Mutual 
evaluation, however, applies to the stage before that: where the parties 
are establishing their prior conditions for equivalence. It is argued here 
that mutual evaluation is not a part of ‘managed’ mutual recognition, 
it is the precursor to it. It is part of the process of convergence that 
results in one of the preconditions for ‘managed’ mutual recognition 
noted by Nicolaïdis and discussed earlier—that of ‘prior conditions for 
equivalence’. ‘Managed mutual recognition’ is set out in Chapters III–
VI of the Services Directive. The mutual evaluation process is set out in 
Chapter VII, ‘Convergence Programme’. Mutual evaluation is a ‘trust-
building’ tool, it enables a conversation between the negotiating parties 
that may lead to greater convergence but certainly to greater trust over 
time simply by virtue of the transparency it inculcates in the process. 
Under the mutual evaluation procedure in the Services Directive, states 
are required to report on the measures they have dismantled and on those 
they have retained, giving reasons both for why they have retained them 
and explaining how they satisfy the proportionality, non-discrimination 
and necessity criteria.
The process itself, as set down in the Services Directive, is one that negotiating 
parties could always undertake, similar to the ‘ex post guarantees’ to which 
Nicolaïdis refers (2001: 108); that is, guarantees between the parties 
after the treaty—in which the mutual recognition process is set out—
has been adopted. However, the advantage of formalising this process, 
as has been done in the Services Directive, is that it imposes a discipline 
on the contracting states to undertake the process. Strictly speaking, as a 
177
9 . ‘MUTUAL EvALUATION’
matter of EU law, failure by a member state to comply with its obligations 
to report and to provide observations as stipulated in Article 39 of the 
Services Directive puts it in breach of EU law and can result in the state 
being the subject of infringement proceedings brought by the European 
Commission before the Court of Justice of the European Union. Such 
proceedings seldom run their course because the member state, working 
with the Commission, will do what is required to meet its obligations. 
The threat, and the initiation of infringement proceedings, however, assist 
the state in prioritising such obligations in a way that would not happen 
in the absence of such sanctions. 
The same discipline could also be achieved in an international (as distinct 
from a supranational) agreement if the parties included provisions 
establishing a joint committee that would have responsibility for ensuring 
such reporting obligations were met.
Conclusion
As the discussion in this chapter has demonstrated, the principle of 
mutual evaluation has great potential as a policy tool for trade negotiators 
in the current and future negotiating environment. Barriers to trade—
perceived or real—will be, for the foreseeable future, increasingly located 
behind borders, embedded in domestic policy settings. Understandably, 
in this context, even managed mutual recognition is difficult to achieve. 
The extent to which negotiating parties have reciprocal trust and confidence 
in their respective regulatory systems is varied and fragmented even where 
such parties are homogenous. This becomes even further accentuated 
where the regulatory, political and social cultures are heterogenous, as is 
the case, for example, among many of the states currently negotiating the 
Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA). 
Mutual evaluation offers negotiators an effective tool to progress 
cross-cultural dialogues with a view to developing mutual trust and 
confidence in differing governance and regulatory structures, where 
there is significant  equivalence of intent. The majority of World Trade 
Organization (WTO) members continue to confirm their commitment, 
publicly at least, to a multilateral trading regime under the auspices 
of  the WTO rather than the network of plurilateral and bilateral trade 
and investment agreements that have flourished in the last two decades. 
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If we accept, at face value, the commitment of governments across the 
world to trade liberalisation as a means of improving the standard of 
living of their citizens, and that this is best done in a multilateral trading 
context (both arguable propositions when one considers how states 
behave), we must conclude that those governments are willing to take the 
steps necessary to remove barriers to trade as they appear. We must also 
conclude that those governments accept that the removal of such barriers 
must necessarily result in greater regulatory convergence—there are limits 
to which different regulatory structures can deliver equivalent outcomes, 
after all. However, for the reasons set out in this chapter, the further 
behind the borders such trade barriers are, the greater the difficulty in 
addressing them. This difficulty is undoubtedly one of the contributing 
factors to the lack of progress on such trade negotiations through the 
WTO. This inertia has spawned the plethora of regional and bilateral 
free trade agreements (FTAs) that have been and are being negotiated 
at present.
If mutual evaluation is incorporated into the preferential agreements and 
FTAs currently being proposed or negotiated (e.g. EU–Australia FTA, 
EU–New Zealand FTA, Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, 
EU–India FTA, EU–Japan FTA), there is a real chance of progress in 
liberalising trade in the more contentious areas behind borders. In the 
case of agreements that have been finalised, whether or not they have 
entered into force, contracting states can still choose to apply the principle 
of mutual evaluation informally in their dealings with each other. 
The strength of mutual evaluation as a policy tool is that it can foster 
mutual trust and confidence between the negotiating parties in their 
respective regulatory systems, even if, initially, there is considerable 
divergence between those systems. As Figure 1 shows, mutual evaluation 
is an effective tool to prepare the preconditions identified by Nicolaïdis 
for establishing managed mutual recognition between systems. 
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Figure 1. Mutual evaluation as a precursor to mutual recognition
Source: Author .
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Bringing Australia and the EU 
Closer: Is an FTA a Solution?
Paul Gretton
Introduction
At a time when the prospects for finalising the Doha Round of trade 
negotiations is bleak, it is timely to consider what kind of trade policy 
agenda governments should be pursuing. One possible approach is the 
continuation of strategies based on the negotiation of preferences through 
bilateral and regional deals. Another approach would be to refocus 
attention on trade liberalisation based on the most favoured nation (MFN) 
and national treatment principles of the international trading system, 
supported by domestic reform. Such an approach would be directed 
at enabling economies to adapt to the increasingly integrated global 
trading environment and to reach their productive potential. Bringing 
the like-minded trade-oriented economies of the European Union (EU) 
and Australia together provides the opportunity to eliminate remaining 
impediments to trade and investment between the regions according 
to MFN/national treatment principles. It also affords an opportunity 
to consider mutually beneficial behind-the-border reforms.
Industry consultations towards securing improved economic cooperation 
will indicate some business priorities—ones that are properly focused on 
overcoming sticking points in international commerce and providing 
market access to business.
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The perspectives on what a trade agenda and trading environment may 
deliver, though, will vary. Individual companies could ask: ‘What is in it 
for my business?’ The wider community should ask: ‘Will an agreement 
provide community-wide benefits?’ The answer to these questions is not 
necessarily the same for all. But the subtext for all scenarios is to consider: 
‘Are benefits the greatest available?’ ‘Will an arrangement impede future 
commercial and policy options?’
This leads to the need to consider appropriate architectures and trade 
liberalisation strategies. It appears to this writer that there are no ‘free 
trade’ agreements. Yes, there are binding agreements between countries 
and groups of countries that exchange preferences, and the formation of 
such arrangements has clearly gained momentum with the stalling of the 
Doha Round. But such arrangements:
• encourage holding back worthwhile domestic reforms to maintain 
‘negotiating coin’ for the next negotiation;
• involve diversion of highly skilled resources in tit-for-tat negotiations;
• lead to new regulations in the form of rules of origin and preferences 
impeding efficient decision-making in merchandise and services trade, 
and investment; and 
• favour businesses directly advantaged by negotiated preferences.
This is at the cost of other domestic businesses that may be more productive 
and internationally competitive, and at the expense of those countries 
and their businesses that are excluded from the particular agreement 
in question. 
There is also an emerging tendency to include in preferential trade 
agreements provisions that depart from the national treatment principle 
to afford procedural rights to foreign companies not available to local 
enterprises through investor–state dispute settlement (ISDS) or impose 
more stringent intellectual property (IP) provisions that benefit IP holders 
while raising the cost of IP use to the rest of the community. 
In short, bringing the Australian and EU economies closer together 
in a  mutually beneficial way depends on ongoing domestic economic 
reforms that are genuinely trade liberalising. What could the elements be?
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Trade and competitiveness—where do 
impediments bite?
While the trade strategies will have a major impact on potential benefits 
and what is realisable, the footprint of activities brought within the 
negotiations will also be important. One broad way of looking at this 
issue is to look at what is traded across borders and what is ‘behind the 
border’ or, put another way, the value added in trade.
Global trade statistics show that trade relations between economies are 
dominated by merchandise trade, mainly in manufactures (Figure  1). 
Further analysis now becoming available based on input–output modelling 
shows that behind-the-border services are key to realising the potential 
of economies. Assessments of how the productivity of domestic service 
provision can be improved would be a good starting point for improving 
the overall competitiveness of an economy. However, trade barriers in the 
form of tariffs, rules of origin and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) will not only 
raise the cost of imports to domestic industry and consumers, but also 
impede realisation of the productive potential of services.
Figure 1. While trade relations are dominated by merchandise trade, 
behind-the-border services productivity is key to competitiveness
a) Agriculture includes forestry, hunting, and fishing. Non-manufacturing industrial 
production includes mining and quarrying, electricity/gas/water supply, and construction . 
Manufacturing is the remainder of industrial production
Source: Johnson 2014 .
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World trade and production are also increasingly structured around 
‘global value chains’. A value chain identifies the full range of activities 
that firms undertake to bring a product or a service from its conception 
to its end use.
Figure 2. The ratio of the global gross value of exports to the value 
added in exports has increased, 1970 to 2009a 
APEC, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation; EEC, European Economic Community; GFC, 
global financial crisis; IT, Information Technology; WTO, World Trade Organization
a) The original estimates of Johnson and Noguera were expressed in terms of value added 
exports to gross exports (the VAX ratio), the inverse of the ratio reported in this figure.
Sources: Based on Johnson & Noguera 2012; Productivity Commission 2015a . 
As production processes have increasingly been dispersed across countries 
to take advantage of lower-cost production opportunities and the level 
of inter-industry trade has increased, the gross value of exports to the 
value added generated has increased. Over the period 1970 to around 
2009, available estimates indicate exports per unit of value added 
increased from 1.15 to 1.33—that is, by around 15 per cent (Figure 2).1 
Most of this increase occurred after 1990, coinciding with major trade 
liberalisations—including those associated with the formation of the 
1  ‘Gross exports per unit of value added’ is the inverse of what is commonly known in the 
empirical trade literature as the ratio of ‘value added exports’ (VAX) to gross exports (Johnson & 
Noguera 2012). Aggregate value added exports is less than gross exports because of the existence of 
intermediate stages of production within and across countries.
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Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1989 and the Bogor 
Declaration of 1994, China’s accession to the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) in 2001, the expansion of the EU to include former Soviet bloc 
economies, and the emergence and uptake of advanced information 
and communication technologies. With the contraction of global trade 
associated with the 2008 global financial crisis, global exports per unit of 
value added, however, declined.
The increase in the ratio of gross exports to value added between 1970 
and 2009, and particularly after 1990, predominantly reflects structural 
changes within the global manufacturing sector (Figure 3). In particular, 
while exports of final manufactures grew, the number of stages 
(or  slicing up) of the stock of final manufactures increased faster. As a 
result, the value of exports of manufactures relative to the value added 
embodied in those exports has risen over 30 per cent—mainly since 1990. 
In contrast, exports of agriculture and services per unit of value added has 
slightly declined—as the value of exports of agriculture and services have 
grown slower than the use of those products as inputs into the increasingly 
fragmented manufacturing sector and into final consumption.
Figure 3. Changes in global exports per unit value added by sector, 
1970 to 2009a
a) Non-manufacturing includes oil and gas, iron ore and other mining .
Source: Based on Johnson & Noguera 2012 .
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A key impediment to liberalising merchandise 
trade—remaining tariffs and rules of origin
Average tariffs are low in EU economies and Australia for primary products 
and manufactures, both in absolute terms and relative to other economies 
(Figure 4, left-hand panel) while average tariffs at a global level have been 
on the decline (Figure 4, right-hand panel). 
Figure 4. Customs tariffs remain
Source: World Bank 2016b .
Despite the fact that import tariffs are at historically low levels and 
suggestions that tariff protection is less important than was historically 
the case, the formation of modern preferential bilateral and regional trade 
agreements has been accompanied by the negotiation of complex product-
specific rules of origin to establish eligibility for trade preferences under 
an agreement. The requirement for product and agreement-specific origin 
rules suggests that remaining tariffs do bite and that the tariff preference 
is material. Tariff preferences extend tariff assistance to qualifying firms 
in partner economies otherwise reserved for local firms (Productivity 
Commission  2004a). Although difficult to quantify, trade preferences 
and origin rules have a number of effects that impede economic efficiency 
and lower productivity. They can: 
• divert trade in final goods from lower-cost suppliers of competing 
products;
• lead some firms to adopt a more costly input mix and higher cost 
structure in order to obtain preferential access for finished products; 
and 
• induce changes in the location of investment between members of 
a preferential agreement and between members and non-members 
(Productivity Commission 2004b).
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They also add to the risk of doing business arising from the potential 
for delay in documentation and clearance and failure to meet origin 
requirements.
With the increasing number of preferential trade agreements, there are 
now many countries that have separate, differently specified rules of 
origin with different trading partners. This has led to a complex system 
of ‘criss-crossing’ trade preferences where products entering a particular 
country enjoy access on widely varying terms depending on their origin, 
leading to a ‘spaghetti/noodle bowl’ across agreements or ‘hub and spoke’ 
effect between one (large) economy and trading partners linked to it by 
bilateral agreements.
Preferential trade agreements contain a range of approaches for conferring 
origin that businesses must consider when sourcing inputs to attain 
concessional tariff rates for merchandise trade commonly centred around 
change of tariff classification, specified process or regional value content 
tests. Some products, typically agricultural or mining, can also be 
prescribed as being ‘wholly obtained’ or ‘produced entirely locally’.
These approaches (or tests) are variously applied individually or in 
combination to determine origin. In the case of agreements entered into 
by Australia to date, the application of the approaches varies between 
products within agreements and, for individual products, between 
agreements—for example, from a single three-tiered rule in the agreement 
with Singapore based on a regional value content approach to more than 
5,200 individual rules in the agreement with Korea based on product-
specific rules for each Harmonized System (HS) item (Table 1). 
Table 1. Count of listed rules of origin by trade agreement











Source: Productivity Commission 2015b; Author estimates .
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In addition to differences in the number of origin rules listed in schedules, 
there is also a diversity of approaches used for conferring origin. The most 
common rule is the change in tariff classification (CTC) test, but there is 
considerable variation in how CTC rules are combined with other rules 
(Figure 5, left-hand panel) and how they are applied across agreements 
(Figure 5, right-hand panel). 
Figure 5. Methods used to determine origin of merchandise trade 
in Australian preferential trade agreementsa,b,c,d
a) CTC refers to a change in tariff classification test. RVC refers to a regional or qualifying 
value content rule . ‘Other’ includes combined CTC and RvC rules, CTC rules with 
exceptions and specified process tests requiring particular production methods to be 
applied; b) The agreement with Singapore is not included as it applies a single three-tiered 
test of origin; c) Individual rules can be expressed at the 4-digit heading level, 6-digit 
subheading level or groupings of tariff line items; d) When the Australia–New Zealand 
Closer Economic Relations (CER) agreement entered into force in 1983, an RvC rule with 
a simple technical test was the main rule applied . The rules reported replaced that rule 
and have been in force since 1 January 2007 .
Source: Productivity Commission 2015b; Author estimates .
The different rules and rule structures across agreements mean that a firm 
trading with multiple countries faces greater complexity and compliance 
costs through the need to interpret, and comply with, different rules 
of origin. Although difficult to quantify, it has been estimated that 
the economic cost associated with these requirements could be as high 
as 25  per cent of the value of goods traded within the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (APEC  2009, with reference to 
Manchin & Pelkmans-Balaoing 2007). At this level, it would be more 
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cost-effective to pay the tariff than seek the tariff concession for many 
products. In a recent assessment of the potential impacts of a trans-Pacific 
partnership by the World Bank, it was conjectured that rules of origin 
could lead to the replacement of 40 per cent of imported inputs, on 
average, with higher-cost inputs from agreement partners, as members 
diverted trade to take advantage of preferential tariffs under such an 
agreement (World Bank 2016a). These estimates illustrate the additional 
drag on productive efficiency introduced by preferential rules of origin.
In an attempt to move away from the ever-increasing complexity of 
rules of origin schedules in trade agreements, the Australian Productivity 
Commission has recommended on a number of occasions that, for locally 
sourced products, the rules be ‘waived’ between agreement partners 
when tariff rates in partner countries are similar or low—that is, when 
the risk of trans-shipment of non-partner exports is low (Productivity 
Commission 2004b, 2010). Given the low average tariff rates in both the 
EU and Australia and the distance separating the two areas (and attendant 
relatively high transport costs), this recommendation would have 
particular applicability in any agreement involving the exchange of tariff 
preferences between Australia and the EU. 
Rules of origin apply to services and investment too
While the existence of rules of origin in goods trade is well known, their 
application (and associated consequences) in services trade and investment 
has received much less attention. Rather than defining the physical origin 
of the service or investment (the focus in goods trade), trade agreements 
have generally sought to delineate ownership or control and through this 
the origin of a service supplier or investor (Fink & Nikomborirak 2007). 
The effect is to deny foreign (non-party) owned or controlled companies 
access to the provisions negotiated in trade agreements, although, as with 
rules of origin on merchandise trade, the expression of the rules differs 
between agreements. 
For example, the Australia–United States of America (USA) bilateral 
agreement (in force since 2005) has adopted a services and investment 
origin rule denying benefits ‘if the service supplier is an enterprise owned 
or controlled by persons of a non-Party or of the denying Party that 
has no substantial business activities in the territory of the other Party’ 
(Articles 10.11 and 10.12). The Thailand–Australia Agreement (also in 
force since 2005) stipulates that a service supplier or investor must not 
be owned or controlled by persons of a non-party (Articles 804 and 905). 
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The recent economic partnership agreement between Australia and 
Japan (in force since 2015) is more specific about the level of ownership, 
stipulating that an enterprise may be denied the benefits of the agreement 
if it is more than 50 per cent owned by a non-party or has a majority of 
its directors appointed by a non-party that has no substantial business 
activities in the area of the other party (Articles 9.14 and 9.17). On the 
other hand, the Australia–New Zealand Closer Economic Relations 
Agreement (ANZCERTA) (which entered into force in 1983) requires 
that a service or investment must not be indirectly provided by a person of 
neither member state (Articles 14 and 18).
This variability across agreements adds to the complexity and uncertainty 
facing foreign-owned or controlled service suppliers and investors with 
Australian operations seeking to utilise negotiated access commitments. 
The discretionary nature and vagueness of the services and investment 
rules of origin leave a number of questions concerning the actual or 
potential impact of the rules of origin on services trade and investment 
activity. For example: 
‘To what extent would the provisions chill (or influence) commercial 
activity that may otherwise have occurred?’ and ‘Under what circumstance 
would the partner government invoke the provisions and in such an 
event, how would terms such as ‘enterprise’, ‘ownership and control’ and 
‘substantial business undertaking’ be interpreted in the context of the 
transaction in question?’ 
An issue is whether there is merit in seeking to confine liberalising measures 
for services and investment on the basis of ownership and control of the 
entities involved, or whether MFN/national treatment principles should 
be applied more widely.
What about services?
The coverage of modern bilateral and regional trade agreements is 
typically inclusive of chapters on services. This can be justified by the 
growth in services trade and the movement of natural persons for work 
and pleasure, and also on the grounds of the importance of services in 
supporting merchandise trade—the services value added component of 
trade. In looking at the services aspect of the implications of Australian 
bilateral and regional trade agreements up to 2010, the Productivity 
Commission found in a number of areas that the main impediments to 
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effective competition by Australian service providers in partners’ services 
markets appeared to be related to regulatory and institutional issues that 
lie outside the scope of agreements (Productivity Commission 2010a). 
An earlier survey of offshore investment by 201 of Australia’s largest 
firms indicated that the commercial imperative of getting closer to 
the customer is the main driver of offshore investment (Productivity 
Commission 2002). The survey also indicated that government influences 
were of secondary importance with tax being the most significant, ahead 
of labour market policies, foreign tariff arrangements, mergers and 
environmental regulation, and access to capital. 
An issue for services trade liberalisation is whether in fact negotiated 
bilateral or regional preferential market access arrangements are the most 
effective way towards services trade liberalisation. 
Looking within for economic reform potential
While remaining tariffs are still a defining feature of international 
merchandise trade and the trading relationship between economies 
given economies’ resource endowments and proximity to global trading 
partners, the domestic institutional and regulatory environment will be 
a determining feature of economies’ cost competitiveness and preparedness 
to trade in both goods and services. As with customs tariffs, governments 
can directly address possibilities to improve economic competitiveness 
and thereby raise economic output and incomes. 
The importance of the domestic operating environment to the trading 
potential of agreement partners highlights the role of domestic reform in 
adding to commercial opportunities and contributing to the potential for 
trade and investment between economies. One approach is to identify 
and assess at the national level NTBs to international trade in goods and 
services, and investment to: 
• identify regulatory and other impediments to efficient investment and 
the conduct of commerce, and reform potential;
• assess the potential direct impacts of possible reforms on economic 
variables such as productivity, costs and prices of local industry, 
participation of the workforce in employment, and the mobility 
of labour across industries and regions; and 
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• assess the economy-wide impacts of possible changes and the timescale 
over which benefits may accrue and adjustment costs be incurred 
(Figure 6). 
Figure 6. Identifying and assessing the impacts of reform potential
Source: Based on Productivity Commission 2010b .
Such a framework has been developed and recently applied in the 
Australian context to assess the impacts of economic reforms in Australia 
(Productivity Commission  2010a, 2012). A similar framework was 
previously applied to assess the economic benefits of national competition 
policy reforms in Australia and an agenda for national reform (Productivity 
Commission 2005, 2006; Gretton 2013).
In relation to the 2012 study, the Productivity Commission was asked to 
assess the economic impacts of 17 business regulatory reforms underway. 
The reforms spanned a diverse range of activities and industries—some 
related to individual areas of domestic economic activity such as health 
workforce, wine labelling, construction and rail safety, while others 
operated more broadly, such as trade measurement, consumer law and 
occupational health and safety. A distinguishing feature of each of these 
reform areas required cooperation between Australian state and territory 
governments (which have jurisdiction over many of the matters considered) 
and the Australian Government, which has national responsibility for 
economic management. 
Among other things, the policies include trade-related measures 
to  improve the mobility of labour between jurisdictions with reference 
to the health workforce, and measures to facilitate trade with reference to 
trade measurement. In relation to the health workforce, until recently, 
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registration of health professionals in Australia occurred on a state-by-
state and profession-by-profession basis, with an array of government 
bodies and specific legislation. While accreditation was mainly 
undertaken on a national basis, there were still over 20 different bodies, 
with considerable differences in approaches across professions. Some 
were established in cooperation with peak professional associations, while 
others had explicit statutory functions or had responsibilities delegated 
from registering authorities. In order to improve the mobility of health 
labour across jurisdictions in Australia, the Commonwealth, state and 
territory governments implemented a new, nationally consistent system of 
registration and accreditation of health professionals intended to reduce 
the administrative burden, improve labour mobility, and increase the 
consistency and quality of training. 
In consultation with regulators and industry participants, it was assessed 
that the changes would generate cost savings of around A$160 million 
per year, with some associated one-off adjusted costs (with around 
A$20  million being incurred by government and A$24  million by 
practitioners). Implementation was undertaken over a relatively short 
period and depended on broad-based and sustained commitment of 
both governments and the sector. It was conjectured that a more gradual 
approach to that adopted could have jeopardised the development. 
The second area relates to trade measurement. While this reform was 
assessed as affording modest benefits in financial terms (a national 
cost reduction for business of around A$5  million per year), it draws 
attention to the myriad often small steps that can be taken by government 
to help facilitate trade. In this case, matters relating to the millions of 
consumer and business transactions in which the price paid is dependent 
on measures  of quantity and/or quality (or product ‘grade’). The use 
and verification of product measures in Australia is governed by trade 
measurement regulation. Despite the earlier changes, inconsistencies 
in approaches remained and a further change was made to centralise 
the approach within the Australian Government with the intention of 
achieving greater consistency and lowering administrative and business 
costs. 
Across all areas, while any estimates of impacts are subject to a margin 
of  error, it was assessed that full implementation of the reforms could 
lower business costs in gross terms by a value approaching A$3.6 billion 
(2010–11 Australian dollars). After account is taken of additional 
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compliance costs to business the reforms together could raise gross 
domestic product (GDP) by around 0.4 per cent (or around A$6 billion 
in 2010–11 Australian dollars). On the basis of implementation plans and 
possible adjustment lags, it was assessed that around 60 per cent of the 
total economy-wide effects would be felt by 2020 with some short-run 
national adjustment costs (Figure 7). 
This study illustrates a workable approach to assessing and quantifying 
the impacts of economic reforms which differ in nature and economic 
footprint. 
Figure 7. Timescale over which the estimated longer-run impacts of 
selected regulatory reforms are estimated to occur, 2007–08 to 2049–50 
Source: Productivity Commission 2012 .
Mutual recognition agreements
Mutual recognition agreements provide means of fostering integration 
between like-minded economies. Typically, they are formed separately 
from bilateral and regional trade agreements. For example, in the 1990s, 
governments in Australia and New Zealand agreed that they would 
mutually recognise compliance with each other’s laws for the sale of goods 
and the registration of occupations.
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The agreements adopt a negative list approach under which all goods and 
occupations are covered other than where exemptions are specified to 
restrict the coverage of the laws (such as to protect public health or safety) 
or to quarantine the coverage of the laws (such as on how goods are to be 
sold or in relation to sovereign rights).
The schemes are inherently decentralised, with administration and 
compliance largely delegated to individual regulators in each jurisdiction. 
There are also a number of central bodies—including an administrative 
appeals tribunal, a trans-Tasman occupations tribunal, ministerial 
councils and central government departments—that provide oversight 
and coordination roles, and a cross-jurisdictional review forum that 
enables jurisdictions to collectively oversee the schemes and coordinate 
actions.
Under the terms of the mutual recognition schemes, the agreements are 
required to be reviewed every five years, with reviews having occurred in 
2003, 2009 and 2015 (Productivity Commission 2003, 2009 and 2015c, 
respectively). The latest review found that the schemes are well established 
as a means of making it easier to do business across borders. However, it 
was found that the value of the schemes risks being slowly eroded due 
to regulators not always implementing mutual recognition as required, 
weak oversight, and an increase in the number of goods and related 
laws permanently kept outside the scope of the schemes. There are also 
specific concerns being found with the operation of mutual recognition 
of occupations that have the potential to weaken the community’s 
and regulators’ trust in the schemes and undermine their legitimacy. 
Proximate influences identified include licensing in the least stringent 
jurisdiction in order to obtain registration through mutual recognition 
in a jurisdiction with more stringent regulation (termed shopping 
and hopping); continuing professional development requirements; 
background checking; and determinations of occupational equivalence. 
There is scope to improve governance arrangements and administration 
of the Australian and New Zealand system to enhance effectiveness and 
regulatory trustfulness.
An issue is to what extent can mutual recognition of goods and 
occupations under the Australia–New Zealand systems be meaningfully 
integrated with the EU system. A further issue is whether any integration 
could be extended according to a negative list approach or would it be 
more practicable to adopt a positive list approach? Importantly, would 
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any move towards mutual recognition between systems generate a new 
set of administrative and origin requirements that could add to cost and 
erode in-principle advantages and cost effectiveness?
Some areas of concern with preferential 
trade agreements
Intellectual property provisions
The protection of intellectual property (IP) rights has become a mainstream 
feature of trade agreements at the bilateral, regional and multilateral level. 
While the WTO Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) Agreement set (high) minimum standards for the scope, length 
of term, administration and enforcement of IP rights, some preferential 
agreements (including those to which Australia is a participant) have 
provided, or are seeking to provide, more stringent protections.
For individual countries, the impact of these provisions will depend 
directly on whether they are net exporters or importers of different forms 
of IP material. The ultimate impact of the provisions will depend on 
how they affect the level and growth in economic activity of national 
economies, partner economies and the broader global economy. For 
Australia, doubts have been raised about whether recent internationally 
negotiated IP provisions are likely to deliver benefits. In particular, the 
extension of the terms of patent protection from 16 to 20 years under 
TRIPS and the extension of copyright protection from the life of the 
author plus 50 years to plus 70 years under the Australia–United States 
trade agreement (AUSFTA) have been assessed as imposing net economic 
costs (Gruen, Bruce & Prior 1996 and SCFTAAUSA 2004, respectively). 
The relevance of trade-related IP issues for Australia has gained even 
greater prominence because of the potential for increased stringency in IP 
provisions in future agreements without commensurate economic benefits. 
The introduction of longer terms of IP protection (including patents, 
trademarks and copyright), lower hurdles for qualifying for IP rights, 
a greater role for government in enforcement and substantially increased 
penalty provisions, all could impose additional net costs on consumers 
and industry. To the extent that the return to IP holders awarded by 
more stringent IP laws outweighs the benefits to the broader economy, 
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the provision would also impose net economic costs, lowering trading 
and growth potential across the bloc. If more stringent IP provisions 
negotiated in preferential agreements are projected into plurilateral and 
multilateral agreements, any costs could be even higher.
Given the capacity of IP systems to influence creative activity, trade and 
commerce and the complex legal and management systems established 
to manage IP law, the desirability of an overarching framework review 
of Australia’s IP system was suggested (Productivity Commission 2013). 
The Australian Government’s Competition Policy Review (Competition 
Policy Review 2015) later recommended that such a review be conducted 
by an independent body. Among other things, it recommended that the 
review cover the incorporation of IP provisions in international trade 
agreements. 
The government then asked the Productivity Commission to undertake 
a public inquiry into Australia’s intellectual property system. The 
Commission was asked to consider the current balance between access to 
ideas and products, and incentives to innovate and create, and to make 
recommendations to improve the wellbeing of the Australian community. 
In its final report, amongst other things, the Commission recognised 
that poorly designed IP rights can impose costs irrespective of whether 
a country is a net exporter or importer of IP (Productivity Commission 
2016). This would occur when an IP system is weighted in favour of 
rights holders to the detriment of consumers and intermediate users. 
The Commission found that international agreements often contain 
prescriptive obligations that significantly constrain Australia’s domestic 
policy arrangements. It suggested the need to improve the evidence base 
and analysis to inform international engagement, together with more 
transparent policy development. 
An issue is to what extent can engagement between Australia and the EU 
with its diversity of member states, improve the evidence base and analysis 
of the impact of IP on the wellbeing of communities? A further issue is to 
what extent can such engagement provide leadership in the formulation 
of multilateral IP standards that better contribute to trade and commerce 
and improved community wellbeing?
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Investor–state dispute settlement
Some trade agreements and investment treaties entered into by the 
Australian Government contain provisions for settling disputes between 
an investor of one party to the agreement and the government of the other 
party—termed ISDS provisions. Under the provisions, dispute settlement 
options can include third-party arbitration. For example, the ISDS 
provisions in the bilateral investment treaty between Australia and Hong 
Kong were used by Philip Morris Asia to initiate third-party arbitration 
in relation to Australia’s tobacco plain packaging laws (Productivity 
Commission 2014, 2015a).
There has been a growing number of ISDS cases in recent years, rising 
to at least 70 new claims in 2015 from around 50 in the immediately 
preceding years (Figure 8). While claims have historically been initiated 
against developing and transitional states, recent years have witnessed 
an increase in the number of cases against more developed economies 
(around 40 per cent of the total for 2014 and 2015 were accounted for 
by claims on EU/OECD member states). A broad range of government 
measures have been challenged in recent years, including changes related 
to investment incentive schemes, concessional arrangements, cancellation 
or alleged breaches of contracts, revocation or denial of licenses and 
alleged direct or de facto expropriation (in part, the issue motivating 
Philip Morris Asia’s claim against the Australian Government).
Figure 8. Known ISDS cases: 1987 to 2014
LHS, left-hand side; RHS, right-hand side . a) The total number of treaty-based investor–state 
disputes published on the UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub web page is 696 at April 2015 . 
This estimate is adopted in the cumulative tally charted . The number of cases reported for 
2014 and 2015 is based on a count of cases on the UNCTAD webpage at April 2015 .
Source: UNCTAD 2016 . 
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While information on the amount of compensation sought by applicant 
investors is not available for all reported cases, the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has reported claims 
ranging from less than US$1 million (five cases) in 2015 to US$1 billion 
or more (80 cases) in that year (UNCTAD  2016). Information on 
awards by  tribunals is available for 112 cases. Of these, 27 were for 
US$500 million or more. The largest group of awards totalled around 
US$50 billion and related to a series of claims on the Russian Federation 
for actions by respondents against the Yukos Oil Company. 
The inclusion of ISDS provisions in Australia’s preferential trade agreements 
and investment treaties has become an increasingly contentious issue 
with concerns centering around the growth in the number of ISDS cases 
brought internationally; extension of substantive appeal rights available to 
foreigners but not available to domestic firms; risk of inhibiting regulatory 
change assessed to be in the communities’ best interest (regulatory chill); 
effectiveness of safeguards and carve-outs; and lack of transparency 
and inadequate parliamentary scrutiny of ISDS (and other) provisions 
(SFADTLC 2014). There have also been concerns for the potential for 
the authority of domestic courts to be undermined by ISDS arbitration 
(French 2014).
Public consultations were organised by the European Commission in 
response to public debate about investment protection and ISDS in the 
proposed EU–USA trade agreement known as the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP). The consultations indicted that there was 
scope for improvement in agreement provisions including in relation to 
the protection of the right to regulate; the establishment and functioning 
of arbitral tribunals; the relationship between domestic judicial systems 
and ISDS; and the review of ISDS decisions through an appellate 
mechanism (European Commission 2015a). The European Commission 
subsequently proposed a new Investor Court System to replace existing 
ISDS provisions in trade negotiations including in the TTIP (European 
Commission 2015b). The proposal, amongst other things, includes an 
appellate body, precise definition of conditions under which investors can 
make a case and preservation of governments right to regulate. 
In a parallel development, Germany, after indicating that it would 
not ratify  the recently signed EU–Canada agreement (known as the 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, CETA), which contains 
ISDS clauses, was reported to have subsequently withdrawn from that 
position (ICTSD 2014a , 2014b). A joint press announcement by European 
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Commissioner for Trade and Canada’s Minister of International Trade 
indicated that a legal review of the CETA text had been completed and 
that the investment chapter had been revised to ‘strengthen the provisions 
on governments’ right to regulate; move to a permanent, transparent and 
institutionalised dispute-settlement tribunal; revise the process for the 
selection of tribunal members, who will adjudicate investor claims; set 
out more detailed commitments on ethics for all tribunal members; and 
agree to an appeal system’ (Freeland & Malmstrom 2016). The intention 
to pursue a multilateral investment tribunal was also announced. 
Australia has included ISDS clauses in six of its bilateral trade agreements: 
Singapore (2003), Thailand (2005), Chile (2009), ASEAN and New 
Zealand (2010), Korea (2014) and China (2015). Recent agreements 
include safeguards to protect the government’s ability to regulate in the 
national interest. Australia also has ISDS provisions in its 21 traditional 
Investment Protection and Promotion Agreements (IPPAs) signed over 
the last three decades.2 An examination of foreign investment trends with 
Australia’s main foreign investment partners suggests that ISDS provisions 
are unlikely to have been relevant considerations in the investment 
decisions of Australian firms investing abroad or foreign firms investing 
in Australia (Productivity Commission 2015a). 
Given the persistent and unresolved debate surrounding foreign 
investment protection and ISDS and the emergence of substantive 
protections and appellate processes to address concerns, a relevant 
question to be considered is: ‘What impact have existing ISDS provisions 
(or their absence) had on investment flows and do those impacts deem 
ISDS provisions worthwhile from a national perspective?’ A further 
question is: ‘Whether the evolution of ISDS provisions in recent trade 
agreements is likely to afford benefits in the national interest that warrant 
giving foreign corporations procedural rights (or investment guarantees) 
not available to resident investors?’
In its report on bilateral and regional trade agreements (Productivity 
Commission  2010b: 271), the Productivity Commission concluded 
there was an absence of an identifiable underlying economic problem on 
market failure grounds necessitating the inclusion of ISDS provisions in 
bilateral and regional trade agreements. 
2  There are agreements are with Argentina, China, Czech Republic, Egypt, Hong Kong, Hungary, 
India, Indonesia, Laos, Lithuania, Mexico, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, 
Romania, Sri Lanka, Turkey, Uruguay and Vietnam.
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Key messages from the Productivity 
Commission’s 2010 study into trade 
agreements
After considering the evidence received from business and government 
and quantitative modelling, the Productivity Commission in 2010 
not surprisingly concluded that unilateral and MFN (that is non-
discriminatory) reforms are likely to offer the greatest benefits to Australia. 
This conclusion could reasonably be applied to other economies and 
federations of economies including the EU. 
It also concluded that the likely economic benefits of preferential 
agreements are ‘oversold’, expectations are too high, and improvements are 
needed to the independence, transparency and timing of assessments of 
trade agreements, particularly when including issues that are traditionally 
domestic policy or that can add to costs. 
The complexity of bilateral and regional trade agreements, the potential 
for provisions to impose net costs on the community and the availability 
of alternative reform options present a compelling case for analysis in 
advance of negotiations to answer the question, ‘What are the most 
beneficial liberalisation measures available?’, and of the agreement text at 
the conclusion of negotiations to answer the question, ‘How well does the 
negotiated text compare to the benchmark?’ Current processes, however, 
tend to be aspirational and fail to adequately assess the potential impacts 
and broader liberalisation alternatives. They also do not systematically 
quantify the costs and benefits against what otherwise may occur 
(the  counterfactual), fail to consider the opportunity costs of pursuing 
preferential arrangements compared to non-discriminatory and other 
reform options, tend to ignore the extent to which agreements actually 
liberalise existing markets and are silent on the need for post-agreement 
evaluations of actual impacts.3
3  This is not to suggest that such analyses would be an easy undertaking. There are many practical 
difficulties involved in quantifying the impacts of agreements due to the variable quality and 
completeness of international services trade and investment statistics and the inherent difficulty in 
quantifying services and investment trade barriers compared to tariff measures. Nevertheless, given 
the potential for preferential agreements to impose net costs, these difficulties should not be used as 
a justification to avoid greater scrutiny, including through the quantification of potential impacts.
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Although there could be debate as to the most appropriate methodology 
for quantifying and assessing the scale and scope of the impacts of 
a bilateral or regional trade agreement, one point of reference is an 
economy-wide methodology for assessing the impacts and benefits of 
national economic reforms (Box 1). Such a methodology would identify 
the scope for change, the likely direct effects and economy-wide effects in 
a series of steps beginning with the identification of intended incremental 
changes and concluding with an overall assessment, including scope for 
improvement (Figure 9). The methodology could be applied in an ex ante 
analysis of the potential impacts of an agreement and in an ex post analysis 
of an agreement text. 
Under the methodology, ex ante evaluation would enable mutually 
beneficial unilateral reforms to be identified and considered as trade 
liberalisation alternatives. One of the most obvious options would be 
consideration of the removal of remaining customs tariffs on an MFN 
basis rather than the granting of tariff preferences supported by yet 
another regimen of rules of origin. Similarly, possible extensions to market 
access and the application of national treatment of service providers and 
investors could be considered on a non-preferential basis to maximise 
domestic benefits to negotiating partners and avoid the efficiency costs of 
trade diversion. The scope for and relative merits of appropriate mutual 
recognition arrangements could also be assessed as a means of overcoming 
impediments to trade and investment that cannot be overcome simply 
by negotiating market access. 
A comprehensive ex post evaluation of a negotiated text would include 
a consideration of the likely incremental effects of an agreement over what 
would have occurred in its absence and alternatives, and an analysis of the 
prospective impacts of the negotiated text against the potential identified 
in the ex ante evaluation. It would cover the likely direct effects on trade 
and investment after taking account of all incremental changes, including 
how the take-up of any negotiated preferences would be influenced by 
rules of origin and other NTBs, carve-outs (sectors or activities where 
the agreement’s commitments are quarantined) and negotiation and 
ongoing administration (and legal) costs. Economy-wide impacts to 
participating economies would be canvassed, taking account of the direct 
effects on barriers to trade and investment, and resource constraints in 
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sectors gaining market access and the economy more broadly (such as 
labour market constraints). The prospect of inhibiting regulatory change 
(regulatory chill) through new treaty obligations would also be considered 
as would the contingent liabilities created by the agreement. Finally, 
the opportunity costs of the agreement in terms of delaying unilateral 
liberalisation for the sake of maintaining negotiating coin would be again 
evaluated. 
Box 1. Possible evaluation framework for trade agreements
A comprehensive and rigorous analysis of an agreement would:
• provide information on the potential national economic impacts of the full 
agreement, including estimates of the economy-wide and distributional effects of 
change and the time paths over which benefits are likely to accrue and costs be 
incurred;
• assess, where practicable, the impact of the agreement to assist participating 
economies achieving their productivity and trade potential and the opportunities 
for improvement, considering remaining customs tariffs and other barriers to trade 
and investment, carve-outs and phasing, as well as the nature of merchandise 
trade, services trade, direct and portfolio investments, IP and the movement of 
natural persons between agreement partners and between the partners and other 
economies;
• assess the scope for the agreement to evolve over time to further assist 
participating economies achieving their productivity and trade potential, including 
through review provisions and built-in agendas; and
• assess the scope and appropriateness of the agreement to act as a model or 
template for other agreements to encourage effective, adaptable and accountable 
approaches to improve economic wellbeing .
At a more detailed level, the analysis would (for each chapter of the agreement):
• identify the current institutional settings and changes from those settings, including 
phasing arrangements;
• list the eligibility requirements (including rules of origin for goods, services and 
investment) for the receipt of preferences under the agreement;
• report on who or what could be potentially directly affected by the agreement, 
and levels and trends in bilateral trade and investment;
• identify the nature of potential direct benefits and costs of full implementation of the 
text of an agreement and impediments, if any, to the take-up of preferences;
• quantify, where practicable, the potential benefits and costs and the timescale over 
which they are likely to occur;
• identify and quantify, where practicable, transition costs compared to ‘business 
as usual’ that are likely to be incurred achieving preferences under the agreement;
• assess any potentially adverse impacts of an agreement, including inhibiting 
regulatory change (regulatory chill); and
• assess the opportunity cost of an agreement, including holding back domestic 
reform to maintain negotiating coin .
Sources: Based on Productivity Commission 2015: Box 4 .5; Productivity Commission 
2010a, 2010b .
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Figure 9. Stages of a comprehensive evaluation and possible 
evaluation indicators
Source: Based on Productivity Commission 2015: Figure 4 .3 .
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Bringing the EU and Australia 
closer together
Bringing the EU and Australia closer together is naturally supported by 
similarly high regulatory standards and stages of economic development. 
There is also a similar intent of academic and trade qualifications and 
ways of working despite geographic separation. These common elements 
naturally bring the economies of the EU and Australia closer together. But 
there are impediments, including traditional trade barriers; protectionist 
sentiment in professional bodies and ways of working; local regulatory 
requirements relating to service provision; technology moving ahead 
of regulations—just think what can be done with information and 
communications technology compared to a decade ago; and geographic 
and time zone differences, which still matter. There are also differences in 
language and cultural norms. There are workarounds for business (such as 
foreign direct investment, movement of natural persons and business 
partnerships), but these may not be optimal, warranting attention to the 
barriers to trade and investment. (The workarounds also do not cover 
the need for governments to cooperate on matters of taxation and other 
protocols.) 
So, what might be brought up internationally that will lead to worthwhile 
domestic reform and provide a bridge to bring Australia and the EU 
closer? On the merchandise trade side, remaining tariffs and rules of 
origin seem obvious candidates. Other candidates may be identified 
around product standards, packaging and labelling and the movement 
of merchandise through border security. And, while it is often said that 
tariffs are low and have little protective value, if this is the case, ‘why 
are governments persisting with tariff regimes?’ And, more puzzling, with 
low tariffs, ‘why the insistence on complex rules of origin in bilateral and 
regional agreements?’ 
On the services side, mutual recognition of qualifications and affiliations 
would seem to be a strong candidate for early attention. But this raises 
the potentially sensitive question of how to allow for differences in 
professional, regulatory and other standards, and allow for criminal and 
other checking. The pacing of regulation with technology, which gives 
recognition to the reality of the latest advances, is another matter that 
would seem to require ongoing vigilance, and that would lend itself to 
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close cooperation between like-minded economies. Questions in this 
regard include ‘Is enough already being done and what more could 
reasonably be done to deliver community-wide benefits?’ 
But, in all these developments, in bringing Australia and the EU closer, can 
there be compelling reasons to sidestep the MFN and national treatment 
principles? In conclusion, one final question: ‘What would it take to make 
EU–Australian cooperation truly trendsetting in the application of these 
principles and to compensate for lack of progress in Doha?’
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EU and Australia: Europe’s 
Challenges and Policy Options 
for Future Trade
Roderick Abbott and Hosuk Lee-Makiyama
Introduction
At this point, Europe’s trade relationships with the Asia-Pacific region have 
entered a period of constant activity following a general reorientation of 
its policy priorities since the ‘Global Europe’ strategy. The 2006 statement 
of future trade policy recognised the shift in economic growth patterns 
towards Asia and aimed to establish closer links with the region.
By 2015, the European Union (EU) had already concluded its first 
‘next-generation’ free trade agreement (FTA) with Korea, in force 
since mid-2011, followed by Singapore, the Andean Community and 
Canada. There are a number of bilateral negotiations ongoing with other 
countries, including Japan, India and Malaysia. The Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership (TTIP) was launched in mid-2013 and its 
fate remains unclear.
Meanwhile, on the Asia-Pacific stage, one major and important 
development has been the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations. 
The talks included Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, 
Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States of America 
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(USA) and Vietnam.1 Other  influential actors in the region, including 
South Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand (and even China), have 
formally or informally shown their interest in joining the negotiations or 
acceding to the agreement (Bauer et al. 2014).
The TPP negotiations were a response to a rapid progression that marks 
the Asia-Pacific region as the emerging global economic centre: intra-
regional trade this region has more than tripled since 2000 (Bauer et al. 
2014). The region has undergone a process of profound change marked 
by the extraordinary rise of China and growing intra-regional industrial 
linkages, especially strong in East and Southeast Asia. This has resulted 
in a staggering increase of the intra-regional trade and investment, with 
China increasingly gaining weight at the expense of other trading partners 
outside of the region, mainly the EU and the USA.
The EU has reacted only recently to these developments with the launch 
of trade negotiations with Japan and the USA. However, Australia and 
New Zealand are not yet in negotiations with the EU, a trade policy 
blind spot that is yet to be addressed. The markets of Australia and 
New Zealand taken together are considerable in terms of gross domestic 
product (GDP). EU trade with these two countries is underdeveloped, 
and roughly equivalent to EU trade with Singapore or the United Arab 
Emirates.
Meanwhile, Australia is increasingly more embedded in its own 
hemisphere. Australia had already made its own ‘pivot to Asia’, an 
inevitable trend given its geographical location and the structure of its 
economy. In preparation for the TPP, Australia has concluded an FTA 
with Japan. Outside the TPP context, Australia has also concluded an 
FTA with Korea (2014) and, more recently, one with China (2015).
In assessing the impact of these developments, it becomes clear that both 
sides of the EU–Australia relationship are organising their trade affairs 
in a wider global context. If Asia is considered the hub of the wheel, 
Australia  and the EU are two spokes to the region that complement 
each other; but this does not exclude a strut between the two, which 
would reinforce both—namely, through an Australia–EU FTA. Such an 
1  In January 2017, President Donald Trump withdrew the USA from the TPP negotiations. This 
was part of a broader move away from trade agreements. However, in May 2017 the remaining 11 
members of the TPP announced they would continue to pursue the agreement, the negotiating text 
of which remains that released on 26 January 2016.
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agreement might not be of central significance in the region, but might 
play a supporting role in areas of more specific interest to both parties and 
offer them complementary advantages to the wider agreements already 
in place.
Europe’s challenges in the Asia-Pacific region
Europe and the creation of the single market is proof that geography is 
a central theme. Geographic proximity was, and still is, a powerful and 
growing force in the way economies integrate with the world. Natural 
trading trends in the region are pointing towards more intra-regional 
trade, with or without policy-induced liberalisation through FTAs. Europe 
is already competing against the Asian economies, which are, naturally, 
integrating and consolidating their supply chains in the region and with 
the USA. In goods trade, almost half of US exports are already destined 
for countries that are participating in the TPP negotiations, while the 
equivalent EU number is closer to 30 per cent—even with exports to 
the USA included.2 The picture is especially worrisome for EU exporters 
of agricultural products (Messerlin 2012).
This is why Europe’s challenge is to minimise the degree of policy 
restrictions in its trade with the Asia-Pacific region—even in the absence 
of competing liberalisation from the TPP. In the absence of full-scale 
multilateralism, this liberalisation needs to take place as coherently as 
possible within the region. 
The combined effect of natural and policy-induced market integration will 
change the competitive relationship between European and local firms 
already present in the Asia-Pacific region. Any delay in engaging with TPP 
members could be too costly: the TPP will be the first competing trade 
agreement that is large enough to cause measurable negative impact. The 
estimates by Kawasaki (2011) demonstrate that the EU’s aggregate income 
(in terms of purchasing power) falls by 0.1 per cent as a result of the trade 
diversion created by the TPP. While Europe has negotiated bilaterally 
with some TPP countries, it has no strategy equivalent to the TPP, which 
could address tariffs and regulatory divergences with the economies in the 
2  Calculations based on UN Comtrade (2013).
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Asia-Pacific region. This is why Europe is likely to address the Oceania 
blind spot by negotiating FTAs with Australia and New Zealand, using 
its own template. 
In sum, these FTAs with the TPP signatories are primarily not about 
additional market access—but are to maintain the current baseline 
and defend existing market shares. By doing so, Europe maintains its 
current utilisation rates in manufacturing, employment and profitability 
in services and its agenda-setting powers in world trade. 
It is worth mentioning that the EU faces other competing geometries 
besides the TPP. The Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
is on a trajectory towards transforming itself into a common economic 
area. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) aims 
to create a region-wide free trade area by merging ASEAN’s existing FTAs 
(including China, India, Japan and Australia/New Zealand) and the 
proposed trilateral China–Japan–Korea FTA, although the future of this 
one is uncertain due to recent geopolitical tensions. 
The RCEP is built on existing (and relatively weak) old-style tariff-
centric FTAs, while the TPP could achieve market access and regulatory 
disciplines on new trade issues that are ‘World Trade Organization-plus’ 
(‘WTO-plus’). In contrast, the TPP is the agenda-setting pillar in the 
region, not the EU FTAs. TPP membership has now reached 37.5 per cent 
of global GDP, or 60 per cent of world trade, and other potentially 
standard-setting FTAs (including TTIP and RCEP) will follow the TPP 
in terms of timing (Bauer et al. 2014).
Australia in Europe’s map over the 
Asia-Pacific region
The EU trade strategy is, by default, multilateral, while its bilateral FTAs 
were not necessarily commercially motivated and instead aimed at specific 
goals and problems in its neighbourhood around the Mediterranean and 
the pre-accession countries in Eastern Europe. Almost 10 years after 
the Global Europe strategy, the plan to trial FTAs in the Asia-Pacific 
region, starting with Korea, still holds. This is an operation of economy 
of scale—to conclude a large number of FTAs in the region based on 
a European model text. By and large, this strategy was sustained until the 
opening of the TTIP that pivoted political attention back to the Atlantic. 
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Interestingly, any ventures that have boldly gone beyond that objective—
for instance, when the EU attempted to negotiate with economies that 
are yet to sign FTAs with the USA—have either failed or been subject 
to delays. These include the failed regional deal with ASEAN, India and 
Mercosur.
Europe already negotiates bilaterally with some TPP countries and has 
already concluded a few agreements, some quite recently. Yet it has no 
strategy equivalent to the TPP that builds a larger framework in the Asia-
Pacific region and addresses future trade issues. This European lack of 
initiative is merely an expression of the absence of a much broader vision 
and a ‘grand map’ in Europe on what trade relations with the Asia-Pacific 
region should evolve into.
On the European map of FTAs, it has already signed agreements with 
three TPP members: Mexico, Chile and Peru. Singapore and Canada 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) negotiations 
have been concluded but await ratification. Moreover, the EU is already 
in negotiations with the USA, Japan, Malaysia and Vietnam, leaving only 
three TPP alliance economies (Australia, New Zealand and Brunei) to be 
negotiated with.
Both Australia and New Zealand have favourable business climates and 
consistently ranked high in terms of ease of doing business in the past 
decade, and Australia in particular has trade that is expanding quite 
rapidly  by the standards of a mature Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) economy. However, their trade 
with Europe is lower than economies of similar economic size—Australia 
has a smaller share of EU trade than Canada, while New Zealand falls 
behind Peru and Vietnam (Eurostat 2013).
There are a number of arguments for Europe to open up negotiations 
with Australia. Firstly, Australia maintains tangible trade barriers with an 
average tariff near 9 per cent, which is relatively high for a developed 
economy (WTO 2013). This suggests there is a plain mercantilist case 
and an export-driven rationale for liberalising trade between the EU and 
Australia. Exports, or the prospects of export-led growth, are rarely the 
biggest gains of FTAs compared to consumer gains and the long-term 
impact of increased dynamic competition, leading to more competitive 
economies. However, Europe—suffering from overcapacities and anaemic 
growth at home—often acts on such mercantilist instincts.
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TPP signatories with EU FTAs
Singapore 0 .63 1 .0 7 .9 22 .7 1 .4
Canada 3 .88 8 .0 1 .2 51 .1 1 .7
Peru 8 .92 58 .0 8 .3 24 .6 0 .3
Mexico 14 .17 49 .0 4 .6 35 .8 1 .3
Chile 6 .62 41 .7 7 .1 9 .5 0 .5
TPP signatories with ongoing EU FTA negotiations 
USA 2 .96 3 .7 3 .1 65 .2 14 .2
Japan 6 .76 13 .3 2 .7 48 .8 3 .2
Malaysia 4 .26 23 .0 5 .3 25 .4 1 .0
vietnam 18 .2 90 .3 17 .2 30 .1 0 .8
TPP signatories without EU FTA negotiations
Australia 8 .88 9 .3 5 .9 58 .9 1 .2
New Zealand 4 .02 2 .0 3 .9 52 .2 0 .2
Brunei 5 .15 91 .0 2 .2 4 .4 0 .0
MFN, most favoured nation; STRI, Services Trade Restrictiveness Index
Sources: UN Comtrade 2013; World Bank 2014a, 2014b; OECD STRI 2014; Eurostat 
2013 .
Secondly, the competition Europe faces on the Australian market from 
similar, high value-adding economies is evident. Looking at Australian 
consumption and import penetration, Europe is outcompeted in each of 
its key export sectors: on the transport equipment sector, which includes 
railway equipment, the market share of the USA is five times larger; 
and on passenger cars and motor vehicles, Japanese exports hold more 
than half of the Australian market and outcompetes Europe by 50 to 1. 
The USA leads on other key EU export interests such as machinery and 
chemicals and, interestingly, Europe only enjoys a sizeable lead on food, 
beverage and agriculture, areas that are traditionally sensitive for Europe. 
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Figure 1. Import penetration, Australia in select sectors
Sources: OECD STAN 2013; UN Comtrade 2013 . 
Europe’s sensitivities
Minerals and natural resources such as coal, gold and copper account 
for one-third of Australia’s exports to the EU, which is consistent with 
Australia’s trade with the world. However, agricultural products account 
for an additional 21 per cent. This is dominated by beef, wine and seeds, 
while other basic staples in Australia’s agricultural trade such as wheat, 
cotton and barley are missing (UN Comtrade 2013). 
Table 2. EU imports from Australia, top 20 categories
Top 20 EU import products from Australia % of EU imports from Australia
Coal 23 .0
Rape or colza seeds 9 .4
Gold 6 .3
Wine 4 .7
Unwrought lead 3 .7
Copper ores and concentrates 3 .3
Zinc ores and concentrates 3 .2
Diamonds 2 .4
Wool, not carded or combed 2 .3
Unwrought nickel 2 .3
Lead ores and concentrates 2 .0
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Top 20 EU import products from Australia % of EU imports from Australia
Silver 1 .9
Medicaments 1 .8
Orthopaedic appliances 1 .8
Meat of bovine animals 1 .5
Other nuts, fresh or dried 0 .9
Radioactive chemical elements 0 .9
Titanium ores and concentrates 0 .9
Meat of sheep or goats 0 .9
Niobium, tantalum, vanadium, etc . 0 .8
Source: UN Comtrade 2013 .
Agriculture is a central determinant of trade policy for both the EU and 
Australia.  Whereas Europe maintains its common agricultural policy 
(CAP), which consumes 40 per cent of its budget, Australia has some of 
the most efficient agricultural producers in the world, including items 
that are among the most sensitive for Europe, especially regarding crops. 
Currently, the level of agricultural support (in terms of gross farm receipts, 
i.e. revenues) is 10 times higher in the EU than in Australia. 
However, given the fiscal position of the EU, it is evident that CAP is 
being forced to reform. With a 13 per cent cut in subsidies approved 
in the 2013 multiannual financial framework, it is evident that the EU 
will orient itself towards export-driven agriculture, especially in sectors 
where the EU has comparative advantages, such as processed agricultural 
products, wine, pork or dairy (European Commission 2013a, 2013b).
Given the EU is facing unilateral reform in agriculture, the bargaining 
chips of agricultural tariffs and tariff rate quotas will quickly pass their 
due dates. Europe’s choice on CAP is either to put agriculture up for 
negotiation now or lose them as bargaining chips in FTAs through 
inevitable unilateral reforms. But with 2.5 per cent of GDP coming 
from agriculture (compared to 1.4 per cent in the USA or 1.7 per cent 
in France) (FAOSTAT 2012), and more than half (52.8 per cent) of its 
territory being arable land (World Bank 2013), Australia has also the 
capacity to scale up its production if given the opportunity. OECD and 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (OECD-FAO) 
projections show that it is likely to do so in the coming 10 years (OECD-
FAO 2014).
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Regulatory divergences
Australia and New Zealand may be smaller players internationally. 
However, they are like-minded polities with extensive mutual recognition 
agreements (MRAs) signed in 1999 covering telecom equipment, 
electronics, pharmaceutical products, medical devices, machinery and 
pressure equipment. 
Australia and New Zealand are also signatories of the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) agreement of 1958 that 
sets common automobile standards, championed by the EU to become 
global standards. The centrality of these standards in recent EU trade 
negotiations (including Korea, Japan and TTIP) is evident. But it is worth 
noting the USA (which follows its own competing regional standard—the 
federal motor vehicle safety standards) is outperforming the European car 
industry on the Australian market despite the commonality of standards 
between the EU and Australia. 
Where New Zealand has concluded a series of comprehensive sanitary 
and phytosanitary agreements and achieved data privacy adequacy with 
the EU, Australia also has a wines agreement in place that protects some 
European geographic indications.
TPP countries have a divergent view on geographic indications going back 
to the Doha Round, when the EU tabled a proposal to secure geographic 
indication protection through the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) that would create prima facie 
assumptions for their legal protection among WTO members, while 
Australia endorsed a voluntary system. 
In conclusion, the manner that regulatory divergences are addressed 
plays an increasingly important role in market integration. Current FTAs 
dedicate a fair amount of negotiation time and political capital (or finger-
pointing in case of failure) on sanitary and phytosanitary issues, technical 
barriers to trade and sector annexes on non-tariff measures. Especially for 
the EU, these annexes are a necessity to advance key export interests such 
as the pharmaceutical, chemical or automobile sectors. 
Australia and New Zealand already enjoy the level of regulatory 
cooperation that the EU generally achieves through its FTAs. 
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This is particularly true for the recognition of conformity assessment 
bodies that allow parties to maintain their own standards while avoiding 
duplicate testing. This supplements the approach where the EU seeks 
outright adaptation of its own regulations or standards, as the case of 
UNECE car safety regulations or FTA provisions on e-commerce that 
are directly transposed from internal EU directives. Previous generation 
FTAs, modelled on the EU–Korea FTA, addressed regulatory divergences 
through positive integration of EU internal rules. Whereas the EU single 
market is built on mutual recognition, the EU does not seek (or achieve) 
similar comprehensive mutual recognition or functional equivalence 
through its external agreements (Kenyon & Hussey 2011).
Europe’s current difficulties in the TTIP and EU–Japan FTA negotiations 
show that any notion of ‘shared values’, ‘like-mindedness’, common 
heritages or geopolitical interests is no match against old mercantilist 
interests that awaken in every FTA negotiation. However, the pre-
existing state of regulatory cooperation with Australia and New Zealand 
provides a starting point that did not exist with other counterparts before 
negotiations began. 
Wider regional perspectives
Australia is also tied to New Zealand through the Closer Economic 
Relations (CER) trade agreement, which is the most comprehensive 
FTA between two OECD countries and the only cross-border market 
integration that incorporates elements that comes close to the European 
single market. The CER even incorporates elements that go beyond the 
European single market, with full liberalisation of services on a negative 
list basis. The full mutual recognition (provided through the Trans-Tasman 
Mutual Recognition Arrangement, TTMRA) also covers professional 
qualifications, and individuals registered to practise an occupation in each 
jurisdiction are entitled to practise an equivalent occupation in the other, 
without the need for further testing or examination.
The CER and its construct offer an interesting alternative approach to the 
EU FTAs. Unlike the single market, the CER achieves market integration 
through decentralisation and avoids institution building and supra-
national harmonisation of standards and regulations. Instead,  the CER 
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is built on mutual recognition using existing judicial systems of its 
signatories, presenting a model that may be more suitable to bilateral 
FTAs than Europe’s own internal integration. 
Moreover, the common economic area created by the EU, Australia 
and New Zealand would have an economic output the size of the ASEAN 
or North American FTA (NAFTA), but where the socioeconomic 
disparities (such as income and wages) would not exceed the already 
existing differences within Europe (Eurostate 2014; WTO 2013).3 
A  three-party negotiation of EU–CER is not unlikely, whether it takes 
place through two separate FTAs that is later consolidated into a common 
and singular framework in the following phase, or whether the parties 
decide to conduct a TPP-style negotiation based on bilateral negotiation 
on market access overarched by common rules and annexes.
Australia and New Zealand are also tied through their joint FTA with 
ASEAN  (AZEAN–Australia–New Zealand Free Trade Agreement, 
AANZFTA)—the most ambitious FTA concluded by the ASEAN bloc. 
This phased out 96 per cent of the tariffs, introduced simplified rules 
of origin, trade facilitation and sanitary and phytosanitary agreements. 
The AANZFTA is unusual as it liberalises services significantly, notably 
in educational, financial and telecommunication services, and provides 
transparency and national treatment, limiting anti-competitive practices 
(Vitalis 2015). The multiparty FTA also contains horizontal commitments 
on domestic regulation, facilitation of business movement, and investment 
rules (with investor–state dispute settlement, ISDS), electronic commerce, 
intellectual property and competition policy. The  agreement achieves 
some level of recognition of equivalence through a ‘comply or explain’ 
approach that is applied horizontally to all regulatory divergences.
Australia’s successful venture of integrating with Southeast Asia should 
be seen in the light of Europe’s own failed attempt to negotiate a region-
to-region FTA with ASEAN. The completion of FTAs between the EU 
and both Australia and New Zealand could open up options that are 
not available to European trade policy today, including region-to-region 
integration with either the CER, or CER and ASEAN, or eventually both.
3  Eurostat 2014; World Bank, World Development Index 2013.
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Europe’s policy options
The lack of rapid response and comprehensiveness in addressing the 
competition from the TPP could be costly for the EU. Nonetheless, 
whether it is due to agricultural sensitivities or negotiation fatigue, EU 
trade policy could choose to remain passive on remaining countries in 
the Asia-Pacific region that it has not opened up negotiations with. The 
EU and Australia are already part of a few plurilateral negotiations in the 
trading system, including the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) and the 
Environmental Goods Agreement that could, at least in theory, provide 
some WTO-plus commitments. Both are also parties to some WTO 
plurilaterals (Information Technology Agreement and General Agreement 
on Trade in Services (GATS) additional protocols on services) but not 
all of them: Australia is yet to accede to the Agreement on Government 
Procurement (signed by New Zealand in 2015) or the plurilateral 
agreement on pharmaceuticals. 
Such non-action would have short-term negative effects coming from 
trade diversion. Over the long term, further negative effects could be 
expected because of the impact of the TPP on non-participating countries. 
As TPP and other intra-regional agreements are likely to incorporate at least 
some form of trade or regulatory standards, European exports will certainly 
face some new compliance costs, further increasing the productivity gap 
between the EU and the USA. TPP disciplines on corporate governance, 
investment, competition and state-owned enterprises could substantially 
transform the business environment of the signatories, and lead to higher 
returns, while the returns on the European home markets will remain 
relatively low.
This raises two issues. The first concerns the timing because, as the earlier 
discussion on CAP suggested, Europe’s negotiation leverage against 
Australia would deteriorate with successive unilateral reforms. Moreover, 
a conclusion of the TPP could turn Europe into rule-takers rather than 
rule-makers, and leave it unable to advance its own priorities (for example, 
on issues like automobile standards, geographic indications or public 
procurement) in the world’s most expansive economic region. 
The second question is closely linked to the first, and concerns 
sequencing—that is, the order with which trade negotiations will take 
place and concessions will be given. When an economy seeks regulatory 
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convergence, it will seek to harmonise its rules with the largest potential 
market first, as it would give them the best chance to reap the reciprocal 
benefits. This is the pattern followed by many Asian economies (e.g. Korea, 
Japan, Singapore) that opened up negotiations with the USA first, 
and went subsequently into smaller negotiations where they gave away 
concessions they had already made in the first deal to others. The threat 
of trade diversion is often a leverage that is used to open up negotiations 
with reluctant partners. 
As the world’s largest trading bloc, sequencing tends to come out reverse 
logic. The EU tends to start with the smaller (and thereby less threatening) 
and more flexible counterpart first (Lee-Makiyama 2015). This would 
allow Brussels to receive a better first offer in terms of both market access 
and excluding its sensitive products. The strategy was deployed against 
Korea/Japan, and to some extent also CETA/TTIP. 
As Australia’s GDP is eight times larger than New Zealand’s, Europe’s 
sequencing strategy could be its default strategy towards Oceania. While 
the market potential of Australia is larger in terms of GDP, and Australia’s 
exports into the EU are three times larger than New Zealand’s, less of 
its trade is currently exempt from duties. Australia’s agricultural exports 
are far more diversified, with considerable quantities of products where 
EU subsidy reforms are still pending.
Conclusions
EU trade policy is shaped by the long-term economic developments 
where the world economy pivots towards the Asia-Pacific region, at the 
same time as the relative importance of Europe’s domestic markets are 
declining. In order to counter the aggregate income drop expected from 
the TPP, the EU has very few policy options except to negotiate bilaterals 
with all TPP countries to advance its own FTA template. Following this 
logic, FTA negotiations with Australia and New Zealand may be just 
a matter of time. 
Europe’s offensive export interests tend to be in highly regulated sectors 
where technical standards play a major role for market access. Achieving 
regulatory compatibility and avoiding regulatory compliance costs 
matters for export competitiveness, especially in sectors like automobiles, 
machinery, pharmaceuticals, medical devices and chemicals—and EU 
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firms are already underperforming vis-à-vis their TPP competitors on 
these sectors in Australia. If the TPP succeeds in setting new regulatory 
standards, EU exports will inevitably face additional compliance costs 
where their TPP competitors do not. On agriculture, European exports 
could even be locked out from the TPP markets, making domestic 
agricultural reforms even costlier and riskier to undertake.
But the prospects of Australia–EU FTA negotiations raise some new and 
interesting questions. The first question concerns Australia’s link to New 
Zealand and the CER. As described above, past negotiation strategies and 
agricultural sensitivities suggest that Europe could start negotiating with 
Australia’s smaller neighbour first. But given the free movement of goods 
and services guaranteed under the CER, it would become untenable in 
the long run to conclude an FTA with only one of the CER countries, 
as goods and services move freely between Australia and New Zealand. 
Similar problems would arise if both FTAs were concluded, but with 
highly asymmetrical outcomes (e.g. where tariffs are cut in Europe for 
a certain good from one CER country, but not for the other), especially 
if rules of origin in the two FTAs are not harmonised. 
Unlike Europe’s customs union with Turkey, Australia and New Zealand 
do not apply common external tariffs. Australia and New Zealand have 
concluded both joint and individually negotiated FTAs. But whenever 
a major FTA was concluded by one of the CER countries, the other 
moved in swiftly to negotiate its own FTA. However, there are also 
some divergent interests between Brussels, Canberra and Wellington—
especially on agriculture, where New Zealand is more specialised than 
Australia. A region-to-region agreement between the EU and CER could 
be constructed in various ways and built on individual schedules, as in the 
AANZFTA or TPP.
Relatively ambitious agreements on regulatory cooperation already exist 
between Australia and the EU. The pre-existing levels of regulatory 
cooperation are on a par with some relatively recent EU FTAs. Should the 
Australia–EU FTA include a chapter and annexes on regulatory issues, its 
provisions are likely to be on the same level of ambition as the goals on 
recognition of equivalence currently negotiated under the TTIP or TPP; 
otherwise, it would have little value added compared to the pre-existing 
MRAs.
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Regulatory harmonisation and cooperation bring about another 
dimension of complexity, in areas where the CER and TTMRA go beyond 
the internal liberalisation in the EU, notably on services and professional 
qualifications (Kenyon & Hussey 2011). Assuming that the EU cannot 
adopt and implement similar high-level standards internally, the scope of 
the Australia–EU FTA is constrained by the functional limits of the single 
market. Finally, there are certain discrepancies with the relationships that 
would need to be addressed: for example, Australia has concluded a wine 
agreement with the EU, and New Zealand has a received an adequacy 
ruling on data privacy rules, allowing for open cross-border data flows. 
Both questions could either be resolved through a ‘race to the top’, 
where all parties agree to the highest standard prevailing in the three-
party relationship, or ‘cherry picking’, where each party maintains the 
flexibility to define their own agreement with the other two according 
to the problems in that relationship. The determinants that will shape 
the form of the final EU–Australia agreement will be the need for such 
flexibility that will be balanced against the risks of asymmetrical, or even 
incomplete, liberalisation between the EU and Oceania.
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1  The case addressed here is based on the economic and commercial benefits of an agreement 
rather than other issues.
2  GDP data are from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2015b).
3  Data for merchandise and commercial services trade are from the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) (2014). Note that the reported numbers are for world trade excluding intra-EU trade. This is 
appropriate if we are treating the EU as a single economic area, just as we do not count (say) trade 
between Australian states in the international figures.
An FTA with the EU: What 
Could Be Gained?1
Bruce Gosper
Too big to ignore
When considering international economic policy, the European 
Union (EU) is simply too big to ignore. In 2014, the 28 members of 
the EU had  a  combined US dollar gross domestic product (GDP) of 
US$18.4 trillion, making it the world’s largest economy. On a purchasing 
power parity (PPP) basis, which adjusts for differences in spending power, 
the EU was again the world’s largest economy in 2014, with a GDP 
of almost PPP$18.5 trillion.2
Despite ongoing economic strains within the Eurozone, the EU is also 
an international trade and investment superpower. In 2013, for example, 
it was the world’s largest exporter of merchandise goods, with extra-EU 
exports worth US$2,307 billion, or around 15 per cent of the global 
total, and the world’s second-largest importer of merchandise goods, with 
US$2,235 billion of imports, also around 15 per cent of the world total.3 
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The EU is also the world’s largest exporter and importer of commercial 
services. Its extra-EU exports totalled US$891 billion, which was 
almost one-quarter of the global total in 2013, while its imports were 
US$668 billion, or almost one-fifth of the world’s overall import bill. 
In 2013, the EU was the source of US$250 billion of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) outflows, behind only the United States of America 
(USA). In the same year, the EU received US$246 billion of FDI inflows, 
making it the world’s largest recipient (UNCTAD 2014). 
The sheer economic heft of the EU makes it appear rather odd to many 
observers that the EU is the one major trading partner with which Australia 
does not have a free trade agreement (FTA) or even one currently under 
negotiation. In fact, as Mike Adams, Nicolas Brown and Ron Wickes 
point out in Trading Nation (2013), ‘Australia and the European Union 
have purposely looked past each other in the rush for FTAs’.
This situation prevails despite the fact that, over time, there have been 
several calls on the Australian side for a deal with the EU. The 2008 
Mortimer Review, for example, noted that the EU was ‘the only major 
trading partner with which Australia is not negotiating or considering 
negotiating an FTA’ and went on to propose (in recommendation 6.7) 
that the then government should consider the merits of negotiating 
a bilateral FTA with the EU, including the possibility of an agreement 
focused only on services and related investment, which it thought could 
deliver ‘considerable benefits’ (Mortimer & Edwards 2008). A more 
comprehensive FTA would of course deliver even greater benefits for both 
sides and beyond.
Why don’t we already have an FTA with 
the EU?
So, why don’t we have a deal already? Adams, Brown and Wickes 
(2013) suggest several reasons as to why an agreement has so far failed 
to materialise. From an Australian perspective, these include Australia’s 
perfectly sensible focus on the large-scale opportunities offered by the 
Asia-Pacific region; the absence of any compelling problems in the 
bilateral trade and investment relationship that require substantial 
policy intervention (aside  from agriculture, of course); the fact that 
market access is already relatively easy due to generally low tariffs in both 
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economies (an  observation subject to the same qualification); and the 
presence of existing agreements already aimed at protecting investment 
and intellectual property. For example, the EU–Australia Partnership 
Framework, which was signed in 2008, included the objective of 
cooperation on mutual recognition approaches to facilitating trade in 
industrial goods (Rollo 2011).
The same authors also note that big and long-standing differences 
between  Canberra and Brussels over agricultural policy may also have 
‘drained away the reserves of energy needed by trade negotiators and 
political leaders to seriously contemplate another big FTA’. Certainly, as 
Philomena Murray and M. Bruna Zolin (2012) point out, there can be 
little doubt that ‘one single focus of intense conflict and strong emotions 
in Australia–EU relations has eclipsed all other aspects of the relationship 
over many decades … the EU’s agricultural policy and, especially, 
agri-food trade’.
Despite the past difficulties for the bilateral relationship posed by 
agriculture, and despite their own list of reasons as to why no FTA with 
the EU has yet been forthcoming, however, Adams, Brown and Wickes 
still conclude that there is a case for ‘putting historical baggage to one side 
and taking a fresh look’ at the issue.
That’s a perspective that makes a great deal of sense, especially given 
that, under current circumstances, an FTA with the EU has the potential 
to deliver several important strategic and productive benefits to both 
Australia and the EU. This is most significant, perhaps, in key areas that 
foster the innovation both Australia and the EU need to drive future 
growth and respond to critical challenges, such as the impact of disruptive 
technologies, ageing and development of an appropriately skilled, mobile 
and competitive Australian labour market.
This chapter will concentrate on the arguments for, and benefits to, 
Australia from negotiating a comprehensive FTA with the EU. But there 
are also important benefits to the EU; for example, in better leveraging our 
deep integration with Asia and key areas of strength in financial services 
(e.g. superannuation and public–private partnerships in infrastructure 
financing) and in some areas of medical research and technology 
(e.g. neuroscience, cancer research and treatment), to name a few.
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It’s logical to look to a major trade 
and investment partner
A logical and indeed obvious place to look for prospective negotiating 
partners is the group of countries that comprise our major trade and 
investment partners. On this basis, the EU is a standout contender, 
particularly with respect to trade in services and foreign investment.
In 2014 the value of Australia’s total trade in goods and services with 
the EU was about A$84 billion, around 12.6 per cent of our total trade 
in goods and services that year. That made the EU our second-largest 
trading partner in 2013–14, behind only China (which had a 24 per cent 
share) (DFAT 2014). By market share, in 2013–14 the EU was Australia’s 
fourth-largest export market overall, our fourth-largest export market for 
goods and our largest export market for services. The EU was also the 
most important source of all Australian imports, our second-largest source 
of goods imports and our largest source of services imports (DFAT 2014). 
One interesting example of the bilateral trading relationship is 
provided by  the case of Australian Scientific Instruments, a Canberra-
based company  that is owned by The Australian National University. 
In  2012,  the company finalised a multimillion dollar contract for the 
supply of the world-leading Sensitive High Resolution Ion Micro Probe 
(or SHRIMP) to the Polish National Geological Institute. This equipment 
allows extremely accurate data to be collected from geological samples 
and provides insight into geological structures, with applications for 
the mining, oil and gas sectors. The Austrade post in Warsaw provided 
a  supporting role to Australian Scientific Instruments in this process 
(Austrade 2012).
It’s probably also worth noting at this point that the large trade flows 
described above take place against the backdrop of what is already 
a  relatively liberal trade policy environment. According to the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), in 2013 the simple average most-favoured-
nation (MFN) applied tariff in the EU was 5.5 per cent, compared to 
2.7  per  cent in Australia. On a trade-weighted basis, the EU average 
tariff in 2013 was just 2.6 per cent, compared to 3.9 per cent in Australia 
in 2012.4 
4  Sourced from WTO tariff profiles at stat.wto.org/TariffProfile/WSDBTariffPFHome.aspx?Languag 
e=E.
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There is, however, an important sectoral element to this story: the EU 
has an average MFN applied tariff of 13.2 per cent applying to the 
agricultural sector compared to a rate of just 4.2 per cent applying to the 
non-agricultural sector, as Table 1 shows. For Australia, the corresponding 
levels of protection in 2013 were 1.2 per cent and 3 per cent. On a trade-
weighted basis, the average tariff applied to agriculture by the EU in 
2013 was 8.4 per cent and 2.2 per cent for non-agriculture. In the case 
of Australia the corresponding figures were 2.6 per cent and 4 per cent.
Table 1. MFN applied tariffs in the European Union and Australia, 2013
European Union Australia
Average applied tariffs
Overall 5 .5 2 .7
Agricultural sector 13 .2 1 .2
Non-agricultural sector 4 .2 3 .0
Trade-weighted applied tariffs
Overall 2 .6 3 .9
Agricultural sector 8 .4 2 .6
Non-agricultural sector 2 .2 4 .0
Source: WTO 2015 . 
Then, of course, there is the fact that not only is the EU a major trading 
partner for Australia, but it is similarly an extremely important source of, 
and destination for, foreign investment. 
The EU is Australia’s largest foreign investor. The total stock of EU 
investment in Australia as of 31 December 2014 was A$959 billion, 
34 per cent of total foreign investment. Of that, A$170 billion was FDI, 
25 per cent of Australia’s total inward FDI.5 
Recent inward investment stories include the following: in 2014, the 
Acciona-led Transcity Consortium received the Project of the Year Award 
from Infrastructure Partnerships Australia for Legacy Way, a A$1.5 billion 
project to design, construct, maintain and operate a twin tunnel roadway 
in Brisbane; Nestle Australia expanded its operations in Australia by 
investing in a state-of-the-art medical nutrition facility for the company’s 
health sciences business; and German technology company SAP recently 
established a data centre in Sydney (Austrade 2013).
5  Data from ABS (2015). 
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The EU is also the second-largest destination for Australian investment 
overseas in general and for FDI in particular. In 2014, the stock of Australian 
investment in the EU was A$529.2 billion, or about 28 per cent of the 
total stock of our outward investment. Of that total, about A$83.5 billion 
was FDI, which was about 15 per cent of total outward FDI. 
In summary, then, the scale of the bilateral relationship suggests that the 
potential pay-offs from an FTA would likely be significant. Moreover, 
given the relative importance of services trade and foreign investment, 
there are good grounds for believing that the kind of behind-the-border 
measures that modern FTAs address would be of particular benefit 
in encouraging additional economic flows between the two economies. 
An EU deal is the obvious missing element 
in Australia’s list of FTAs
The case for looking to the EU as a negotiating partner that is implied 
by the current depth of the bilateral economic relationship is further 
reinforced by taking a look at our current line-up of FTAs in order to 
identify any obvious gaps. 
One way to approach this is to start with Australia’s top 10 trading partners 
for goods and services. In 2013–14, these were (in descending order): 
China, EU, Japan, USA, Korea, Singapore, New Zealand, Malaysia, 
Thailand and Indonesia. Together, these 10 economies accounted for 
77 per cent of total Australian trade (DFAT n.d.).6 Of this group of 10, 
Australia already has FTAs covering all of them except the EU.7 Adams, 
Brown and Wickes (2013) describe the EU as the ‘biggest single missing 
jigsaw piece’ in our current network of FTAs.
Table 2. Australia’s bilateral trade in goods and services by top 10 
partners, 2013–14
Rank Country Value (mln A$) % share of total
1 China 159,643 23 .9
2 European Union 83,379 12 .5
3 Japan 72,173 10 .8
4 United States of America 58,196 8 .7
6  If ASEAN is included as a group, the EU rank drops to three.
7  Indonesia is the only country in the top 10 without a direct FTA, but is covered in the ASEAN–
Australia–New Zealand Free Trade Agreement (AANZFTA).
239
12 . AN FTA WITH THE EU
Rank Country Value (mln A$) % share of total
5 Republic of Korea 34,589 5 .2
6 Singapore 29,510 4 .4
7 New Zealand 22,689 3 .4
8 Malaysia 19,887 3
9 Thailand 18,837 2 .8
10 Indonesia 15,970 2 .4
Total 514,873 77.1
Source: DFAT 2014 .
We get a similar message if we look at our leading investment relationships. 
So, for example, if we examine the stock of FDI as of end 2012, the top 10 
source economies for inward FDI were (in descending order): EU, USA, 
Japan, China, Singapore, Canada, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates, 
Hong Kong and Malaysia. The corresponding top 10 destinations for 
Australian FDI were (again in order): USA, EU, New Zealand, Singapore, 
China, Malaysia, Indonesia, Hong Kong, Bermuda and India. 
The EU stands out as a major bilateral investment partner with which 
Australia does not have an FTA either in place or under negotiation.
Table 3. Foreign direct investment flows into Australia by top 10 
sources, 2014
Rank Country Value (bln A$) % share of total
1 European Union 169 .6 24 .6
2 United States of America 163 .4 23 .7
3 Japan 66 .1 9 .6
4 China 30 .0 4 .4
5 Singapore 28 .0 4 .1
6 Canada 23 .6 3 .4
7 Switzerland 19 .0 2 .8
8 United Arab Emirates 14 .6 2 .1
9 Hong Kong 11 .5 1 .7
10 Malaysia 9 .6 1 .4
Total 535.4 77.8
Source: ABS 2015 .
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Table 4. Foreign direct investment flows from Australia by top 10 
destinations, 2014
Rank Country Value (mln A$) % share of total
1 United States of America 136 .2 25 .2
2 European Union 83 .5 15 .4
3 New Zealand 61 .6 11 .4
4 Singapore 13 .1 2 .4
5 China 12 .1 2 .2
6 Malaysia 6 .0 1 .1
7 Indonesia 5 .3 1 .0
8 Hong Kong 5 .1 0 .9
9 Bermuda 3 .6 0 .7
10 India 1 .6 0 .3
Total 328.1 60.7
Source: ABS 2015 .
Agriculture is no longer the deal breaker 
that it used to be—the relationship is more 
diverse and sensitivities have modified
To the compelling logic provided by the opportunity to plug in a critical 
missing piece in Australia’s existing network of FTAs can be added the 
fact that agriculture need no longer serve as an automatic deal breaker in 
negotiations with the EU. As Don Kenyon and Pierre van de Eng (2014b) 
pointed out, in large part this is because a series of internal EU reforms 
have, over time, removed some of the serious market distortions that have 
been generated in the past by the EU’s program of export subsidies.8
Granted, this does not mean that there are no significant issues remaining 
with regard to agricultural trade. The relatively high level of EU tariffs 
on agricultural products was noted above and the EU continues to retain 
significant levels of protection overall against agricultural imports that 
serve as a serious impediment to Australian exporters. But there are signs 
that the EU might be prepared to negotiate increased market access to its 
8  Beginning with the initial common agricultural policy (CAP) reform package of 1992, the old 
regime of high support prices to EU farmers has gradually been replaced with direct income support 
(Kenyon & van der Eng 2014b).
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valuable internal market for Australian farmers through the mechanism 
of expanded tariff quotas (TQs), with potentially significant gains in beef, 
grains, sugar, dairy and lamb. I say this from the perspective of being 
closely involved with the Commission in Doha Round discussions on 
market access during the last push for an agreement on the full agriculture 
agenda, in 2008. 
At that time Australia was able to see the shape of what it might secure, 
albeit not easily, through implementation by the EU of Doha’s proposed 
approach to agricultural market access. It was a discussion centred on 
what commercially meaningful concessions Australia might extract in 
return for some margin of manoeuvre for the Commission on the most 
sensitive areas of EU agriculture. In recent years, there has been strong 
cooperation between Australia and the EU on matters such as the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement and the Trade in Services Agreement 
(TiSA). Indeed, in the area of services trade liberalisation in the WTO, 
the EU and Australia have been the most like-minded collaborators not 
only on matters like domestic regulation but also on the need to address 
equity caps and bind current practice and market opening.
Australian agriculture has substantial interests in better access to the EU 
market, and this would need to be a part of any negotiations Australia 
entered into. But after decades of unsuccessfully pushing at the door, 
many in the sector are reluctant to talk about what they might gain 
until they see a real negotiation engaged. And, of course, it shouldn’t be 
assumed that we can predict which agricultural products might do well in 
a more open environment. 
There is ample scope for a substantive 
negotiating agenda
What sort of issues can we expect to arise in a negotiation between the 
EU and Australia? One guide can be found in our respective submissions 
to WTO Trade Policy Reviews. In their 2015 review of Australia’s trade 
policy, the EU commended the openness and transparency of Australia’s 
trade regime, its commitment to multilateralism, and its strengthening of 
intellectual property laws. The EU noted the cooperation with Australia 
on the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement. On a less positive note, 
the EU urged continuing regulatory reform and for Australia to join the 
Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), encouraged Australia 
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to remove the luxury car tax, and highlighted the need for aligning 
of Australia’s sanitary and phytosanitary measures with international 
standards. 
For its part, in its comments to the 2013 trade policy review of the EU, 
Australia commended the EU’s strong commitment to the multilateral 
system and in work with Australia on the TiSA. Australia noted recent 
reforms to the common agricultural policy (CAP), but said some coupled 
payments were increasing, and urged the EU to cease use of export 
subsidies and increase market access. Australia asked that the EU clarify 
third-country access to the government procurement market, commended 
efforts to harmonise the internal market but asked for more consistent 
application, and raised concerns about technical regulations restricting 
the processing of products imported from outside the EU. 
This might give some sense of what an agenda might look like. 
Both Australia and the EU have made strong liberalising commitments 
in tariff elimination in respect of manufactured goods. Agriculture 
would be a substantial element, where Australia would push new access 
for items such as lamb, dairy, beef, wine and seafood. Perhaps a priority 
would be an update of the 1995 ‘Andriessen Assurance’, with the EU 
undertaking not to supply subsidised beef in specified markets in Asia 
and the Pacific. And perhaps the EU would ask Australia to remove our 
single remaining agricultural TQ on its high-value cheeses. A negative list 
services agreement would be a priority for both. 
Similarly, a substantial investment agreement would be fundamental 
given the nature of our economic relationship. Both Australia and the 
EU are committed to strong standards of intellectual property protection, 
and no doubt the EU would look for some recognition of its geographical 
indications interests, as would Australia of its interests in the continuing 
use of generic names. Australia has begun to articulate its own agenda 
on the protection of common names in world trade, and would value 
the opportunity to engage with the EU on this issue. Government 
procurement is seen by both as a key issue. Both Australia and the EU 
would bring sanitary and phytosanitary and technical barriers to trade 
issues to the table in a negotiation. Prima facie, this is a substantial agenda 
and with plenty of potential to enhance the overall relationship.
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The alternative, multilateral route continues 
to look underwhelming … 
If we could rely on the multilateral trading system to deliver a new, broad-
based international trade agreement, then targeting a separate FTA with 
the EU might be a questionable use of limited negotiating resources. 
Unfortunately, for the moment the multilateral option continues to 
look incapable of delivering the kind of deep economic integration that 
a successful FTA might be able to provide with a sharp focus on lowering 
non-tariff barriers (NTBs).
The most compelling piece of evidence for this proposition is the low 
prospects for the original ambitions for the Doha Round; ambitions 
that anyway fell far short of the kind of ‘deep integration’ agenda now 
pursued in modern FTAs. The replacement of those original Doha goals 
with an even more modest agenda, based around the worthy but limited 
objective of trade facilitation, has subsequently confirmed the difficulties 
at the multilateral level. More generally, the repeated failure of the 
WTO ever since the debacle surrounding the so-called Singapore Issues 
(at least, ex-trade facilitation) of 1996 to meet the current appetite of the 
developed world for the kind of behind-the-border measures involving 
agreements on standards and regulation, investment, intellectual property, 
government procurement, competition policy and so on that are of 
increasing salience in today’s global economy suggests that the appetite 
for deal-making outside the WTO will only persist.
Australia remains firmly committed to the multilateral system and to the 
benefits of a multilateral round. The decision to eliminate export subsidies 
on agriculture taken at the 10th WTO ministerial meeting in Nairobi in 
late December 2015 demonstrates how essential the multilateral system 
is in achieving such important systemic changes. Of course, multilateral 
negotiations are needed to address domestic agricultural subsidies. It should 
be clear that this is a subject that cannot be dealt with, certainly in any 
substantial way, in an FTA. Australia is also mindful of its commitments 
in FTAs as a way to continue to progress liberalisation, including through 
inbuilt agendas, to ensure our efforts are not counter to, but support, 
our efforts to advance a strong multilateral rules-based system. 
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The global environment remains 
challenging … 
The limited outlook for the prospects for additional multilateral trade 
liberalisation is accompanied by a moderate outlook for global growth. 
According to the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) World Economic 
Outlook, for example, in real terms world economic growth is slowing. 
Projected rates are significantly below the average growth rates before the 
global financial crisis hit in 2008, and private investment is yet to recover 
(IMF 2015a).
Subdued global growth has contributed to subdued international trade. 
In the same forecast, for example, the IMF estimates that the volume of 
world trade in goods and services will expand in 2015 by 3.7 per cent 
and 2016 by 4.7 per cent, at rates just above those of world GDP. 
That compares to annual trend growth in trade volumes that was running 
at more than 7 per cent before the crisis. 
Moreover, while international trade has certainly not suffered from the 
kind of mass relapse into protectionism that some pessimists feared might 
be triggered by the global financial crisis and the high unemployment 
that followed, nevertheless there are some troubling signs of advances 
in so-called murky protectionism. According to the 16th Global Trade 
Alert report of the London-based Centre for Economic Policy Research, 
for example, between the first quarter of 2012 and the third quarter of 
2014, the number of new protectionist measures implemented not only 
increased again, but in 2013 more new protectionist measures were 
imposed than in the crisis year of 2009 (Evenett 2014). More recently, 
the WTO’s latest assessment judged that ‘G-20 economies between mid-
October 2014 and mid-May 2015 implemented fewer trade-restrictive 
measures per month than at any time since 2013’. However, the same 
report went on to caution that the:
longer term trend remains one of concern with the overall stock of trade-
restrictive measures introduced by G-20 economies since 2008 continuing 
to rise. Of the 1,360 restrictions recorded by this exercise since 2008, less 
than a quarter have been eliminated, leaving the total number of restrictive 
measures still in place at 1,031. Therefore, despite the G-20 pledge to roll 
back any new protectionist measures, the stock of these measures has risen 
by over 7% since the last report. (WTO, OECD & UNCTAD 2015)9
9  Note that the WTO coverage of protectionist measures is more restrictive than the approach 
taken by the Global Trade Alert reports. 
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And the world (including the EU) is moving on
With the multilateral system failing to deliver the kind of deep integration 
that is now a priority for policy makers and businesses alike, many leading 
trading nations have sought alternative approaches, including FTAs, 
regional agreements and most recently the so-called mega-regional deals 
embodied in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership (TTIP). In recent years, the prevailing weak 
global economic environment has almost certainly helped to further 
reinforce this trend, offering as it does the prospect of a new impetus for 
growth and moreover one that may be particularly attractive to fiscally 
constrained governments. 
In the case of the EU, the initial shift in emphasis in trade policy can 
be traced back to at least 2006, when the then EU Trade Commissioner 
was given a mandate to launch a new strategy for a ‘Global Europe’. 
This mandate was then extended and deepened in 2010 as part of the Europe 
2020 strategy. The result has been an official approach that has focused on 
signing deep and comprehensive FTAs with attractive trading partners, 
with the aim of not only securing improved commercial opportunities for 
European businesses, but also of using the EU’s weight to shape the global 
trade and investment policy environment (Deutsch 2012).
The EU successfully concluded its first agreement under this new approach 
in 2010 in the form of an agreement with Korea and has also concluded 
an agreement with Singapore and Vietnam. Elsewhere in the region, the 
EU has negotiations underway with India (since 2007), Malaysia (since 
2010, but paused since 2012) and Thailand (launched in May 2015). 
It also commenced negotiations with Japan in April 2013. And then 
there is the giant of all bilateral trade negotiations the TTIP. From an 
Australian perspective, the fact that the EU is now negotiating with many 
of our key regional trading partners as well as with the USA adds to the 
logic of pursuing our own FTA negotiations with Brussels.
Finally in this context, another recently concluded EU agreement, the 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with Canada 
offers yet more support to the case for an FTA. Interestingly, Canada 
would not have met the original criteria set out by the EU for potential 
FTA partners, focused as they were on emerging economies with 
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significant growth potential and major barriers to EU trade. The inclusion 
of Canada (and subsequently Japan and the USA) therefore signals an 
important shift in the EU’s willingness to conduct bilateral agreements 
with developed economies.
Now CETA could provide us with 
a useful roadmap 
Indeed, as Don Kenyon and Pierre van der Eng (2014a) point out, CETA 
could serve as a template or road map for a possible Australia–EU deal. 
For a start, there are clearly some close parallels between the Australian 
and Canadian economies. This suggests that much of the logic that made 
Canada an attractive negotiating partner for the EU should likewise 
apply to Australia. In addition, Australia’s geographic proximity and deep 
integration with Asian economies is an added advantage. 
More particularly, however, there is the nature of CETA itself, with its 
focus on removing NTBs to services and investment, and its coverage of 
issues such as regulatory standards, rules and people movement. So, for 
example, work by the EU and Canada found that trade in services between 
the two economies was subject to significant barriers that were estimated 
to increase the cost of service provision by between 20 and 50 per cent. 
An official joint study drew on this kind of evidence to conclude that 
bilateral trade could be increased by between 20 and 25 per cent in both 
directions if a comprehensive deal were reached, with roughly half of the 
effect coming from liberalisation of trade in services, and roughly one-
quarter each attributable to reductions in tariffs and in technical barriers.10 
The relative importance of services trade and investment in the Canada–
EU bilateral relationship worked to encourage a focus on the importance 
of behind-the-border issues (Schwanen 2011). Given the similar 
importance of services trade and investment in the Australia–EU 
relationship as set out above—remember, the EU is our most important 
services trade partner, our largest foreign investor and our second-most 
important investment destination—progress in these same areas would 
offer the potential for significant economic gains. For example, as Kenyon 
and van der Eng (2014b) have emphasised in their work, large benefits 
10  These figures also assumed that the Doha Round would be completed. If Doha was not 
completed, the estimated gains would likely be significantly greater (Deutsch 2012).
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for business could be realised by the mutual recognition of technically 
divergent but functionally broadly equivalent licensing, labelling, 
standards, certification regulations and professional qualifications.
From an Australian perspective, the striking thing about CETA is that it 
is the most ambitious services trade agreement that the EU has negotiated 
to date, with commitments that are better than those offered in the EU’s 
FTA with Korea and that are also superior to current EU offers in the 
ongoing TiSA negotiations. Notably, CETA marks the first time that the 
EU has adopted a ‘negative list’ approach in an FTA, which combines 
commitments that bind current market access with future liberalisation 
except where reservations are listed. Since this is also the approach to 
services liberalisation favoured by Australia, CETA represents a positive 
signal that a relatively liberal and dynamic outcome is possible. 
Another important feature of CETA is the inclusion of an MFN 
obligation to extend any future preferential treatment (except in relation 
to the EU’s own internal market or the European Economic Area), which 
helps ‘future-proof ’ the deal. Canada was also successful in using CETA 
to persuade Brussels to reduce the number of policy space reservations 
across a range of sectors, including professional services, environmental 
services, transport services and other business services—all of which 
would be of great interest to Australia. The CETA provisions relating to 
financial services would similarly look attractive to any future Australian 
negotiators.
CETA also suggests that a deal with the EU would offer the opportunity 
to boost innovation. CETA, for example, not only includes commitments 
on research and development services, technical testing and analysis and 
other scientific and technical consulting services, but also establishes 
a  bilateral dialogue on enhanced cooperation on science, technology, 
research and innovation issues.
Engaging with the new trade policy 
landscape
Both the specific example of CETA and the more general trend towards 
deep integration as exemplified by the ambitious aims of the new mega-
regional deals reflect the shifting nature of international trade in today’s 
global economy. That trade is increasingly characterised by international 
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production networks and global value chains, which in turn are heavily 
reliant on close connections between services, standards, intellectual 
property, the role of foreign affiliates, and cross-border flows of capital and 
labour. As is now well known, many of these variables are most influenced 
not by traditional, at-the-border policy measures such as tariffs or quotas, 
but rather by behind-the-border measures including standards and other 
regulations.
Some optimists now see the FTA route in general and the mega-regional 
route in particular as potentially contributing to the emergence of 
a ‘multilateral deal through the back alley’, producing the kind of agreement 
that will end up being ‘far more liberalising and comprehensive than could 
ever be attained in Geneva’ (Suominen 2012). The argument here tends to 
be based around the idea of critical mass. That is, a successful TTIP would 
encompass an economic region that contributes about half of world trade. 
As a result, if these economies were to agree on a common set of standards 
or regulations, there will be strong incentives for exporters in the rest of 
the world to conform to those same standards. Since any trading partner 
choosing to do so would then see its overall trading costs with both the 
USA and the EU decline, this would tend to reduce costs (and boost 
competition) for international players across the board (Cernat  2013). 
The end-game in this optimistic version of the world would then be the 
emergence of a set of global rules by a process of gradual accretion.
While the optimism about an effective global agreement may well turn 
out  to be overdone, the potential importance of this kind of effect, 
as well  as some of the risks it entails for the rest of the world, can be 
seen in some of the modelling around the likely impact of a TTIP on 
the rest of the world. For example, the main study commissioned by the 
European Commission on TTIP found that liberalising trade between 
the EU and the USA would have a positive impact on overall world trade 
and income. However, it turns out that the impact on the rest of the 
world is critically dependent on assumptions made about the potential 
for international convergence on EU–USA standards, which would then 
become de facto global standards in the way described above. This would 
produce lower NTBs worldwide and so deliver increased market access 
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for third countries that would help offset any trade diversion.11 It is these 
assumptions about reductions in NTBs that ensure economies in the rest 
of the world see an increase in welfare via a reduction in global trade costs 
as a result of the TTIP.12
The impact of these assumptions is highlighted by the findings of another 
study of the TTIP—this time by Germany’s Bertelsmann Foundation—
which in marked contrast identifies the potential for a significant degree 
of trade diversion (Felbermayr, Heid & Lehwald 2013). This report looks 
at two scenarios for the TTIP, one based on the elimination of tariffs alone, 
and one based on the kind of deep integration produced by eliminating 
NTBs. The tariff-only scenario sees the main losers from TTIP-induced 
trade diversion concentrated in those developing and emerging economies 
reliant on EU and US export markets—with the biggest losses in North 
and West Africa. According to this model, Australia is a small loser from 
trade diversion, suffering a 0.6 per cent fall in real income per capita in the 
long run. However, the same report’s ‘deep integration’ scenario models 
a much bigger hit to welfare, with Australia seeing a 7.4 per cent drop in 
its long-run real per capita income, alongside other big losers including 
Canada (–9.5 per cent), Mexico (–7.2 per cent) and Japan (–5.9 per cent). 
This negative impact is in large part because this study explicitly does not 
take into account the likelihood that these countries would adopt the same 
standards and regulations as prevail under a completed TTIP. The study’s 
authors highlight the fact that these results provide a strong argument for 
countries such as Canada that already have an agreement with one partner 
in TTIP to conclude another (which the Canadians have just done with 
CETA). Obviously, the same argument applies to Australia: if the EU and 
the USA are going to be in effect writing the global rule book, we will 
likely end up having to adopt it one way or another, or suffer increased 
11  The study actually makes two important assumptions here. First, it assumes direct spillovers 
whereby the bilateral EU–USA streamlining of regulations and standards also provides benefits to 
third parties, since it will become less costly to meet these new, simplified standards. Second, it also 
assumes indirect spillovers whereby third markets choose to adopt some of the common standards 
agreed by the EU and the USA (Francois et al. 2013).
12  A recent study by CEPII also finds ‘little trade diversion induced by a TTIP’, with additional 
bilateral trade mostly replacing domestic production. The USA sees some trade diversion from the 
rest of the world, mostly concentrated in manufacturing, while in the EU there is no trade diversion 
overall as the trade diversion in agriculture (whereby imports from the USA displace those from third 
markets) is more than offset by trade creation with third countries, mainly through global value chain 
effects (Fontagné, Gourdon & Jean 2013).
AUSTRALIA, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE NEW TRADE AGENDA 
250
relative trade costs. With that prospect in mind, it makes sense to seek to 
be an active participant in shaping the rules as far as possible, a proposition 
that further reinforces the case for an Australia–EU FTA.
As mentioned earlier, Australia remains committed to the multilateral 
system and the benefits of a comprehensive multilateral round. Australia 
is mindful of its commitments in FTAs as a way to continue to progress 
liberalisation, including through inbuilt agendas, to ensure our efforts are 
not counter to, but support, our efforts globally, to keep the door open 
for a multilateral round.
Conclusion: The case for an Australia–EU 
agreement
In conclusion, then, there are several good reasons for considering the case 
for an Australia–EU FTA. Some of these are fairly obvious. In particular, 
the substantial nature of the existing bilateral economic flows, particularly 
with regard to services trade and investment, are indicative of the scale of 
potential pay-off from a successful agreement. Likewise, the fact that the 
EU currently stands out as the ‘biggest single missing jigsaw piece’ in our 
existing and prospective network of FTAs supports the logic of a push to 
negotiate a deal. 
Then there is the argument that there are grounds for believing that 
agriculture may no longer be the deal-breaker that it has been in the past, 
and indeed that there might now be scope to deliver improved access to 
the EU’s high-value internal market for Australian farmers. There may 
also be important opportunities for Australian businesses to cooperate 
with European agri-supply chain operations to leverage Australia’s role 
as a ‘gateway to Asia’. On top of this, the limited opportunities currently 
on offer via the multilateral route, along with a sluggish global growth 
environment and some signs of increased protectionist pressures across 
the world economy, argue for valuing the general growth and liberalisation 
benefits on offer from pursuing a bilateral agreement with the EU. 
All of these arguments are given further force by the fact that the EU is 
already negotiating deals with many of our key regional trading partners, 
as well as a prospective ‘mega-regional’ deal with the USA in the form 
of a TTIP. Since the latter in particular has the potential to set the rules 
of the global game across a range of issues, it would be advantageous for 
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Australia to maximise our input into the process and minimise the risks 
associated with trade diversion. Further, the EU is seemingly willing to 
embark on a negotiating approach compatible with Australia’s significant 
interests. 
It seems probable that an FTA with the EU would also offer Australia 
additional pay-offs. For example, as Jim Rollo pointed out in 2011, 
there would be potentially important pay-offs for Australia’s exports of 
elaborately transformed manufactures through the reduced trade costs 
that could come from the mutual recognition of regulatory regimes 
(Rollo 2011). Similarly, there could be gains from improved deals on 
the movement of people, and from enhanced access to government 
procurement markets across the EU. There could also be significant pay-
offs for domestic policies within Australia. For example, Adams, Brown 
and Wickes (2013) have suggested that the sort of major FTA that a deal 
with the EU would entail could also serve as a useful spur for domestic 
reform efforts.
Finally, joint work together in recent years—including on Doha—has 
underlined that Australia and the EU do share interests in global economic 
governance and in encouraging transparency, openness and liberalisation. 
Surely as Australia engages in mega-deals across regions and with other 
major economies, it should be working together with the EU to enhance 
not only bilateral linkages, but also common global interests. 
In summary, then, there is, at minimum, a strong case from an 
Australian perspective to consider carefully the merits of pursuing an FTA 
with the EU.
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Australia and the EU: Partners 
in the New Trade Agenda
Don Kenyon and Pierre van der Eng
The chapters in this book provide detailed analyses of several aspects of 
the new trade agenda, and the role of Australia and the European Union 
(EU) in promoting it. The different context of the two entities in part 
determines their roles: the EU with its important influence in the Northern 
Hemisphere; and Australia with its focus on trade liberalisation in the 
Asia-Pacific region—the fastest growing region of the global economy.
Essentially, as the introduction and several chapters demonstrate, the 
new trade agenda is about the increasing integration of national and 
regional economies around the world. It is characterised by the shift away 
from tariffs and quotas as a major obstacle to global trade flows towards 
behind-the-border non-tariff barriers (NTBs). The exception here is in 
sectors such as agriculture, where the maintenance of domestic support 
in the form of governmental subsidies of one kind or another mandate 
the continuation of high levels of border protection. 
Both Australia and the EU, therefore, are now set on a trade policy course 
with two objectives:
1. To conclude bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) with key trading 
partners that focus increasingly on liberalising NTBs that currently 
go beyond the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO), while 
continuing to work actively in Geneva for a successful outcome to the 
WTO’s Doha multilateral trade negotiations; and
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2. To ensure that these ‘new generation’ or ‘WTO-plus’ FTAs will be 
a ‘stepping stone’ and not a ‘stumbling block’ (European Union 
2006a: 8) to better WTO rules and more effective multilateral trade 
liberalisation into the future.
How could a new generation FTA between Australia and the EU advance 
these objectives? What progress towards these objectives has been achieved 
in the new-generation FTAs already negotiated by both Australia and 
the EU? This concluding chapter offers some tentative answers to both 
questions.
Could an Australia–EU FTA produce 
meaningful liberalisation?
First, a few facts to underline the significance of bilateral business 
relations. The EU of 28 member states is Australia’s second-most 
important trading partner, following China, in two-way trade in goods 
and services. In 2014, with 18 per cent of the total, the EU constituted 
Australia’s second-largest source of imports, behind China (21 per cent), 
but ahead of the United States of America (11 per cent). With 5 per cent 
of the total, the EU ranks third as an export market for Australia, behind 
China (33 per cent) and Japan (18 per cent) (DFAT 2015a). The EU is 
also Australia’s largest two-way trade partner in services, accounting for 
19 per cent of the total (DFAT 2015a) and it is Australia’s largest source 
of inward direct investment, accounting for around 25 per cent of the 
total stock of foreign direct investment (ABS 2015). The EU, accounting 
for some 25 per cent of the global economy and more than 40 per cent of 
world trade in goods and services, is clearly a world economic and trade 
super power. In addition, the EU already has or is negotiating FTAs with 
many of Australia’s major markets in Asia and with virtually all Australia’s 
major trading partners that are members of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD). These trade realities, therefore, 
make a good case for an Australia–EU FTA.
Second, a negative that has long overshadowed Australia–EU 
relations  since  the early 1970s relates to agricultural trade. As Murray 
(2005: 98–131) explained, the EU’s common agricultural policy (CAP) 
has been an issue of continued contention between both entities over the 
20 years that followed the accession of the United Kingdom (UK) to the 
then European Economic Community in 1973. The CAP and particularly 
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the agriculture export policy of the EU—specifically the subsidised 
export of the so-called beef, butter, sugar and grains mountains onto the 
world market, which depressed global food prices and adversely affected 
Australia’s rural exports around the world—were a major trade flashpoint 
between Australia and the EU. It has long been said that agriculture would 
therefore be a major obstacle to Australia negotiating an FTA with the 
EU; that the continuing existence of the CAP would exclude agriculture 
being on the negotiating agenda. 
This is now an outdated view. Australia’s agricultural producers have 
found alternative export destinations, and are generally no longer 
dependent on the EU, as Murray and Zolin (2012) have demonstrated. 
More importantly, two developments have solved the fundamentals of 
this problem between Australia and the EU. First, the initial CAP reform 
package of 1992 and the agreement it led to on agriculture in the Uruguay 
Round of multilateral trade negotiations encompassed reductions on the 
use of export subsidies into the future; and second, the subsequent CAP 
reform packages from 1993 to 2003 continued the process of replacing 
high support prices to farmers in the EU with direct income supports. 
As the chapter by Daugbjerg and Swinbank in this book explains, these 
successive CAP reform packages reduced agricultural production in the 
EU, reduced further the need for export subsidies in the EU and led 
ultimately to the offer of the EU in the Doha negotiations to eliminate 
export subsidies altogether (WTO 2008). Export subsidy elimination 
has now been implemented through decisions taken at the 10th WTO 
ministerial meeting in December 2015.
Access to the EU market for the temperate agricultural products that 
Australia continues to export to the world, however, remains a problem. 
This is largely as a result of the high levels of ‘tariff equivalents’ against 
agricultural imports that the EU was permitted to maintain at the end of 
the Uruguay Round negotiations in 1994.1 These tariff equivalents still 
operate as effective barriers against increased market access in the EU. 
The Doha negotiating process has, however, opened up opportunities to 
reduce the importance of this problem. Under the negotiating framework 
established by WTO in 2008, increased market access through expanded 
1  During the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, agreement was reached to convert 
all NTBs, including variable import levies in the EU, to tariff equivalents. As the high level of these 
tariff equivalents remained a significant barrier to imports, negotiated access to highly protected 
agricultural markets such as the EU was provided through tariff quotas at low or zero rates of duty.
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tariff quotas (TQs) at low import duty rates would be provided for all 
sensitive products on which high levels of tariff equivalents continue to 
apply (WTO 2008). 
The Doha negotiations remain uncompleted but, as Gosper’s chapter in 
this collection foreshadows, there appears to be no compelling reason 
why expanded TQs at low rates of import duty could not also provide 
improved access for Australia’s agriculture exports to the EU market in 
FTA negotiations. The EU has already signalled its readiness in Geneva 
to negotiate on improved TQ access. No doubt, agriculture-related trade 
interests of the EU, such as treatment accorded to genetically modified 
products (GMOs), recognition of an expanded list of geographic 
indications (GIs), and sanitary and phytosanitary regulations would also be 
on the negotiating agenda. Agriculture, therefore, while both an essential 
and difficult subject for both sides in a new-generation FTA negotiation 
between Australia and the EU—as it was recently in the Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) negotiations with Canada, as 
Elijah’s chapter in this volume discusses—need not be the deal-breaker it 
would have been in earlier years.
Where would the major benefits of a new-generation FTA between 
Australia and the EU lie? Improved EU market access for Australia’s beef, 
grains, sugar, dairy products and lamb would be a big positive for Australia. 
It would do much to defuse an issue that has dogged the relationship since 
the 1960s, as mentioned above. More broadly, a new-generation FTA 
could go a long way towards liberalising behind-the-border regulatory 
NTBs across the broad spectrum of agriculture, services and manufactures 
trade between the EU and Australia. Two factors in particular could be 
important in realising such an objective in negotiations. Both Australia 
and the EU have well-developed regulatory standards and enjoy high 
equivalence of regulatory intent. This could open the way for mutual 
recognition of technically different but broadly equivalent standards that 
impact on trade across a wide range of products and services. 
The importance of bilateral services trade between the EU and Australia 
is discussed at greater length in Kerneis’s chapter. In 2014, the EU was 
both Australia’s largest export market for services with 16 per cent of 
the total and the largest source of imports of services into Australia with 
23 per cent of the total (DFAT 2015a). In the recent CETA negotiations, 
the EU agreed to the liberalisation of services trade according to the 
‘negative-listing’ approach (European Commission 2014). Under this 
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approach, commitments are taken on all services in bilateral trade, apart 
from those inscribed on a specific exceptions list. This is the first time 
in any trade negotiation that the EU has conceded the negative-listing 
approach to services liberalisation.2 It is, however, the approach typically 
taken by Australia in its FTA negotiations. Now that the EU has taken the 
negative-listing approach with Canada, it is difficult to envisage it taking 
a less liberalising approach in future FTA negotiations, at least with any of 
its other OECD trading partners. The application of the negative-listing 
approach to services trade liberalisation in an FTA negotiation between 
Australia and the EU would be an important mutually beneficial gain, 
opening up the opportunity for the further expansion of trade in what 
is already the fastest growing area of bilateral trade. 
In important specific areas of bilateral services trade between Australia 
and the EU, such as business and professional services, mutual recognition 
of broadly equivalent but technically divergent licensing and certification 
regulations could play an important trade-creating role in a new generation 
Australia–EU FTA. Even more important benefits would come from 
the mutual recognition of divergent but broadly equivalent professional 
qualifications requirements. Again, important steps towards liberalisation 
on this basis have been taken in the context of the CETA negotiations, 
which could provide a basis for a comparable outcome between Australia 
and the EU.
Average tariffs on non-agricultural goods are now low, at just 3 per cent 
in Australia and 4.2 per cent in the EU in 2014 (WTO 2015a). So there 
would appear to be little danger of serious trade diversion from differential 
tariff rates in an Australia–EU FTA, as Rollo (2011) substantiated. On the 
other hand, mutual recognition and/or harmonisation of standards would 
be trade-creating by neutralising the trade impact of regulatory divergences 
impacting on an expanding range of goods traded bilaterally between 
Australia and the EU. Current examples include food standards, packaging 
and labelling standards, sustainable production and environmental 
standards, and differing product standards on an increasingly wide range 
of semi-manufactured goods or components involved in intra-industry 
trade between Australia and the EU (Rollo 2011). There would also be 
practical trade benefits to both sides from reducing the negative trade and 
2  In all previous FTA negotiations, including that with Korea discussed by Kang in this volume, 
the EU has taken the less liberal ‘positive-listing’ approach to services negotiations under which 
commitments are taken only on those services and services sectors included on a specific list.
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investment impact of divergent regulations that affect public procurement 
policies (especially at a sub-member state level in the EU and at sub-
federal level in Australia), competition policies, and investment restriction 
and protection policies. 
Apart from agriculture, therefore, Australia–EU FTA negotiations could 
be even more focused than the CETA negotiation was on breaking new 
ground in the liberalisation of NTBs relevant to key areas that need to 
be resolved under the new trade agenda identified in Chapter 1. Such 
negotiations could play a role in advancing the twofold trade policy 
objectives espoused by both Australia and the EU; that is, liberalising 
NTBs through a bilateral FTA while ensuring that such liberalisation acts 
as a stepping stone rather than a stumbling block to strengthening the 
WTO, and enhancing scope for more effective multilateral negotiations 
on NTB issues into the future.
Meeting the challenges of the new 
trade agenda 
As noted in Chapter 1, global trade rules dealing with NTBs, notably 
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and since 
1995 under WTO, have developed only slowly. Limited progress was 
made through the Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations (1973–79) 
in negotiating ‘codes’ to discipline NTBs such as anti-dumping and 
countervailing measures taken by governments against imports and the 
plurilateral ‘Understanding on Government Procurement’. But, with 
reference to the exceptions rule in Article XX of the GATT, there were 
no limitations on the restrictions that importing countries could impose 
on services imports in terms of, for example, licensing and professional 
qualifications, and on goods imports in terms of, for example, technical 
standards and sanitary and phytosanitary import barriers. 
Significantly more progress was made in this respect during the Uruguay 
Round (1986–94) with the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 
and the ‘Technical Barriers to Trade’ and ‘Sanitary and Phytosanitary’ 
agreements. Nevertheless, in the light of subsequent experience, the 
shortcomings of these agreements—particularly regulations limiting 
the supply of traded services; technical standards for manufactured and 
processed food products; and sanitary and phytosanitary regulations 
on imports—have become evident.
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Domestic regulations on licensing, certification and professional 
qualifications are part of the behind-the-border decisions (both at 
governmental and professional association levels) that determine 
international trade flows of traded services. National and/or regional 
divergences in such regulatory decisions produce the NTBs that 
limit trade  flows in services. The domestic regulation article of GATS 
(Article VI) determines that regulatory decisions ‘[shall] not constitute 
unnecessary barriers to trade [and] … [shall] not [be] more burdensome 
than necessary to ensure the quality of the service’ (WTO 1994). 
This  ‘necessity clause’ in GATS is mirrored by a similar provision in 
Article 2 of the Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement that is part of 
the Uruguay Round Agreements of 1994; namely, ‘technical regulations 
shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate 
objective’  (WTO 1994). Similar provisions are also to be found in the 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement of 1994, where Article 5 contains 
a comparable ‘necessity test’ to those in the GATS and the Technical 
Barriers to Trade agreements, as well as a requirement to base import 
restrictions on ‘risk assessment’ to ‘human, animal or plant life and health’ 
(WTO 1994). These agreements also all contain provisions encouraging 
mutual recognition as a solution to regulatory divergences, especially—
it  appears—in circumstances where there is a high level of equivalence 
of regulatory intent.
These principles are all aimed at reining in the NTB effect of regulations 
governing the supply of services, technical standards applying to goods, 
and conditions aimed at limiting import restrictions in defence of sanitary 
and phytosanitary standards. They are ground-breaking provisions, 
clearly aimed at tackling behind-the-border NTBs. In practice, however, 
operationalising them into meaningful multilateral trade rules that can 
be enforced in future trade liberalisation negotiations has proven to be 
a challenging and so far incomplete task. The disciplinary provisions of 
the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement in particular have been the 
subject of 42 separate dispute settlement cases under the tough rules of 
the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding since the conclusion of the 
Uruguay Round (WTO 2014a). So, apart from the use of the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding to put flesh on the bones of the Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary disciplinary provisions, operationalising the ‘necessity 
tests’ of the GATS and Technical Barriers to Trade agreements have not 
proceeded far in WTO. In that light, what may recent FTAs negotiated 
by both the EU and Australia have achieved?
AUSTRALIA, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE NEW TRADE AGENDA 
264
(a) Plurilateral and bilateral
Before answering this question, it is useful to briefly discuss the respective 
experiences of the EU and Australia, and of Australia and New Zealand, 
in seeking to deal with their regulatory divergences and resulting NTBs. 
In particular, the efforts of EU member states to do so in the context 
of creating the EU single market, of the states of Australia in creating 
a more integrated national entity, and of Australia and New Zealand in 
the context of the Closer Economic Relations (CER) agreement across 
the Tasman Sea.
Compared to the latter two cases, the experience of the EU is certainly 
of longer duration and has, over time, become more complex as the 
organisation grew from six original member states at comparable levels 
of economic development in 1957 to today’s far more economically 
heterogeneous collection of 28 member states. During many years, the 
EU sought to deal with divergent technical product standards within 
individual member states through a painstaking process of harmonising 
standards. Following the Single European Act 1986, the EU shifted its 
focus to an ‘equivalence’ or mutual recognition approach in the creation 
of the single market in the EU during the 1990s. This was largely based 
on the Cassis de Dijon judgment of the European Court of Justice (1979), 
which found that goods lawfully produced in one EU member state 
cannot be banned from sale on the territory of another EU member state, 
even if they are produced with different technical or quality specifications. 
Over time, however, the enlargement of the EU reduced the levels of 
equivalence and trust among member states, and therefore the option 
of automatic acceptance of regulatory heterogeneity. Consequently, the 
EU has moved back towards attempting to fix detailed technical and 
environmental product standards on an EU-wide basis and seeking 
acceptance of its harmonised regulatory standards in FTAs negotiated 
with third countries (Messerlin 2011). 
The experience inside Australia, and also between Australia and New 
Zealand, has been different. Concerned by continuing regulatory 
divergences between the states of Australia on product standards and 
also influenced by the Cassis de Dijon judgment and the EU’s single-
market drive through the 1990s, the Australian government of the day 
implemented the mutual recognition agreement (MRA) between the 
Australian states and territories from 1992, and in 1997 extended this 
to the Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition Arrangement (TTMRA) with 
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New Zealand. The TTMRA therefore became the first international trade 
agreement for the mutual recognition of standards. It covered not only 
product standards (on an unconditional but ‘with exceptions’ basis—
that is, a negative-listing approach) but also the mutual recognition of 
professional qualifications standards between Australia and New Zealand 
(Hussey & Kenyon 2011).
In its continuing efforts to deal with regulatory divergences between 
member states, the EU has embarked on a more recent and hopefully 
more enduring experiment in mutual recognition in its efforts to complete 
the EU single market in the services sector. The EU’s 2006 Services in 
the Internal Market Directive, which aimed originally to implement an 
unconditional form of mutual recognition for a wide range of business 
and professional services across the EU, had a long and difficult gestation 
going back to the mid-1990s.
Member state negotiations over the provisions of the directive coincided 
with the erosion of trust within an expanding EU—to take in a growing 
number of former Warsaw Pact countries—to accept as ‘equivalent’ 
divergent licensing provisions in different member states for a wide range 
of traded business services. The outcome was a compromise based on 
a concept known as mutual evaluation. The mutual evaluation concept 
in the directive is designed to operate as a peer-review process undertaken 
by member state authorities. If the divergent regulation is found to be 
comparable in regulatory intent, mutual recognition must be accorded 
(European Union 2006b). Mutual evaluation is therefore intended to 
operate as a managed form of mutual recognition.
How does the experience of the EU, Australia, and Australia and New 
Zealand in dealing with NTBs (or regulatory divergences) in technical 
standards for goods and in licensing provisions for services—either of the 
unconditional, negative-listing variety demonstrated by the TTMRA or 
the managed mutual evaluation variety present in the EU cross-border 
trade in services directive—relate to the broader application of the mutual 
recognition principle internationally? By granting recognition to the 
technically divergent regulations of another jurisdiction, the certifying 
state is effectively saying that those regulations meet acceptable standards, 
which implies a high level of equivalence of regulatory intent and a high 
level of trust between the jurisdictions. To a significant degree, this is likely 
to be the case between at least those countries that are currently members 
of the OECD. 
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Past experience has shown that there are no significant problems between 
the states in Australia, or between Australia and New Zealand with the 
unconditional, negative-listing mutual recognition approach in both 
the MRA and the TTMRA. There do, however, appear to be problems 
with the mutual recognition of product standards among the 28 member 
states of the EU, mainly related to issues of trust across an increasingly 
economically heterogeneous membership (Messerlin 2011). Hopefully, 
the more managed form of mutual recognition present in the 2006 
Services in the Internal Market Directive of the EU will work more 
effectively for the EU, and even between the EU and its trading partners 
in new-generation FTAs, and not just on services but on product and 
environmental (i.e. sustainable production) standards as well. 
Against this background, what can some of the FTAs negotiated after 
2006 tell us about progress made on liberalising NTBs? These are three 
examples:
1. The EU and Canada reached agreement in CETA on the recognition 
of professional qualifications, which appears to provide a successful 
example of the international application of the unconditional mutual 
recognition principle in so far as it provides for government-to-
government agreements, confirming consensus reached at professional 
levels on the conditions under which mutual recognition can be 
agreed. Guidelines for reaching consensus within specific professions 
are provided in CETA (European Commission 2014). 
2. The Australia–Korea FTA provides for the establishment of 
a  working group on professional services, charged inter alia with 
making recommendations on the mutual recognition of professional 
qualifications between Australia and Korea (DFAT 2014b: Chapter 7, 
Annex A). Similar provisions exist in the Australia–Japan FTA (DFAT 
2014a). These could open the door to the eventual liberalisation of 
professional services trade comparable to that contained in CETA. 
However, as these provisions are formulated in the current agreements 
Australia has negotiated, they are less definitive than the provisions 
in CETA. 
3. All three agreements above provide for cross-border trade in services 
commitments to be made on a negative-listing basis. This represents a 
significant expansion of the ‘national treatment’ commitments so far 
negotiated under GATS, as all tradeable services under these FTAs are 
subject to commitments to maintain the same regulatory treatment 
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on imports as for domestic service providers. In WTO terms, such 
‘bindings’ are considered valuable as parties to the agreement are 
protected (in effect multilaterally and not just bilaterally) from 
discriminatory treatment. Even if there is not a great deal or any actual 
trade liberalisation, this commitment operates as an effective ceiling 
on the NTB effect of regulations impacting on tradeable services.
Outside the areas of services and the scope of the WTO’s Technical 
Barriers to Trade and Sanitary and Phytosanitary agreements, post-
2006 FTAs negotiated by the EU have broken beneficial new ground 
in the liberalisation of other NTBs generated by new trade agenda 
issues. One  example is the chapter on public procurement in CETA. 
The existing plurilateral agreement in the WTO concerns competitive 
tendering of procedures for public procurement contracts. Currently, 
67 WTO member states are either full members or have observer status 
in this WTO agreement. In practice, the tendering procedures of this 
WTO agreement apply primarily to the agencies of central governments 
that are actual signatories to this agreement. The new ground broken by 
CETA is to apply agreed tendering procedures to sub-federal and regional 
government authorities both within the EU and Canada. It therefore 
provides a useful expansion of agreed disciplinary provisions to a broader 
range of public purchasing authorities (European Commission 2014).
Similarly, on investment policy some progress is being made. CETA raises 
the threshold to C$1.5 billion under which foreign direct investment 
from the EU into Canada will no longer be subject to review under the 
Investment Canada Act. In both the FTAs negotiated by Australia with 
Korea and Japan, the threshold under which foreign investments will 
not be subject to prior screening by the Australian Foreign Investment 
Review Board has been raised to A$1 billion. CETA also contains specific 
provisions for the conduct of investor–state dispute settlement (ISDS) 
as well as investment protection rules (Government of Canada 2013). 
On competition policy, CETA incorporates specific competition policy 
provisions relating especially to disciplinary provisions applying to 
monopolies, including monopoly state-owned enterprises. Similarly, 
the EU–Korea FTA contains a competition policy chapter setting out 
competition policy principles governing the conduct of monopolies 
and public enterprises, as well as the control of restrictive business 
agreements and subsidies, transparency, dispute settlement and the 
relationship between the FTA chapter and the provisions of the WTO 
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(European Union 2011: Chapter 11). On product standards issues, the 
EU–Korea FTA made progress through the identification of Korean 
equivalents to the motor vehicle parts standards of the United Nations’ 
Economic Commission for Europe. In the case of electronic goods 
and electrical appliances, the agreement reduced the scope of third-
party certification by implementing the use of ‘supplier’s declaration of 
conformity’. In the EU–Singapore FTA, the chapter by Elms in this book 
finds that Singapore agreed to recognise EU standards and testing regimes 
for cars and car parts and that there was agreement on using international 
standards where possible in the electronics sector. Progress on resolving 
differences in technical barriers to trade more generally appears to have 
been left primarily to future regulatory cooperation within this FTA.
Based on the preliminary assessment above, it is possible to conclude 
that some progress on liberalising NTBs in recent FTAs has been made. 
CETA is the outstanding example. It also appears that more progress 
is being made on services, through negative-listing commitments and 
mutual recognition of qualifications on professional services; investment 
policy; public procurement, through the deepening of commitments to 
open tendering and transparency to sub-national purchasing authorities; 
and possibly also on competition policy, than on the standards and 
licensing NTBs that are the subject of the WTO Technical Barriers to 
Trade agreement and the GATS agreement on services. On standards and 
licensing issues, apart from the limited progress that seems to have been 
made through the harmonisation of divergent product standards in the 
EU–Korea and EU–Singapore FTAs, substantive treatment of divergent 
regulatory standards impacting on goods and services trade appears limited 
to chapters on regulatory cooperation. These chapters provide essentially 
for consultations aimed at encouraging greater convergence between the 
parties on future regulatory decisions expected to impact on trade. 
The experience of both Australia and the EU internally, and their 
respective experience in recent FTA negotiations with others, gives rise to 
expectations that ‘trade friendly’ mutual recognition solutions to the many 
issues of standards and licensing raised above will be worth exploring in 
forthcoming Australia–EU FTA negotiations. The range of problems is 
likely to include mutual recognition of qualifications on traded professional 
services, such as architectural and engineering services; licensing and 
certification requirements on other traded services, including a wide 
range of business services; food, packaging and labelling standards; and 
sustainable production and environmental (e.g. biodiversity) standards; 
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as well as technical standards on a growing range of semi-manufactured 
parts and components that are traded in global supply chains, and motor 
vehicle standards, which are of increasing interest to the EU. Mutual 
recognition solutions along the lines of CETA on professional services 
qualifications could be explored. 
An alternative to mutual recognition could be the more involved managed 
mutual recognition approach envisaged by the EU in, for example, 
the EU’s 2006 Services Directive. As a consequence of this Directive, 
individual member states are permitted to maintain regulations on 
traded services in defence of ‘public policy, public security, public health 
and the protection of the environment’ (Article 16), but only through 
a peer-review process through which it can be demonstrated that such 
measures are ‘non-discriminatory’ against imports and necessary and 
‘proportionate’ to the requirements of the conditions specified (European 
Union 2006b). There is no reason why this managed mutual recognition 
approach should be restricted to tradeable services between the EU 
member states. Its extension to a broader range of regulatory NTBs in 
future FTA negotiations could yield worthwhile results in reducing the 
NTB effects of many standards issues on both goods and services trade.
(b) Multilateral
It is possible to conclude, at least provisionally, that some of the outcomes 
that are emerging from recent FTA negotiations conducted by both the 
EU and Australia in areas such as undertaking services commitments 
on a negative-listing basis, mutual recognition of professional services 
qualifications, public procurement, investment and competition policy 
could well be useful as eventual stepping stones to more effective current 
WTO disciplinary provisions and possibly future WTO negotiations 
on some NTB issues. Nevertheless, this is an issue that requires further 
detailed study. 
In considering how NTBs related to regulatory divergences on traded 
goods and services could be liberalised multilaterally, it may be helpful to 
consider existing WTO agreements. In particular, how operationalisation 
of the ‘necessity clauses’ of both GATS (Article  VI) and the Technical 
Barriers to Trade agreement (Article  2) could be a  stepping stone to 
stronger WTO rules and future multilateral trade liberalisation. 
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Progress might be made (as indicated above) by the wider use of the mutual 
evaluation approach to a more managed form of mutual recognition in 
reducing the NTB effect of regulatory divergences on technical standards 
for goods and services. Progress has already been made with the mutual 
recognition agreement on professional services qualifications in CETA 
and GATS, while both the WTO Technical Barriers to Trade and WTO 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary agreements have their separate provisions on 
according equivalence or mutual recognition wherever feasible. However, 
as noted above, mutual recognition solutions to problems of technical 
barriers to trade generated by the new trade agenda rely on high levels of 
equivalence of regulatory aims and objectives, and even more so on a high 
level of trust in the regulatory governance of different trading partners. 
Mutual recognition solutions will therefore always be problematic where 
these elements are lacking. What other options might be available, 
therefore, for use between trade partners that are part of a broader, 
more heterogeneous group in the context of plurilateral or multilateral 
discussions?
One obvious option would be to attempt to arrive at a set of ‘horizontal’ 
disciplinary provisions that expand the provisions of GATS and possibly 
the WTO Technical Barriers to Trade agreement. In relation to GATS, 
such work would be aimed at developing criteria relating to licensing, 
qualifications and technical standards requirements in an effort to 
operationalise the necessity test of GATS. Work on this task has in fact 
been conducted within WTO for some years now, but without yielding 
useful results. The horizontal disciplinary provisions route therefore does 
not appear to present well as a viable option. 
A more productive option could be through the Trade in Services 
Agreement (TiSA) negotiations that are currently taking place in Geneva. 
TiSA is a negotiation between 53 developed and developing members 
of WTO (counting the 28 members states of the EU separately) aimed 
at the further liberalisation of trade in services. Negotiations began in 
April 2013 to seek an agreement that is compatible with GATS and that 
will ‘support and feed back into multilateral trade negotiations’ (DFAT 
2015b: 18). As well as arriving at additional commitments across ‘all 
services sectors’, TiSA aims at developing new disciplinary provisions 
(trade rules) on, inter alia, ‘domestic regulation to ensure regulatory 
settings do not operate as a barrier to trade in services’ (DFAT 2015b: 18). 
According to the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
‘positive progress’ has been made on developing new trade rules on 
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domestic regulation at recent rounds of TiSA negotiations in 2014 and 
2015 (DFAT 2015c). This could be a promising sign. By November 
2016, 21 negotiating rounds had been held but agreement had not yet 
been reached.
A still more fruitful option, and one for which there is precedence, could be 
the ‘sectoral’ or vertical approach. The existing stand-out example here is 
the WTO’s 1998 Reference Paper on Basic Telecoms. It sets out common 
guidelines for a regulatory framework aimed at supporting the transition 
of the telecommunications sector from state monopolies to a competitive 
international market. These principles encompass competitive safeguards, 
interconnection, universal service, allocation and use of scarce resources, 
and the existence of independent regulators unencumbered by government 
controls. Some 60 WTO members are signatories to this reference paper. 
While the paper is as much about competition policy as it is about setting 
a regulatory framework for the telecommunications sector, it does provide 
a model of regulatory guidelines and best practice that could be adapted 
to the needs of other traded services on a sectoral basis applying across the 
broad spectrum of WTO membership (WTO 2014b). 
Another example is a separate sectoral agreement in the information 
technology (IT) sector: the WTO’s 1996 Information Technology 
Agreement (ITA), which was recently renegotiated and expanded. The 53 
WTO members involved in the ITA negotiations have agreed to eliminate 
tariffs on a most-favoured-nation (MFN) basis on IT products, which 
currently account for 10 per cent of global trade. The new agreement also 
includes a commitment to identify solutions to NTBs in the IT sector 
(WTO 2015b). 
New disciplinary provisions being negotiated in the TiSA process also 
include financial services, information and communications technology 
services, professional services, maritime transport services, air transport 
services, delivery services, energy services and public procurement. New 
opportunities for sectoral regulatory frameworks of broader plurilateral 
and multilateral application may therefore also emerge from this process. 
A final option that might be considered could be an attempt to develop 
conceptual tools on the operation of standards of goods, licensing 
provisions and qualifications conditions in services that may be utilised 
on a case-by-case basis; in particular by groupings of countries that are 
at different stages of economic development and that span different parts 
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of the world. This approach could have linkages to the mutual evaluation 
concept in the EU’s 2006 Services Directive and to the principles of non-
discrimination, necessity and proportionality used in developing the EU’s 
single market in goods and services. Peer review, efforts to encourage 
equivalence and build trust, as well as research into appropriate dispute 
settlement options could be a part of this current outlier option for seeking 
to deal with the NTB effect of divergences in standards and licensing 
arrangements that apply to traded goods and services.
Conclusion
Over the last more than 20 years the new trade agenda has become the 
focus of trade liberalisation. Bilateral and plurilateral agreements are 
increasingly aimed at liberalising behind-the-border regulatory NTBs that 
impact on services trade (such as licensing and certification requirements); 
trade in goods, particularly trade in semi-manufactures within global 
supply chains (divergent technical standards); foreign direct investment 
flows; public purchasing tender processes; and competition policy issues.
The EU and Australia are pursuing similar objectives in FTA 
negotiations.  The outcome of the GATT Uruguay Round achieved 
much to defuse the long-standing conflict over agricultural trade 
policy. This outcome, together with accompanying domestic economic 
reforms, resulted in the EU and Australia emerging as partners. Both 
continue to pursue further multilateral trade liberalisation in relation 
to manufactures, services and the full range of new trade agenda issues. 
Australia and the EU were partners pursuing a new round of multilateral 
trade negotiations that opened in 2002 at the WTO Doha Round. Both 
have been disappointed with the failure to bring the Doha Round to a 
successful conclusion. A  contributing factor in the failure of Doha to 
achieve acceptable outcomes has been the continuing weakness of GATT 
rules to discipline NTBs that resulted from issues that are now part of the 
new trade agenda.
In light of sustained delays in the completion of the Doha Round, the 
EU and Australia have pursued bilateral and plurilateral FTAs that aim 
(a)  to liberalise NTBs in ways that go beyond the current rules of the 
WTO, and (b) to ensure that these new ‘deep integration’ or ‘GATT-plus’ 
FTAs will be stepping stones rather than stumbling blocks to better WTO 
rules and to more effective multilateral negotiations into the future. 
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Some progress in creating such stepping stones to a better WTO has 
been made in recent FTAs negotiated by both Australia and the EU. The 
standout example to date is CETA between the EU and Canada. But 
stepping stones can also be identified in the FTAs Australia has negotiated 
with Korea and Japan, as well as in the FTAs that the EU has concluded 
with Korea and Singapore. In these agreements, most progress has been 
made in relation to services. For example, through commitments to the use 
of a negative-listing approach and the mutual recognition of professional 
qualifications. Progress has also been made on public procurement by 
expanding competitive tendering to the enterprises of sub-federal and 
regional authorities, on investment, through the relaxation of investment 
restrictions, and through convergence of competition policy principles. 
Much less progress has been made in dealing with the trade impact of 
divergent product standards and licensing requirements. These remain 
major NTBs in goods and services trade. For the most part, signatory 
countries rely on regulatory cooperation to deal with these issues in order 
to overcome future problems.
Of the possible future solutions in this respect, mutual recognition 
remains the clearest and simplest instrument for dealing with diverging 
standards and licensing requirements in a way that accommodates already 
existing agreements in WTO. This is underlined by the EU’s experience 
with the creation of the single market, and Australia’s experience with 
the creation of the 1992 mutual recognition agreement between the 
Australian states, and the subsequent extension of the principle to New 
Zealand under the Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition Agreement, as this 
chapter has argued. 
The chapter also stressed that mutual recognition requires high levels of 
equivalence of regulatory intent, capacity and trust. These conditions are 
not always present between potential FTA partners and may need to be 
nurtured. However, as this chapter has argued, strong foundations for 
the underlying requirements of mutual recognition exist in the current 
trade and business relations between Australia and the EU. With the 
required will and effort, it seems likely that negotiations towards an 
Australia–EU FTA will make better progress on mutual recognition 
solutions to divergent standards and licensing NTBs than has been the 
case in the other FTAs that they have recently negotiated. A significant 
conclusion of this chapter is therefore that an Australia–EU FTA is likely 
to be a significant stepping stone to better WTO rules and outcomes into 
the future.
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This chapter also canvassed mechanisms through which WTO-friendly 
solutions applicable to a broader range of WTO members might be found 
to behind-the-border NTBs. It raised options to resolving this, including 
horizontal solutions, the most promising of which is the TiSA negotiation 
on services trade liberalisation between 53 developed and developing 
countries currently being pursued in a WTO context. Vertical or sectoral 
approaches also merit attention, as the discussion of the Reference Paper 
on Basic Telecoms and the agreement to liberalise information technology 
trade indicated. 
Finally, the chapter has argued that scope exists for further research into 
the ways in which the principles that underlie existing WTO agreements 
for the purpose of disciplining NTBs—such as ‘non-discrimination’, 
‘necessity’ and ‘proportionality’—could be defined and developed into 
conceptual tools that would be of more practical use in future trade 
negotiations aimed at liberalising behind-the-border NTBs. All these 
options for the development of mechanisms for liberalising NTBs merit 
further attention, consideration and research.
As a postscript to this chapter and to the book as a whole, the UK voted 
in a national referendum on 23 June 2016 to leave the EU. The UK 
implemented Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union (the exit clause) 
that started a two-year period of negotiations on the terms of its departure 
from the EU on 28 March 2017. Whatever the outcomes of this process 
will be, the opportunities remain for Australia and the EU to be partners 
in advancing the new trade agenda. 
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Andriessen Assurance – 1985 guarantee by EC Agriculture Commissioner 
that the EC would not use export subsidies to promote European beef 
exports in Australia’s Asian markets
anti-dumping – under the 1994 WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement, 
signatory countries can take retaliatory actions in substantiated cases 
of an exporter selling goods below the home market price or cost 
of production
behind-the-border trade barriers – measures that are not tariffs but 
restrict or impede international trade, such as labelling requirements, 
environmental regulations, rules of origin, etc.
bilateral investment treaties – agreements establishing the terms 
and  conditions for private investment by nationals and companies 
of signatory countries. See foreign direct investment
change in tariff classification – pertaining to rules of origin, a product 
that has undergone significant transformation and as a result changed 
tariff classification is said to have originated in the country where that 
transformation occurred
Codex Alimentarius – established by Food and Agriculture Organisation 
and the World Health Organisation in 1963 to develop harmonised 
international food standards that protect consumer health and promote 
fair practices in food trade
conformity assessment – testing procedures to ensure that products 
are manufactured in conformity with national technical standards. 
Countries entering into a ‘Conformity Assessment’ agreement 
mutually accept each other’s testing outcomes
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Directorate-General for Trade of the European Commission – EU 
Directorate-General responsible for relations between the EU and 
the rest of the world involving trade of goods, services, intellectual 
property and investment 
Dispute Settlement Body (WTO) – WTO agency adjudicating trade 
disputes between WTO members
Doha development agenda – since 2001, the current round of multilateral 
trade negotiations to lower trade barriers under WTO auspices
Doha Round – see above
duty drawback – arrangement between countries that allows exporting 
firms to obtain a refund of customs duties paid on imported goods 
where those have been processed for export
EU Single Market – a single market of EU member countries based on 
arrangements that seek to guarantee the free movement of goods, 
capital, services and people
Eurozone – monetary union of 19 of the 28 EU member states that 
use the euro (€) as their common currency and sole legal tender
everything but arms – 2001 EU initiative under which all imports into 
the EU from UN-specified least developed countries are duty and 
quota-free, except for armaments
feed-in tariff – policy instrument to integrate electricity from renewable 
energy sources into the electricity grid through payments to producers
foreign direct investment (FDI) – investment flows by companies 
between countries for the purpose of establishing controlling 
ownership in a business enterprise in a host country
geographic indications – specifications of the geographical origin 
or products as indications of their quality or reputation
Global Europe strategy – 2006 EU communication signalling the intent 
of member countries to increase trade liberalisation beyond existing 




Global Trade Alert – association of independent organisations that 
monitor and report actions by countries that are likely to discriminate 
against foreign trade
Group of 8 (G8) – refers to the group of eight highly industrialised 
nations: France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Japan, the 
United States, Canada and Russia
Health Check reform – 2009 reform of the EU common agricultural 
policy (CAP) to modernise, simplify and streamline the CAP and 
remove restrictions on farmers
Informational Technology Agreement (ITA) – plurilateral 1996 
agreement within the WTO framework to lower taxes and tariffs on 
information technology products traded between signatory countries
Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements (IPPAs) – bilateral 
agreements for the promotion and protection of mutual investments 
by contracting parties
mega-FTA – free trade agreement between more than two countries 
that together contribute a large share to global gross domestic product 
(GDP) and/or to global international trade
mega-regional – deep integration partnerships between countries in 
a global region that together contribute a large share to global GDP 
and/or to global international trade
Mortimer Review – 2008 Australian Government Review of Export 
Policies and Programs 
most favoured nation (MFN) treatment – signatories to WTO 
agreements cannot discriminate between other signatories and are 
required to give all those trade partners equal treatment
multi-annual financial framework – imposes limits on annual EU 
budgets, both total and for different policy areas, when the EU enters 
legally binding obligations of five years or more
multilateral(ism) – multiple countries cooperating on a given issue
multiparty FTA – free trade agreement that includes more than two 
countries, as opposed to a bilateral FTA
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mutual recognition agreement (MRA) – agreement by which two 
or more countries agree to accept each other’s divergent technical 
standards on products or services mutually traded
mutual recognition of professional qualifications – agreement under 
which two or more countries agree to accept divergent technical 
requirements on mutually traded professional services
negative list – listing of service sectors that retain restrictions in free trade 
agreements, or a listing of economic sectors that remain prohibited 
or restricted for FDI in investment agreements; non-listed sectors are 
unrestricted
new-generation FTAs – FTAs that include commitments well beyond 
current obligations under WTO, particularly in areas such as the 
elimination of non-tariff barriers, liberalisation of services trade and 
investment, competition policy
new trade agenda – or ‘deep trade agenda’, refers to new and growing 
trends in international business, such as internationalisation of supply 
chains, growth of services trade, FDI, and liberalisation of non-tariff 
trade barriers
plurilateral agreement – legal or trade agreement between more than 
two countries
‘plus’ (e.g. ‘WTO-plus FTAs’; ‘GATT-plus FTAs’) – liberalisation 
outcomes of new-generation trade agreements that aim to surpass 
current commitments under WTO
positive list – listing of service sectors that open to foreign trade in free 
trade agreements, or a listing of economic sectors that are open to FDI 
in investment agreements; non-listed sectors remain restricted
producer support estimates – indicator of the annual transfers from 
consumers and taxpayers to support agricultural producers, arising 
from policy measures
protectionism – economic policy of limiting international trade through 
e.g. tariffs on imported goods, restrictive quotas, and a variety of non-
tariff trade barriers 
regional FTA – see multiparty FTA
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rules of origin – criteria needed to determine the country of origin 
of a product
sanitary and phytosanitary measures – measures to protect humans, 
domestic, animals and plants from diseases, pests or contaminants
specific trade concern – concerns relating to specific measures imposed 
or  maintained by WTO members brought by one or more trade 
partners to the WTO Technical Barriers to Trade Committee
tariff – trade policy instrument, a tax imposed on imported goods 
and services
tariff rate quota – trade policy instrument, a higher tariff is imposed 
on imported goods beyond a quota threshold
third-party countries – those countries that are not signatories 
to a particular trade agreement between two or more other countries
Tokyo Round – seventh round of multilateral GATT negotiations 
1973–79 resulting in reductions of multilateral tariffs
Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) – proposed international trade 
treaty between 23 parties, including the EU, aiming to liberalise 
international trade in services between signatory countries
trade liberalisation – removal or reduction of national restrictions 
or barriers on the international exchange of goods and services
trade-weighted effective exchange rate index – index of the foreign 
exchange rate of a country’s currency, corrected for changes in the 
price level in that country relative to the price levels in countries that 
are its most important trade partners 
trade-creating – increase in international trade
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
agreement – 1994 international agreement under the WTO setting 
minimum standards for intellectual property regulation applying 
to nationals of other WTO member countries and bringing TRIPS 
issues into the purview of WTO dispute settlement procedures
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Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition Arrangement (TTMRA) – 
non-treaty agreement between Australia and the Australian states 
and New  Zealand covering sale of goods and mutual recognition 
of divergent goods standards and professional qualifications
Uruguay Round – eighth round of multilateral GATT negotiations 
1986–1994 comprising 123 countries and resulting in several 
agreements to reduce trade barriers on goods and services and 
establish WTO
Warsaw Pact (countries) – a collective defence treaty between the Soviet 
Union and seven socialist countries in Central and Eastern Europe in 
existence during 1955–91
WTO Round – intergovernmental negotiations through the WTO 
to  reach multilateral agreement on liberalisation of international 
trade. The Doha Round since 2001 is the current round
WTO-plus – negotiated commitments in addition to those in existing 
multilateral agreements and rules placed on a country newly acceding 
to WTO, or FTAs in which parties commit themselves to trade 
liberalisation outcomes surpassing current commitments under WTO 
(see ‘plus’)
